Land without site licence used by gypsies without permission from owners–Nature of ‘reasonable steps’ to be taken by owners to evict occupiers–Physical force not required–Legal action may be, and justices should remember the new procedure in order 113, RSC, but everything depends on the facts of each case–Owners who failed to go to law absolved by the magistrates–Council’s appeal fails
This was an
appeal by way of case stated from a decision by Redditch justices on June 26
1974 dismissing an information preferred by the appellants, Bromsgrove District
Council, against the respondents, Elsie and Beatrice Carthy, of Tamworth,
Staffordshire, alleging that as joint occupiers of land at Wapping Lane,
Beoley, Worcestershire, they permitted it to be used as a caravan site without
a licence, contrary to the requirements of the Caravan Sites and Control of
Development Act 1960.
Mr R Sears
(instructed by Sharpe, Pritchard & Co, agents for the clerk to the council)
appeared for the appellants, and Mr B Healy (instructed by Argyle & Sons,
of Tamworth) represented the respondents.
Giving
judgment, LORD WIDGERY said that the respondents’ land was not accessible by
public transport and they did not have any transport of their own. They
therefore employed a local agent to administer the land on their behalf. There
was no caravan site licence for the land, and none had been applied for. A
number of caravans belonging to gypsies, between one and eight in number, had
been parked on the land since August 1973. The respondents found this out and
instructed their agent to remove the caravans. The agent did his best on the
spot. He went to the site and tried to persuade the gypsies to leave. The
justices found that he tried all reasonable means to get the gypsies to leave,
though he drew the line at physical force. The respondents did not take legal
advice with a view to evicting the gypsies, but they did nothing positive to
indicate that they
put up. A feature which had been mentioned in the case was that the
respondents’ agent had tried to get planning permission to build a dwelling on
the land, but this had been refused by the local authority. It was said that if
the respondents had been granted planning permission they would have taken more
steps to get the gypsies off the land. The justices found that although the
respondents had not resorted to proceedings for an injunction they had taken
all reasonable steps to get the caravans off the land, and they (the justices)
dismissed the information. The council appealed.
In deciding a
case of this kind, one must have regard to what steps the occupier might
reasonably have taken. Failure to take steps that were unreasonable did not
amount to permitting, and it was the justices who were entitled to decide what
was reasonable and what was not. Clearly the landowner was not required to
resort to physical force; that was not a step the owner could reasonably be
expected to take. However, a failure to take legal action for eviction could
obviously amount to a failure to take reasonable steps, and it was argued that
an owner who failed to take legal steps to evict gypsies must be held to be
permitting their occupation. He (his Lordship) thought that that went too far.
Everything must depend on the nature of the case. The prospects of success in
any legal action had to be considered, and the likely cost to the respondents
taken into account. It was no good bringing legal proceedings against a
floating population like gypsies only to find that the people against whom the
legal proceedings were successful were replaced by others. In the present case,
he (his Lordship) had no reason to doubt that the justices applied their minds carefully
to the case, and therefore their judgment must stand. He would add that since
the introduction of order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the procedure
for obtaining possession from squatters and other floating populations had been
made a great deal easier than it was; when the question of reasonable steps
came up, notice should be taken of the new proceedings when considering what
steps were reasonable. In this case the justices did not consider the new
order, but he (Lord Widgery) thought it likely that if they had, they would
have come to the same decision, and in those circumstances he would dismiss the
appeal.
ASHWORTH and
BRIDGE JJ agreed, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed.
