Landlord and tenant — Lease or licence — Legal capacity to grant tenancies — Housing trust holding temporary housing accommodation as licensee — Whether housing trust capable of granting tenancy — Whether tenancy granted — Whether tenancy by estoppel relevant approach
Pursuant to a licence agreement dated 27 March
1986 the respondent housing trust had the use of a block of flats to provide
temporary housing accommodation. A local authority owned the block; by reason
of section 32 of the Housing Act 1985 it would have been ultra vires for
the authority to grant the trust a tenancy. The licence agreement prohibited
the trust from granting tenancies. By an agreement dated 31
the trust permitted the appellant to occupy a flat in the block under what was
called a weekly licence. The appellant brought proceedings claiming that the
trust was in breach of the repairing obligations implied by section 11 of the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 into all leases of dwellings of less than seven
years. The trust then served a notice to quit on the appellant and claimed a
declaration that he held a licence and not a tenancy. The Court of Appeal
dismissed an appeal by the appellant against the decision of the county court,
which had decided that the appellant was only a licensee. The appellant
appealed.
allowed. The meaning of an agreement as to the extent of possession that it
grants depends on the intention of the parties, objectively ascertained by
reference to the language and relevant background. The agreement, construed
against the relevant background, plainly gave the appellant a right to
exclusive possession. The circumstances that the trust was a responsible
landlord performing socially valuable functions; that it had agreed not to
grant tenancies; that the appellant had agreed that he was not to have a
tenancy; and that the trust had no estate out of which it could grant one, were
not circumstances that would make an agreement to grant exclusive possession
something other than a tenancy. The agreement between the appellant and the
trust was a lease within the meaning of section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant
Act 1985. The appellant’s case did not depend upon establishing a tenancy by
estoppel, but upon the legal agreement he had and its legal effect.
The following cases are
referred to in this report.
Bruton v London
& Quadrant Housing Trust [1998] QB 834; [1998] 3 WLR 438; [1997] 4 All
ER 970; [1997] 2 EGLR 91; [1997] 50 EG 87; (1997) 75 P&CR D1
Family Housing Association v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 779; [1990] 1 All ER 385; [1990] 1 EGLR
82; [1990] 24 EG 118, CA
Lewisham Borough Council v Roberts [1949] 2 KB 608; [1949] 1 All ER 815; (1949) 65
TLR 423
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries v Matthews [1950] 1 KB 148; sub nom Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries v Matthews 65 TLR 655; [1949] 2 All ER
724; (1949) 154 EG 352
Morton v Woods
(1869) LR 4 QB 293
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tanger [1976] 1 WLR 989; [1976] 3 All ER
570; [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 621, HL
Street v Mountford
[1985] AC 809; [1985] 2 WLR 877; [1985] 2 All ER 289; [1985] 1 EGLR 128;
(1985) 274 EG 821, HL
Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288
This was an appeal by
Gary Bruton from a decision of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his
appeal from a decision of Judge James in Lambeth County Court, who had
determined a preliminary issue in favour of the respondent, London &
Quadrant Housing Trust, in proceedings by the appellant for the enforcement of
implied repairing obligations and by the respondent for possession.
Kim Lewison QC and David Watkinson (instructed by
GL Hockfield & Co) appeared for the appellant; Roger Henderson QC and
Terence Gallivan (instructed by Devonshires) appeared for the respondent
housing trust.
Giving his opinion, LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY said: I have had the advantage of
reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord
Hoffmann, in which he has referred to the facts, the statutory provisions and
the relevant authorities.
Although the agreement between Mr Bruton and the
housing trust is described as a licence, and since the trust itself had only a
licence it may have been intended to be only a licence, on the basis of Street
v Mountford [1985] AC 809* and Westminster City Council v Clarke
[1992] 2
possession and prima facie is a tenancy.
*Editor’s note: Also reported at [1985] 1 EGLR
128
The only doubt I have had is as to whether, as Street
v Mountford contemplated to be possible, this prima facie
conclusion is displaced by other relevant factors; what in Street v Mountford
are called ‘surrounding circumstances’. The surrounding circumstances relied on
here spring from the essential function of the housing trust in providing
accommodation for the homeless and, to that end, to maintain a stock of housing
over which it has maximum control, which a licence rather than a tenancy might
be more likely to give.
