Town and Country Planning Act 1971–‘Stop notice’ under section 90 following enforcement notice complaining about extensive alterations to the greyhound racing track at the Bristol Stadium–Project to make track suitable for motor cycle speedway racing–Criticisms of enforcement notice and stop notice–Whether enforcement notice sufficiently specified the matters alleged to constitute a breach of planning control and whether stop notice sufficiently described the ‘specified operations’–Complaint that enforcement notice referred in general terms to operations on land and then specified some particular operations only–Held that there was no objection to a general description followed by specific matters included in it which were not necessarily exhaustive–As stop notice incorporated the terms of the enforcement notice it was also sufficiently specific–Appeal by stadium dismissed
The present
appeal took the form of a case stated by Bristol magistrates on an information
alleging contravention of a stop notice served on the appellants under section
90 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 in respect of operations affecting
the track at the Bristol Stadium. The appellants were the owner-occupiers of
the stadium and the respondent, John Albert Brown, was the city clerk, Bristol,
who preferred the information.
G Bartlett
(instructed by Robbins, Olivey & Lake, agents for Burges, Salmon & Co,
of Bristol) appeared on behalf of the appellants; A Fletcher (instructed by Blyth,
Dutton, Holloway, agents for John Albert Brown, City Clerk’s Offices, Bristol)
represented the respondent.
Giving
judgment, LORD WIDGERY CJ said: This is an appeal by case stated by justices
for the County of Avon in respect of their adjudication as a magistrates’ court
sitting at Bristol. The proceedings in question arose out of an information
preferred on April 15 1977 by the respondent, who is an officer of the planning
authority, against the appellants, who are the owner-occupiers of certain premises
at Bristol, alleging that the appellants had contravened the provisions of a
stop notice served upon them on April 7 1977 under section 90 of the Town and
Country Planning Act 1971, namely that they permitted the carrying out or
continuing of operations at the said premises, being operations alleged in an
enforcement notice served upon them on April 7 1977 under the provisions of
section 87 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, namely widening of and
other alterations to the track including the provision of new foundations.
That is all
somewhat complicated, but the complications of the case in general have been
greatly reduced by the assistance we have had from counsel, and the position
can now be put fairly briefly. The appellants, as I have already indicated, are
the owners and occupiers of land in Bristol, which is described as the Bristol
Stadium. No doubt it is well known to local people because Bristol Rovers play
there, and there is a greyhound track which is already laid and operating on
the area. About the beginning of 1977 there was a further project to adapt the
track to make it suitable for motor bicycles and speedway racing, and it was
this activity which clearly caused the local authority to be concerned about
what was happening. Having discovered what was about to occur, and indeed the
magnitude of the development which was contemplated, the local authority served
an enforcement notice under the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 on April 7
1977. On the same day they served a stop notice under section 90 of the same
Act.
I must pause
for a moment just to consider what those two
thinks that a breach of planning control has taken place has, as a weapon to
prevent a continuance of that activity, to serve an enforcement notice under
section 87 of the Act of 1971. By subsection (6) of section 87 there are
specified the essential features which every enforcement notice must display.
Subsection (6)(a) of section 87 provides:
An
enforcement notice shall specify: (a) the matters alleged to constitute a
breach of planning control; (b) the steps required by the authority to be taken
in order to remedy the breach, that is to say steps for the purpose of
restoring the land to its condition before the development took place or
(according to the particular circumstances of the breach) of securing
compliance with the conditions or limitations subject to which planning
permission was granted. . . .
The local
authority in this case took action on April 7 under that section by serving an
enforcement notice, and the enforcement notice appeared in most respects at all
events to comply with the law, although there is criticism and objection to it
in part. Much of it is in language in what one might describe as common form.
It is addressed to Mr White, who is secretary for the appellants. It sets out
the obligations which arise under section 87 of the Town and Country Planning
Act, which I need not read again in detail. Then it goes on in paragraph 2 to
its real substance and effect.
Paragraph 2
reads:
AND WHEREAS
it appears to the local planning authority that a breach of planning control
has taken place at Bristol Stadium, Eastville, in the City of Bristol
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the premises’) after the end of 1963 in that
development comprising operations on land requiring the consent of the local
planning authority have commenced and no planning application has been received
or permission given by the local planning authority.
The notice
goes on:
Such
operations relate to the track within the Stadium used for greyhound racing
which is now being physically increased in width to form a dual purpose track
for both greyhound racing and in accordance with statements made for motor
cycle speedway racing.
The same
paragraph continues:
The
operations on land referred to include: (i) Widening of and other alterations
to the track including the provision of new foundations and kerbing for the
widened track; (ii) Alterations to the lighting equipment; (iii) Alterations to
the fencing and some of the crush barriers the latter having been set back
behind their previous line to enable the track to be widened. . . .
