Town and country planning – Caravan park – Injunction – Claimant local authority applying for final injunction requiring defendants to cease work on disputed land – Whether construction works having benefit of planning permission – Whether works within permitted development rights – Whether court to refrain from granting injunction – Application granted
The first defendant was the registered owner of a large caravan park which had operated at Hayes Country Park in Wickford, Essex for many years. The second defendant held the caravan site licence and the third, fourth and fifth defendants were officers of the first defendant.
The claimant was the local planning authority for the area which included the caravan park. It alleged that work had commenced at the caravan park on a stretch of land that fell outside the boundaries of the relevant planning permission granted in 2013. It applied for a final injunction pursuant to section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requiring the defendants to cease use of the disputed land and return it to grass.
The defendants denied that the land fell outside the 2013 permission and asserted that the terms of its caravan site licence permitted it to conduct much of the preparatory work already undertaken. Further, even if the work was outwith both the permission and the scope of permitted development under the licence, the court should nevertheless refrain from granting an injunction.
The core issues were: (i) whether the recent construction had taken place on land that had the benefit of planning permission; (ii) whether, even if the disputed land fell outside the boundary set by the permission, the defendants were nevertheless entitled to undertake certain works pursuant to permitted development rights said to flow from the grant of their licence; and (iii) whether, even if the defendants had no legal entitlement to conduct the works, the court should nevertheless decline to exercise its discretion to grant the injunction.
Held: The application was granted.
(1) The starting point was the general rule that in construing the scope of a planning permission which was clear, unambiguous and valid on its face, regard should only be had to the planning permission itself or documents deemed to be incorporated into it by reference. The authorities made plain that for the incorporation of the application to be achieved more was required than mere reference to it on the face of the permission. Clear words signposting incorporation in the mind of the reasonable reader were required. There was no signposting here that even hinted that the entirety of the planning application was incorporated into the permission. The permission simply noted that the claimant had given consideration to the application. There was nothing in that language that came close to suggesting incorporation. The reference to “consideration” simply recorded the unremarkable fact that the claimant had followed a lawful process by considering the application for planning permission before making its decision. Thus, subject to the application of a recognised exception to the general rule, the boundaries set by the 2013 permission fell to be assessed exclusively by reference to the permission itself and the site plan. In most cases concerning the interpretation of planning permissions, the relevant aspect said to be ambiguous was recorded in writing. In that context, the requirement to interpret clauses by reference to their natural and ordinary meaning was well understood. The position was different where plans fell to be examined. Nevertheless, the underlying principles were the same, namely a common-sense assessment of the relevant part of the permission document, here (at least) a plan, was required: Miller-Mead v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 2 QB 196, Wilson v West Sussex County Council [1963] 2 QB 764, Staffordshire Moorlands District Council v Cartwright (1992) JPL 138, Slough Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1995) JPL 1128, R v Ashford Borough Council, ex parte Shepway District Council [1999] PLCR 12; [1998] PLSCS 156, Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2016] 1 WLR 85; [2015] PLSCS 362 and UBB Waste Essex Ltd v Essex County Council [2019] EWHC 1924; [2019] PLSCS 138 followed.
(2) In the present case, boundary line B on the site plan was ambiguous; the question was whether that impacted upon boundary line A which, viewed in isolation was clear and unambiguous in its delineation of the southern boundary. Although the question did not appear to have been addressed in previous cases, the courts had considered essentially the same question in the context of written conditions, rather than visual plans, and the underlying principles were the same. Simply because one aspect of a clause might be ambiguous did not entitle a party to open up non-ambiguous clauses to reinterpretation by reference to extrinsic materials. That approach was consistent with the principle that permissions should be given a common-sense reading (whether text or plan) and that exceptions to the general rule should be narrowly construed. There was nothing unnatural or incongruous in dividing the boundary line. Accordingly, A as shown on the site plan delineated the boundary of the 2013 permission. The ambiguity in respect of B did not require resolution for present purposes.
(3) To the extent that the plan attached to the caravan site licence showed a more extensive boundary, it was erroneous. There was nothing in the conditions attached to the caravan site licence that gave rise to any requirement to carry out any work on the disputed land within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015. All of the work that had taken place on that land had been to facilitate and prepare for the introduction of caravans where previously there were none. It was thus impossible to see how there could be a requirement within the 2015 Order to put in foundation bases, pipework etc for caravans which had no right to be there (in respect of those already placed on site) or which could not be placed.
(4) The court was satisfied that it was appropriate to grant an injunction having regard to all the circumstances. The works carried out were unlawful because they had been conducted outwith the planning permission. The history of the disputes between the parties inured in favour of the clarity and certainty of an injunction. It was just and proportionate to grant a final injunction.
Jack Parker (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard LLP) appeared for the claimant; Michael Rudd (instructed by Stephens Scown LLP, of Exeter) appeared for the first, third, fourth and fifth defendants.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