I am, however, satisfied that the judgment of
Slade LJ in Family Housing Association v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 779†
was correct, although I share his anxiety about the impact of such a result on
the housing trust. There were, it follows, in this case, no special
circumstances to displace the general rule.
†Editor’s note: Also reported at [1990] 1 EGLR 82
Accordingly, for the reasons given by Lord
Hoffmann, I agree that this appeal could be allowed.
Giving his opinion, LORD JAUNCEY OF TULLICHETTLE said: The respondent is a
charitable housing trust, one of whose purposes is to provide short-term
accommodation for the homeless. The trust has the use of a block of flats owned
by Lambeth London Borough Council pursuant to a licence agreement with that council
of 27 March 1986, which provided that no grant of an estate or other
proprietary interest was thereby conferred and that the subjects should be used
to provide temporary accommodation for homeless persons. It is not disputed
that by reason of section 32(3) of the Housing Act 1985 the council would have
had no power to make such a grant. The trust’s use of the subjects was
accordingly in the capacity of licensee.
On 31 January 1989 the trust entered into an
agreement with the appellant that stated that occupation of a flat in the block
was being offered to him on a weekly licence from 6 February 1989 and that the
trust had the property on licence from the council. I need not condescend
further on the relevant terms of the agreement, which have been fully set out
in the speech by my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann. I do not doubt that
both parties to the agreement were under the impression, and indeed intended,
that the legal consequences of the agreement should be those of a licence. A
not unreasonable intention given that the trust’s only interest in the subject
was that of a licensee. However, the issue in this appeal is whether that
professed intention was achieved or whether the legal consequences of the
agreement amounted to a tenancy bringing into operation section 11 of the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.
In Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809
this house decided that where residential accommodation is granted for a term,
at a rent with exclusive possession, the landlord providing neither attention
nor services, the grant is a tenancy notwithstanding the fact that the
agreement professes an intention by both parties to create a mere licence. It
is the legal consequences of the agreement that are determinative rather than
the label that parties have chosen to attach to it. In this case, the trust
granted exclusive possession to the appellant, a fact that is fortified rather
than detracted from by the reservation of rights of access by the trust and the
council for limited purposes: Street v Mountford, Lord Templeman
at p818. Prima facie, therefore, the agreement constituted a tenancy.
This notwithstanding the fact that the trust had only a limited interest in the
subjects.
However, it remains to consider whether,
notwithstanding the apparent grant of a tenancy, there exist special
circumstances that are capable of negativing this result: Street v Mountford,
Lord Templeman at p822. Mr Roger Henderson QC argued that the fact that the
trust was a responsible charitable organisation performing important social
functions and that it was merely a licensee of the subjects, inhibited by the
terms of that licence from granting tenancies, amounted to such special
circumstances. My lords, in Family Housing Association v Jones
[1990] 1 WLR 779, where the facts were very similar to those in this case, the
association, as licensee of a local authority, granted what was described as a
licence to the defendant to occupy premises on a temporary basis. Following Street
v Mountford [1985] AC 809, the Court of Appeal held that the agreement
constituted a tenancy, and Slade
there existed special circumstances whereby the defendant, albeit in exclusive
possession of the premises, was not a tenant. In my view, Slade LJ’s rejection
was correct and his reasoning equally applicable to the present case. In the
absence of any exceptional circumstances, it follows that the agreement between
the trust and the appellant constituted a tenancy to which section 11 of the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 applied and that the appeal should be allowed.
I have one further matter to mention. In Family
Housing Association v Jones Slade LJ at p793D observed in relation
to the argument as to the existence of special circumstances:
The argument which we have heard suggests to me
that, whatever their wishes or intentions, it may at least be difficult for
bodies charged with responsibilities for the housing of the homeless to enter
into any arrangement pursuant to section 65(2) of the Housing Act 1985 under
which the person housed is to enjoy exclusive occupation of premises, however
temporarily, without conferring on that person security of tenure by virtue of
the Act…
The result must be substantially to reduce the
choice of methods available to bodies such as the housing association for
dealing with their always limited supplies of housing stock. I am not sure that
this result will necessarily inure to the benefit of the class of homeless
persons in this country viewed as a whole. These are the reasons for the
misgivings expressed at the start of this judgment.