Then as is
required by the section the notice goes on to indicate what has to be done to
put matters right, and this is contained in paragraph 4:
I THEREFORE
HEREBY GIVE YOU NOTICE–(i) that the local planning authority hereby require you
within twenty-eight days after the date on which this enforcement notice takes
effect to take such steps as are necessary to remedy the breach and to restore
the premises to their condition before the development constituting the breach
of planning control set out in para 2 above took place.
The major
argument in this case has been whether the form of that notice satisfies the
statutory requirement because, unless the enforcement notice was something
other than a nullity, the subsequent stop notice would not be effective. The
argument has centred around the requirement of section 87(6) that the
enforcement notice must specify the matters alleged to constitute breach of
control. Complaint is made that this document does not deal with the matter
either in detail or in generalities. In particular, criticism is addressed to
paragraph 2 where there is a reference to the operations on land including
certain specified matters. It is said that, if the operations included certain
matters, they excluded certain matters, and this is said to make the notice
invalid.
For my part,
the answer to this problem is entirely contained in the proposition that you
look at the general activity complained of and not at the individual steps.
Here what is complained of is the conversion and enlargement of the track to
take motor-cycles. That is the development against which all this activity is
directed. In my judgment it is not necessary to describe the development in any
greater detail than that. As Lord Denning said in Miller-Mead v Minister
of Housing and Local Government [1963] 2 QB 196, what is required of
draftsmen of enforcement notices is that they should produce notices which are
fair and understandable and should be notices which an ordinary person can read
and fairly understand what his rights are. It seems to me that, where you get
these forms of development and substantial operations taking place over a
substantial area, it is much better from the point of view of the landowner
that he should be told the general scope of what is complained of about his
conduct and there should not be the sort of detailed arrangement whereby one
looks individually at all the constituent parts of the development.
I think,
therefore, that the general approach of the draftsman of this notice was right,
and I do not think the reference to the operations including certain activities
makes any difference. It is commonplace in legal drafting to provide for a
general description and follow it up with the specific description which may or
may not be comprehensive. One calls to mind the conveyancer’s formula in
dealing with the plan on a conveyance. It is for identification only and not so
as to abridge or enlarge the description hereinbefore contained. In just the
same way the draftsman of this notice who referred to operations being included
in the notice was, I think, seeking to assist by identifying detailed matter as
far as it goes but leaving the generality of the effect of the notice in
general terms.
In my
judgment, therefore, there is nothing to support the argument that the
enforcement notice is void and that it brings the stop notice down with it. One
must, therefore, turn to the provisions of the Act which deal with the stop
notice because, even if the enforcement notice is valid, it is said on behalf
of the appellants that the stop notice is not valid.
The stop
notice is a feature of section 90, which provides:
Where in
respect of any land the local planning authority have served an enforcement
notice, they may at any time before the notice takes effect serve a further
notice (in this Act referred to as a ‘stop notice’) referring to, and having
annexed to it a copy of, the enforcement notice and prohibiting any person on
whom the stop notice is served from carrying out or continuing any specified
operations on the land, being operations either alleged in the enforcement
notice to constitute a breach of planning control or so closely associated
therewith as to constitute substantially the same operations.
The stop
notice in this case strictly followed the wording of that section. It is quite
brief and it recites, first of all, the service of the enforcement notice. It
recites that the local planning authority have power to issue a stop notice.
The effective part comes here:
I THEREFORE
HEREBY GIVE YOU NOTICE that the local planning authority hereby prohibit you
from carrying out or continuing the operations at the premises being operations
alleged in the enforcement notice to constitute a breach of planning control or
any other operations so closely associated therewith as to constitute substantially
the same operations including further alterations to the lighting system, the
track or crush barriers and any alterations to the position of the goalposts.
It is accepted
by counsel, Mr Bartlett, for the appellants that he cannot, on the facts as
found, pursue any argument directed specifically to the goalposts, and his
argument on this part of the case, if I have understood it, is this. He says
that section 90(1) expressly refers to specified operations, and he says that
when you look at the stop notice there are in fact no specified operations.
Hence, says he, even if the enforcement notice is valid, the stop notice falls
down on the basis that it has not described specific operations. The answer to
that was supplied in the course of argument to my satisfaction at all events,
and it was Eveleigh LJ, I think, who
of the enforcement notice, then a deficiency of particularity in the stop
notice may be validated and cured by the fact that the language of the
enforcement notice can be relied upon.
That seems to
me to be a perfectly sensible answer, and I am prepared to adopt it. Therefore,
in my judgment, none of the matters raised before us has substance, and I would
dismiss the appeal.
EVELEIGH LJ
and WOOLF J agreed.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
