Park Homes – Protected site – Parking – Procedure – Whether FTT having jurisdiction to direct access to mobile home pitch be kept free of obstruction – Appeal allowed
Sandy Balls Park at Fordingbridge in Hampshire was a protected site within the Mobile Homes Act 1983. It was an extensive development with a network of access roads to various communal facilities and a variety of timber and metal mobile homes. The three mobile homes with which this appeal was concerned were grouped together with three other homes surrounding a central gravelled area approached by a gravel drive leading from one of the main tarmacked estate roads. Each home had its own allocated parking area.
The agreement under which the permanent pitches on the park were occupied was in a standard form incorporating an implied term that the occupier should be entitled to quiet enjoyment of the mobile home together with the pitch during the continuance of the agreement. Each occupier was required to observe the Park rules which limited parking for each pitch to two vehicles and stated that: “You must not park on the roads or grass verges or in any way which cause an obstruction to other vehicular access”.
The respondent occupied a home under an agreement to which the 1983 Act applied. She applied to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) for a determination of questions relating to the behaviour of two neighbours, including the obstruction of access to her designated parking area by inconsiderate parking. The respondent complained that the appellant park owner had failed to enforce the Park rules and so had failed to protect her from the nuisance and annoyance of which she complained.
The FTT decided that, although a letter of 1 May 2015 was a sufficient instruction to residents to comply with the Park rules and keep access routes clear, the appellant’s predecessor had subverted that instruction by authorising parking in breach of the licence, in particular the covenant for quiet enjoyment. The FTT determined that the appellant should comply with the implied term providing for quiet enjoyment by ensuring that the shared gravel area leading to, and providing access to, the mobile homes was kept clear at all times. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
(1) A covenant for quiet enjoyment was an agreement by a landlord that a tenant’s lawful possession of land would not be substantially interfered with by the acts of the landlord or those lawfully claiming under the landlord. In principle it gave protection to a tenant against disturbance caused by authorised acts by the tenant of the same landlord in adjoining premises. The covenant for quiet enjoyment was also broken by interruption of the enjoyment by the tenant of adjacent premises held under a common landlord, if the landlord had, in the lease or otherwise, authorised that tenant to do the act which caused the interruption. The same principle applied as between the owner of a protected site under the 1983 Act and the occupiers of pitches on that site, although the relationship between them was licensor and licensee, rather than landlord and tenant: London Borough of Southwark v Mills [1999] UKHL 40; [1999] 3 EGLR 35 applied.
(2) While the letter of 1 May 2015 was sufficient to absolve the appellant of responsibility for parking on the gravelled area between homes, which it had specifically prohibited, the FTT’s finding that the effect of exhibiting a notice authorising parking in a specific area was to encourage an obstruction to the respondent’s access would be upheld. The FTT had the benefit of a site visit and there was material on which the FTT could properly reach that conclusion and no basis on which to interfere with its assessment.
(3) The FTT’s jurisdiction extended to granting remedies consequential on its determination of disputes under section 4(1) of the 1983 Act. Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 provided the power to grant additional remedies. The policy of the legislation was that most mobile homes disputes should be dealt with in tribunals rather than courts because of their greater expertise and accessibility and lower cost. The enhanced powers conferred by section 231A of the 2004 Act were consistent with that policy since they reduced the risk that proceedings to resolve disputes might be required to be commenced in more than one forum. The language of section 4 of the 1983 Act was very broad and the powers conferred by section 231A of the 2004 Act were extensive and expressed in general terms. Therefore, with the exception of disputes over termination, the proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between park home owners and the owners of protected sites in England was the FTT: Elleray v Bourne [2018] UKUT 3 (LC); [2018] PLSCS 6 and Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v Santer [2018] UKUT 30 (LC); [2018] PLSCS 20 followed.
(4) Section 231A(4) of the 2004 Act listed a variety of directions which the FTT might give under the “general power” conferred by section 231A. None of those powers was sufficiently broad to justify an order requiring a park owner to ensure that an access area leading to a pitch was kept clear at all times. Such a direction would be breached if, at any time, the designated area was not kept clear. The only part of section 231A(4) which might arguably provide jurisdiction for an order in those terms was subsection (4)(d), which allowed the making of “directions requiring the establishment, provision or maintenance of any service or amenity in connection with a mobile home, pitch or protected site …”. On the assumption that section 231A(4)(d) of the 2004 Act provided jurisdiction to order that a service or amenity in the nature of a clear access be provided, the order of the FTT was not a proper exercise of that power. The effect of the FTT’s direction was to enlarge, rather than enforce, the owner’s obligation and to make it a guarantor of the good behaviour of other Park residents. The direction was not one which it was within the power of the appellant to comply with, and the owner might find itself in breach of the direction despite not being personally at fault. In principle it would be wrong to make such an order.
Paul Kelly (of Tozers Solicitors) appeared for the appellant; The respondent did not appear and was not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