In his dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal
in this case, Sir
distinguish Family Housing Association v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 779.
Regret, no doubt, stemming from Slade LJ’s comments on the consequences of his
rejection of the special circumstances argument. My lords, I share
Slade
regrets.
Giving his opinion, LORD HOFFMANN said: The question in this appeal is
whether Mr Bruton has a tenancy of a flat in Brixton. He occupies the flat
under an agreement dated 31 January 1989 with London & Quadrant Housing
Trust. The trust is a charitable housing trust that, among other things,
provides short-term accommodation for the homeless and others in need of
housing. The question arose because Mr Bruton claims that the trust is in
breach of the implied repairing obligations contained in section 11 of the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Section 13 provides that these are to apply to ‘a
lease of a dwelling-house granted on or after 24th October 1961 for a term of
less than seven years’. Section 36(1) provides that ‘lease’ and ‘tenancy’ are
to have the same meaning. But the trust denies that it granted a tenancy. It
says that the agreement created only a licence to use the flat. When Mr Bruton
brought proceedings in Lambeth County Court to enforce the implied covenants,
it served a notice to quit and claimed a
only a licensee. Judge James directed the trial of a preliminary issue as to
whether Mr
declared that he was a licensee. The Court of Appeal [1998] QB 834* (Kennedy
and Millett LJJ, Sir Brian Neill dissenting) affirmed his judgment.
Mr
*Editor’s note: Also reported at [1997] 2 EGLR 91
The flat is in a block belonging to Lambeth London
Borough Council. They acquired the block in 1975 for housing purposes by the
use of compulsory powers contained in provisions that have now been
consolidated in Part II (Provision of Housing Accommodation) of the Housing Act
1985. The council intended to demolish the block and build new houses or flats
on the site. But the scheme was delayed. On 27
into an agreement with the trust by which they permitted the trust to use the
premises in furtherance of its charitable housing objects. The agreement was
called a licence, and it is agreed that it was not a grant of an estate or
other proprietary interest in the premises. Section 32 of the 1985 Act limits
the powers of a local authority to dispose of land held for the purposes of
Part II of the Act. By subsection (3) the local authority may let the land
under a secure tenancy to a residential occupier, but cannot otherwise dispose
of any interest without the consent of the Secretary of State. It would
therefore have been ultra vires for the council to have granted the
trust any estate or other proprietary interest in the premises.
The agreement between the trust and Mr Bruton read
as follows:
Occupation of Short-Life Accommodation at 2 Oval
House, Rushcroft Road, SW2 on a temporary basis. As has been explained to you,
the above property is being offered to you by [the Trust] on a weekly Licence
from 6
council] who acquired the property for development… and pending this
development, it is being used to provide temporary housing accommodation. It is
offered to you on the condition that you will vacate upon receiving reasonable
notice from the Trust, which will not normally be less than four weeks. You
understand and agree that while you are living in the property, you will allow
access at all times during normal working hours to the staff of the Trust, the
owners and agents for all purposes connected with the work of the Trust.
Conditions were attached, including the following
clause by which Mr Bruton agreed:
To permit the Trust or its agents, surveyors or
consultants to enter the property for the purpose of inspecting the state of
repair and cleanliness of the property or any purpose connected at all
reasonable hours of the day.
In return for the right to occupy the flat, Mr
Bruton agreed to pay £18 per week. Since then, the development scheme has been
abandoned.
Did this agreement create a ‘lease’ or ‘tenancy’
within the meaning of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 or any other legislation
that refers to a lease or tenancy? The decision of this House in Street
v Mountford [1985] AC 809 is authority for the proposition that a
‘lease’ or ‘tenancy’ is a contractually binding agreement, not referable to any
other relationship between the parties, by which one person gives another the
right to exclusive occupation of land for a fixed or renewable period or
periods of time, usually in return for a periodic payment in money. An
agreement having these characteristics creates a relationship of landlord and
tenant to which the common law or statute may then attach various incidents.
