Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd
(Before Lord Justice BUCKLEY, Lord Justice LAWTON and Sir JOHN PENNYCUICK)
Contract for sale of commercial building at redevelopment value of £1.7m signed day before news of listing of property as building of architectural or historic interest–Purchasers stuck with premises now worth perhaps £200,000–Listing ‘an inherent risk in all properties’–Leave to appeal granted
This was an
appeal by Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd from a judgment of
Plowman V-C dismissing the company’s action for rescission of a contract of
purchase of a former whisky-bottling factory and bonded warehouse at 33
Commercial Road, Tower Hamlets, London E1, from the respondents, John Walker
& Sons Ltd, for £1,700,000, and granting the respondents an order for
specific performance. Plowman V-C’s judgment was reported at (1975) 235 EG 565,
[1975] 2 EGLR 145.
Mr A J
Balcombe QC and Mr B K Levy (instructed by Nabarro, Nathanson) appeared for the
appellants, and Mr H E Francis QC and Mr J M Chadwick (instructed by Coward
Chance) represented the respondents.
Contract for sale of commercial building at redevelopment value of £1.7m signed day before news of listing of property as building of architectural or historic interest–Purchasers stuck with premises now worth perhaps £200,000–Listing ‘an inherent risk in all properties’–Leave to appeal granted
This was an
appeal by Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd from a judgment of
Plowman V-C dismissing the company’s action for rescission of a contract of
purchase of a former whisky-bottling factory and bonded warehouse at 33
Commercial Road, Tower Hamlets, London E1, from the respondents, John Walker
& Sons Ltd, for £1,700,000, and granting the respondents an order for
specific performance. Plowman V-C’s judgment was reported at (1975) 235 EG 565,
[1975] 2 EGLR 145.
Mr A J
Balcombe QC and Mr B K Levy (instructed by Nabarro, Nathanson) appeared for the
appellants, and Mr H E Francis QC and Mr J M Chadwick (instructed by Coward
Chance) represented the respondents.
Giving
judgment, BUCKLEY LJ said that the property in question was advertised by the
vendors’ agents as being ‘for sale for occupation or redevelopment.’ Amalgamated made an offer of £1.7m, and on
July 19 1973 the agents wrote accepting this figure subject to contract.
Inquiries were made by Amalgamated in the ordinary way about the existence of
any compulsory purchase orders or any listing of the property as being of
architectural or historic interest. A negative answer was given on August 8.
The contract was signed on September 25, and one day later, the Department of
the Environment wrote to John Walker notifying them that the property had been
included in a list of buildings of architectural or historic interest compiled
in accordance with section 54 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 and
that the list was about to be given legal effect. On September 27 the list was
signed on behalf of the Secretary of State. The evidence about the method of
listing the property was startling. A survey of properties was made by an
investigator, a civil servant, who suggested that certain buildings should be
listed, and the survey was then forwarded to another civil servant, Miss
Dorothy Price, who prepared the list to be signed by the head of the department
concerned. It was her responsibility to decide which properties should go into
the list, although she disclaimed any professional expertise in the matter. In
this case there was a delay of one month in the typing pool. The head of the
department then signed the list, relying on Miss Price’s selection. It was very
strange that decisions of that kind should be taken without more careful
vetting. In other areas there was apparently a blanket listing, leaving the
merits to be decided at a later stage when planning permission was sought.
The
Vice-Chancellor had found that the property with no redevelopment potential was
worth £1.5m less than the contract price, so that the effect of the listing of
the property was to make it worth £200,000. On December 12 1973 Amalgamated issued
a writ against John Walker claiming rescission of the contract on the ground of
common mistake, on the basis that both parties believed at the time of the
execution of the agreement that the property was suitable for and capable of
redevelopment; that the purchase-price demonstrated that fact; and that the
listing had prevented or substantially reduced the redevelopment of the
property, or alternatively, that the listing had frustrated the purposes of the
contract. Amalgamated sought a declaration that the agreement was void and of
no effect, or ought not to be enforced. On December 14 John Walker issued a
writ against Amalgamated seeking specific performance of the contract, alleging
wrongful repudiation and claiming forfeiture of the deposit. The actions were
consolidated. The Vice-Chancellor held first that there was no common mistake
of fact. He treated the property as having been listed on September 27, the day
that the head of the department signed the listing on behalf of the Secretary
of State. On the question of frustration, the Vice-Chancellor applied some of
the tests proposed by the House of Lords in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham
Urban District Council [1956] AC 696, and asked whether Amalgamated could
say ‘This was not the bargain we made’ and whether the undertaking, if
performed, would be a different thing from that contracted for. He found no
frustration of the contract proved, and held that Amalgamated were liable to
pay the full purchase-price.
He (his
Lordship) agreed with the Vice-Chancellor’s decision on common mistake. Mr
Balcombe had submitted that there was here a common mistake as to a fact of
fundamental importance, namely, the fact that the property was ripe for
development. As a result of the listing, said counsel, that was not so, and in
consequence the contract ought to be set aside. Mr Balcombe relied on Solle
v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 and Grist v Bailey [1967] Ch
532, and maintained that a common mistake as to the quality of the
subject-matter was sufficient grounds for rescission in equity. However, one of
the matters of which the court must be satisfied before there could be an order
for rescission on the basis of common mistake was that the mistake was in
existence at the date of the contract. Mr Balcombe relied on the date Miss
Price decided to put the property on the list, but that was an administrative
step, and there was still the possibility that something might have happened
before the head of the department signed the document. The day he signed the
list was the crucial date, and that created the legal reality. The only mistake
was as to the expectation of both the parties, who had expected that all they
had to contend with was planning permission. On the question of frustration, he
(his Lordship) was prepared to presume that the doctrine of frustration could
be applied to contracts for the sale of land, but the necessary facts had not
been established in the present case for presuming that the purpose of the
contract had been frustrated. The object of the vendors was to sell the
property at the contract price and154
show good title. They did not warrant that planning permission was obtainable.
No doubt both parties considered that the property could be developed and that
planning permission was obtainable, but the vendors gave no warranty to that
effect.
The risk of a
property being listed as an historic building was an inherent risk in all
properties. The risk might be remote, marginal or substantial. The effect of
listing made the obtaining of planning permission more difficult, and the
developer would have to apply for ‘listed building permission.’ The purchaser of property must carry that
risk, and any loss as a result must lie where it fell. It was not known whether
the listing would have the alleged effect, and perhaps, if listed building
permission were given, development could go ahead. The Vice-Chancellor’s
decision should be upheld and the appeal dismissed.
LAWTON LJ and
SIR JOHN PENNYCUICK gave concurring judgments, and the appeal was accordingly
dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted.