Barrs Residential & Leisure Ltd v Pleass Thomson & Co (executors of the estate of Hearn) – Park homes – Succession – Pitch agreement – Deceased occupying mobile home under pitch agreement – Will varied to enable son to succeed to home and pitch agreement – First-tier Tribunal finding neither mobile home nor benefit of pitch agreement passing to son – Appellant appealing – Whether son prohibited from enjoying benefit of pitch agreement – Appeal allowed
The appellant was the owner of a mobile home park at Bristol Hill Park, Shotley Gate, Ipswich, Suffolk, which accommodated mobile homes which were owned and occupied by individuals and stationed on a pitch on the site under the terms of a contract (pitch agreement). The pitch agreement was not a tenancy. The park was a protected site within the Mobile Homes Acts.
The deceased occupied one of the mobile homes on the appellant’s site when he died, leaving a will. The will was later varied with the intention that the deceased’s son, who had not previously been living in the mobile home, would succeed to the home with the benefit of the pitch agreement. A question arose whether that intention had been realised. The appellant was not a party to the deed of variation and did not accept that the deeds had the effect claimed by the respondent executor.
The appellant sought a declaration that the son was not entitled to the benefit of the pitch agreement. It contended that, while the son might be the owner of the mobile home as a result of the variation of the will to which he was a party, it did not follow that he was entitled to occupy the mobile home on its current pitch, or on the site at all. The First-tier Tribunal found that neither the mobile home nor the benefit of the pitch agreement had passed to the son and that they both remained part of the deceased’s estate.
The appellant appealed, contending that the mobile home was the property of the deceased’s son but that he could not enjoy the benefit of the pitch agreement. The son had become entitled to the mobile home not “by virtue of the will” under section 3(3)(b) of the 1983 Act, but by virtue of the deed of variation, so that the benefit of the pitch agreement did not enure in his favour.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
(1) The mobile home and the pitch agreement were legally distinct. A mobile home was a chattel and a pitch agreement was a contract. A person might be the owner of a mobile home but not have the benefit of the rights conferred by, or the obligations imposed by, a pitch agreement. Section 2 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 imported into pitch agreements a number of terms which would have effect regardless of any express terms contained in the written agreement.
On the death of a person who was occupying the mobile home at the time of death, the agreement would enure for the benefit of any person residing with them (s.3(3)(a)); or for the benefit of anyone entitled to the mobile home under the deceased’s will or intestacy (section 3(3)(b)), subject to the exceptions in section 3(4)(a) and (b).
(2) In the present case, the mobile home, the moveable structure, belonged to the deceased. It was itself a chattel, and it was alienable by the deceased during his lifetime (with or without the benefit of the pitch agreement) and likewise on his death. However, any disposition of the mobile home with the benefit of the pitch agreement would be effective only if it complied with the mobile homes legislation applicable at the relevant time.
When the deceased died, he was occupying the mobile home as his only or main residence. There was, however, no one residing with him and so the pitch agreement could not be transmitted under section 3(3)(a). The principal asset of the deceased’s estate was the mobile home. The benefit of the pitch agreement was not, as such, an asset of the estate, but, in order to maximise the value of the estate and the mobile home itself, the pitch agreement had to be retained, and its benefit transmitted to the person becoming owner of the mobile home. Section 3(3)(b) was not applicable as it would only apply to pass the benefit and burden of the pitch agreement to the son if he was entitled to the mobile home by virtue of the deceased’s will, which did not make a specific legacy of the mobile home.
(3) When the FTT concluded that, as there had been no valid assignment (of both home and pitch agreement), both agreements remained assets of the estate, it made an incorrect assumption that the two had to remain (and stand or fall) together. The FTT appeared to elide the mobile home and the pitch agreement and did not consider the possibility that they might be treated separately. Its reasoning did not give sufficient weight to the terms of the deed which assigned “all rights and interests in the mobile home to the son by way of inheritance” after he agreed to purchase it for £30,000.
On all the evidence, the transfer of the chattel comprising the mobile home to the son was effective and he became its owner. The mobile homes legislation did not regulate the transfer of the mobile home as a chattel itself, and there was nothing in the 1983 Act, or any of the other legislation, which imposed any specific requirements or restrictions on the transfer of the mobile home.
(4) There was no contemporaneous assignment of the benefit of the pitch agreement. But there was nothing in the legislation which provided that a failure to assign the pitch agreement had any effect on the transfer of the mobile home itself. It followed that, although the son became the owner of the mobile home as a result of the deed of assignment, he could not go into occupation, nor could he alienate (sell or give) the mobile home with the benefit of the pitch agreement. The FTT was wrong to declare that neither the mobile home nor the benefit of the pitch agreement had been transferred or assigned, and that both therefore remained vested in the estate of the deceased.
Guy Adams (instructed by Apps Legal Ltd) appeared for the appellant; the respondents did not appear and were not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