The fact that the parties use language more appropriate to a different kind of
agreement, such as a licence, is irrelevant if upon its true construction it
has the identifying characteristics of a lease. The meaning of the agreement,
for example, as to the extent of the possession that it grants, depends upon
the intention of the parties, objectively ascertained by reference to the
language and relevant background. The decision of your lordships’ house in Westminster
City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288 is a good example of the
importance of background in deciding whether the agreement grants exclusive
possession or not. But the classification of the agreement as a lease does not
depend upon any intention additional to that expressed in the choice of terms.
It is simply a question of characterising the terms that the parties have
agreed. This is a question of law.
In this case, it seems to me that the agreement,
construed against the relevant background, plainly gave Mr Bruton a right to
exclusive possession. There is nothing to suggest that he was to share
possession with the trust, the council or anyone else. The trust did not retain
such control over the premises as was inconsistent with Mr Bruton having
exclusive possession, as was the case in Westminster City Council v Clarke
[1992] 2 AC 288. The only rights that it reserved were for itself and the
council to enter at certain times and for limited purposes. As Lord Templeman
said in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 at p818, such an express
reservation ‘only serves to emphasise the fact that the grantee is entitled to
exclusive possession and is a tenant’. Nor was there any other relationship
between the parties to which Mr
referable.
Mr Henderson QC, who appeared for the trust,
submitted that there were ‘special circumstances’ in this case that enabled one
to construe the agreement as a licence despite the presence of all the
characteristics identified in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809.
These circumstances were that the trust was a responsible landlord performing
socially valuable functions, it had agreed with the council not to grant
tenancies, Mr
trust had no estate out of which it could grant one.
In my opinion, none of these circumstances can
make an agreement to grant exclusive possession something other than a tenancy.
The character of the landlord is irrelevant because although the Rent Acts and
other Landlord and Tenant Acts do make distinctions between different kinds of
landlords, it is not by saying that what would be a tenancy if granted by one
landlord will be something else if granted by another. The alleged breach of
the trust’s licence is irrelevant because there is no suggestion that the grant
of a tenancy would have been ultra vires either the trust or the
council: see section 32(3) of the Housing Act 1985. If it was a breach of a
term of the licence from the council, that would have been because it was a
tenancy. The licence could not have turned it into something else. Mr Bruton’s
agreement is irrelevant because one cannot contract out of the statute. The
trust’s lack of title is also irrelevant, but I shall consider this point at a
later stage. In Family Housing Association v Jones [1990] 1 WLR
779, where the facts were very similar to those in the present case, the Court
of Appeal construed the ‘licence’ as a tenancy. Slade LJ gave careful
consideration to whether any exceptional ground existed for making an exception
to the principle in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, and came to
the conclusion that there was not. I respectfully agree. For these reasons I
consider that the agreement between the trust and Mr Bruton was a lease within
the meaning of section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.
My lords, in my opinion, that is the end of the
matter. But the Court of Appeal did not stop at that point. In the leading
majority judgment, Millett LJ [1998] QB 834 said at p845 that an agreement
could not be a lease unless it had a further characteristic, namely that it
created a legal estate in the land that ‘binds the whole world’. If, as in this
case, the grantor had no legal estate, the agreement could not create one and
therefore did not qualify as a lease. The only exception was the case in which
the grantor was estopped from denying that he could not create a legal estate.
In that case, a ‘tenancy by estoppel’ came into existence. But an estoppel
depended upon the grantor having purported to grant a lease and, in this case,
the trust had not done so. It had made it clear that it was only purporting to
grant a licence.
My lords, I hope that this summary does justice to
the closely reasoned judgment of Millett LJ. But I fear that I must
respectfully differ at three critical steps in the argument.
First, the term ‘lease’ or ‘tenancy’ describes a
relationship between two parties who are designated landlord and tenant. It is
not concerned with the question of whether the agreement creates an estate or
other proprietary interest that may be binding upon third parties. A lease may,
and usually does, create a proprietary interest called a leasehold estate or,
technically, a ‘term of years absolute’. This will depend upon
dat quod non habet. But it is the fact that the agreement is a lease that
creates the proprietary interest. It is putting the cart before the horse to
say that whether the agreement is a lease depends upon whether it creates a
proprietary interest.
