Bridle v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions

Claimant applying for planning permission for change of use of goat shed to dwelling – Council refusing to determine application – Claimant appealing – Inspector dismissing appeal – Claimant seeking to quash inspector’s decision – Whether material changes in circumstance since claimant’s previous appeal – Application dismissed In 1997 the claimant purchased land (the appeal site) and applied to Chelmsford Borough Council for planning permission to use a former agricultural building there as a dwelling. His application was refused, and in September 1998 his appeal was dismissed. The claimant subsequently applied to the council for planning permission for a change of use of a former goat shed to a dwelling with associated curtilage. The council failed to determine his planning application within the requisite period, and he appealed to the Secretary of State. In the inspector’s decision letter of January 2000, he stated that the decision letter on the 1998 appeal “had addressed similar matters to the current appeal”. He therefore considered the main issue to be whether there had been any material changes in circumstance since that decision. Although he identified two changes, the inspector concluded that these were not sufficient to justify allowing the claimant’s appeal. Consequently, he dismissed the appeal and planning permission was refused. The claimant applied to quash the inspector’s decision pursuant to section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. In an argument based upon extracts from the Essex draft rural strategy and draft deposit plan, it was submitted that the inspector had erred in stating that the relevant development plan had not been changed between the 1998 and 2000 decision letters. The claimant further contended that the ongoing residential use of the appeal site had become immune from enforcement proceedings, by virtue of section 171B of the 1990 Act, because the use had continued for over 10 years. It was submitted that this constituted a material change in circumstance since the last appeal. Held: The application was dismissed. 1. The documents relied upon by the claimant were policies in the course of preparation, and had not been finalised. Nor had either party put them before the inspector. The inspector could not be required to take account of a draft plan if it was not referred to by any of the parties to the appeal. Accordingly, the plans considered by the inspector were the relevant plans and were the same as those in force at the time of the 1998 decision. 2. The unauthorised residential use had commenced in 1989 and had been the subject of enforcement action in 1991 and 1993 (ie within the time-limits of the 1990 Act). The enforcement notices remained extant. As a result, the claimant could not benefit from any time-limit in the 1990 Act. The claimant appeared in person; James Maurici (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the defendant. Sarah Addenbrooke, barrister