Town and country planning – Planning permission – National planning policy framework – Government policy against new isolated homes in countryside – Inspector appointed by secretary of state allowing appeal against refusal of planning permission to build new homes on site of former agricultural buildings – High Court upholding decision – Whether inspector misinterpreting and misapplying government policy – Appeal dismissed
The appellant local authority appealed against a High Court order dismissing its application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging the decision of an inspector appointed by the first respondent secretary of state allowing appeals by the second and third respondent developers, respectively under section 174 and section 78 of the 1990 Act. The second respondent’s section 78 appeal was against the appellant’s refusal of an application for planning permission for the erection of two detached single-storey dwellings on the sites of two agricultural buildings with landscaping on land to the east of Lower Green Road, Blackmore End, Wethersfield in Essex. The site was in the village but outside the settlement boundary defined in the emerging development plan. Two pre-fabricated agricultural buildings on the site had previously been demolished. The third respondent’s section 174 appeal was against an enforcement notice issued by the appellant against an alleged breach of planning control on the same site, involving the demolition of a cattle shed and the partial erection of a single-storey building, the laying of footings and a concrete base.
The appellant had refused planning permission on the basis that the site lay within an area of countryside beyond any defined settlement boundaries where there were limited facilities so that the development failed to accord with para 55 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), which provided that new isolated homes in the countryside were to be avoided unless there were special circumstances. The inspector found that, since there were a number of dwellings near the site, the development would not result in new isolated homes in the countryside, and consequently granted planning permission. The High Court upheld that decision, finding that the word “isolated” should be given its ordinary objective meaning of “far away from other places, buildings or people; remote” so that the inspector had correctly understood the policy in para 55 of the NPPF: see [2017] EWHC 2743 (Admin).
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) The policy in para 55 was expressed in general and unprescriptive terms. It identified broad principles and indicated a broad approach. The policy indicated to local authorities, in very broad terms, how they ought to go about achieving the aim of promoting sustainable development in rural areas. The use of the verb “avoid” in the third sentence of para 55 indicated a general principle, not a hard-edged presumption. The policy explicitly concerned the location of new housing development. The first sentence of para 55 told authorities that housing should be “located” where it would enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities. The concept of the “vitality” of such a community was wide, and undefined. But it showed that the policy saw a possible benefit of developing housing in a rural settlement with no, or relatively few, services of its own. The third sentence of the paragraph enjoined authorities to avoid “new isolated homes in the countryside”. That was a distinction between places. The contrast was explicitly and simply a geographical one. Taken in the context of the preceding two sentences, it simply differentiated between the development of housing within a settlement, or “village”, and new dwellings that would be “isolated” in the sense of being separate or remote from a settlement.
(2) Under the policy, as a general principle, the aim of promoting “sustainable development in rural areas” would be achieved by locating new dwellings within settlements and by avoiding “new isolated homes in the countryside”. The examples of “special circumstances” given in the policy illustrated particular circumstances in which granting planning permission for an isolated dwelling in the countryside might be desirable or acceptable. But it was plain that the concept of concentrating additional housing within settlements was seen as generally more likely to be consistent with the promotion of “sustainable development in rural areas” than building isolated dwellings elsewhere in the countryside. Settlements were the preferred location for new housing development in rural areas. Furthermore, the adjective “isolated” was generally used to describe a location. In its particular context in para 55, the word “isolated” in the phrase “isolated homes in the countryside” simply connoted a dwelling that was physically separate or remote from a settlement. Whether a proposed new dwelling was, or was not, “isolated” in that sense was a matter of fact and planning judgment for the decision-maker in the particular circumstances of the case. The language of para 55 was entirely unambiguous, and there was no need to resort to other statements of policy, either in the NPPF itself or elsewhere, that might shed light on its meaning.
(3) As the judge acknowledged, a policy directed to enhancing and maintaining the “vitality” of rural communities was a policy that embraced the “social” dimension of sustainable development. To restrict the concept of an isolated home to one that was isolated from services and facilities would be to deny the policy’s support for, and turn it against, proposed dwellings that could contribute to social sustainability because of their proximity to other homes. That seemed contrary to the aim of the policy to maintain and enhance the vitality of rural communities and would diminish the acknowledged benefit of development in one settlement supporting services in another. The inspector made no error of law, and the judge was right to uphold his decision. The judge’s conclusions were sound and her understanding of the policy in para 55 was correct.
Ashley Bowes (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard LLP) appeared for the appellant; Stephen Whale (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared for the first respondent; Paul Shadarevian QC and John Dagg (instructed by Ellisons) appeared for the second and third respondents.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