Mr Henderson relied on a dictum of Denning
LJ in Lewisham Borough Council v Roberts [1949] 2 KB 608, where
the question was whether the council, exercising delegated requisitioning
powers under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939, were entitled to possession
of part of a house. Denning LJ said at p622:
[I]t is necessary to consider the nature of the
power to requisition land. It is only a power to take possession of land. It is
not a power to acquire any estate or interest in any land… Once possession is taken
the Crown can exercise all the powers incident to possession, such as to
license other people to use the premises;… but it cannot grant a lease or
create any legal interest in the land in favour of any other person, because it
has itself no estate in the land out of which to carve any interest.
It seems to me that Denning LJ was focusing on the
question of whether the Crown could create a legal interest in the land that
would be binding upon third parties, and said, correctly, that the Crown could
not create such an interest without having an estate of its own. It is true
that he said the Crown could not ‘grant a lease’ and this could be read to mean
that the absence of a legal estate prevented the Crown from entering into the
relationship of landlord and tenant. But I do not think that this is what he
had in mind. In any case, the Crown in that case could not have validly entered
into such a relationship because it would have been ultra vires its
statutory powers under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939: see Minister
of Agriculture and Fisheries v Matthews [1950] 1 KB 148.
Millett LJ at p846 distinguished the case of Family
Housing Association v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 779, where, as I have said,
the facts were very similar to those in the present case, on the ground that
‘the fact that the grantor had no title was not referred to in argument or the
judgments’. In my opinion, this is easily explained by the fact that the
grantor’s title or lack of title was irrelevant to the issue in the case.
Second, I think that Millett LJ may have been
misled by the ancient phrase ‘tenancy by estoppel’ into thinking that it
described an agreement that would not otherwise be a lease or tenancy but that
was treated as being one by virtue of an estoppel. In fact, as the authorities
show, it is not the estoppel that creates the tenancy, but the tenancy that
creates the estoppel. The estoppel arises when one or other of the parties
wants to deny one of the ordinary incidents or obligations of the tenancy on
the ground that the landlord had no legal estate. The basis of the estoppel is
that, having entered into an agreement that constitutes a lease or tenancy, he
cannot repudiate that incident or obligation. So in Morton v Woods
(1869) LR 4 QB 293, a factory owner granted a second mortgage to a bank to
secure advances. But the mortgagor had no legal estate, having conveyed it to
the first mortgagee, and therefore could not confer one upon the second
mortgagee. As additional security, the borrower ‘attorned tenant’ to the second
mortgagee, that is to say, acknowledged a relationship of landlord and tenant
between them. This was a device commonly used in old mortgages to give the
mortgagee the rights of a landlord: a speedier procedure for recovery of
possession that was then available and the right to levy distress upon goods
and chattels on the mortgaged premises: see Megarry and Wade, The Law of
Real Property 5th ed (1984) p946. When the borrower failed to pay, the bank
levied a distress. The owner of the goods sued for damages, claiming that the
bank had no right to levy distress because that ancient common law remedy was
available only to the holder of a legal estate. A recital to the mortgage made
it plain that the bank was a second mortgagee and therefore had no legal estate.
The Court of Queen’s Bench held that the mortgagor was estopped from denying
the bank’s legal title. Kelly CB said at p304:
it is the creation of the tenancy, or the
estoppel, which arises from the creation of the relation of landlord and tenant
by agreement between the parties, that makes the actual legal estate
unnecessary to support the distress…
Thus it is the fact that the agreement between the
parties constitutes a tenancy that gives rise to an estoppel and not the other
way round. It therefore seems to me that the question of tenancy by estoppel
does not arise in this case. The issue is simply whether the agreement is a
tenancy. It is not whether either party is entitled to deny some obligation or
incident of the tenancy on the ground that the trust had no title.
Third, I cannot agree that there is no
inconsistency between what the trust purported to do and its denial of the
existence of a tenancy. This seems to me to fly in the face of Street v Mountford
[1985] AC 809. In my opinion, the trust plainly did purport to grant a tenancy.
It entered into an agreement on terms that constituted a tenancy. It may have
agreed with Mr Bruton to say that it was not a tenancy. But the parties cannot
contract out of the Rent Acts or other landlord and tenant statutes by such
devices. Nor, in my view, can they be used by a landlord to avoid being
estopped from denying that he entered into the agreement he actually made.
For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and
declare that Mr
on whether he was a secure tenant or on the rights of the council to recover
possession of the flat.
LORD HOPE OF
CRAIGHEAD agreed with Lord Hoffmann and did not add
anything.
Giving his opinion, LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH said: I agree that this
appeal should be allowed as proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord
Hoffmann and for the reasons that he has given. I would add only this.
The claim made in the action seeks to enforce a
contractual cause of action. The breach of contract alleged against the
defendant housing trust is the failure to maintain and keep in repair the flat
in which the plaintiff, Mr Bruton, is living. He relies upon a written
agreement between himself and the housing trust dated 31 January 1989. The written
agreement does not contain any undertaking by the housing trust to repair the
flat. But Mr Bruton alleges that the agreement creates a relationship of
landlord and tenant between the housing trust and himself and that therefore an
undertaking to repair by the housing trust is compulsorily implied by statute —
section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.
Counsel for the housing trust accepted before your
lordships that a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant suffices to
make the provisions of the Act applicable. The question therefore is whether
the agreement creates such a relationship. The answer to this question is, in
my judgment, determined by the decision in Street v Mountford
[1985] AC 809. The agreement was an agreement to give Mr Bruton the exclusive
possession of the flat for a period or periods of time in return for the
periodic payment of money; the grant of exclusive possession was not referable
to any other relationship between the parties. It follows that the relationship
created was that of landlord and tenant and the provisions of the Act apply to
the agreement. Mr Bruton is entitled to succeed.
The relevant question is simply one of
ascertaining the effect in law of the agreement that the parties made. It is
true that before the court construes an agreement it must inform itself of the
surrounding circumstances existing at the time that the contract was made: Reardon
Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tanger [1976] 1 WLR 989. This rule
applies as much to contracts relating to property as to any other contract. In
the present case, it is correct that both parties knew that the housing trust
was a mere licensee of the council and, in so far as they may have thought
about it, should have realised that for the housing trust to grant Mr Bruton
the exclusive possession of the flat probably amounted to a breach of the
housing trust’s obligations to the council. But this cannot contradict what was
actually agreed between the housing trust and Mr Bruton or its legal effect as
between them: Family Housing Association v Jones [1990] 1 WLR
779. It would be different if it could be shown that the housing trust had no
capacity to make the agreement: Minister of Agriculture v Matthews
[1950] 1 KB 148. Lack of capacity renders an apparent agreement without legal
effect; this is an application of the ordinary principles of the law of
contract. But the
to make the agreement with Mr Bruton (as for that matter had the council:
section 44(1) of the Housing Act 1985).
The Court of Appeal was influenced by the way in
which the case for Mr Bruton was argued before it. It understood that his case
depended upon establishing a tenancy by estoppel. This was not a correct
analysis. He needed to do no more than rely upon the written agreement he had
with the housing trust and its legal effect. The only concept of estoppel that
was possibly relevant was that which arises from the agreement. The estoppel is
of the same character as that which estops a bailee from disputing the title of
his bailor or the licensee of a patent from disputing the validity of the
patent. The estoppels are mutual; they bind both of the parties. Where the
relationship is contractual, as in the present case, the estoppel arises from
the agreement, not the other way round. The present case does not depend upon
the establishing of an estoppel nor does any problem arise from the fact that
the housing trust did not have a legal estate. The case of Mr Bruton depends
upon his establishing that his agreement with the housing trust has the legal
effect of creating a relationship of tenant and landlord between them. That is
all. It does not depend upon his establishing a proprietary title good against
all the world or against the council. It is not necessary for him to show that
the council had conveyed a legal estate to the housing trust. I
cannot agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and would allow this
appeal.
Appeal allowed.
