Town and country planning – Planning permission – Material considerations – Reasons – Claimant local authority applying to quash decision of defendant secretary of state granting planning permission for residential development in open countryside – Whether inspector failing to take into account conflict of proposed development with development plan – Whether inspector failing to give adequate reasons for allowing appeal – Application dismissed
The interested party applied to the claimant local authority for planning permission for a development of ten dwellings at Dunkirk Farm Paddock, London Road, Holmes Chapel, Cheshire. The site comprised an open grassed area of agricultural land, approximately 1.6 hectares in size and located in the open countryside. When the claimant failed to determine the application within the prescribed period, the interested party appealed to the defendant under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The claimant indicated to the inspector appointed by the defendant that it would have refused planning permission on the basis that the proposed development would be located within the open countryside beyond existing settlement boundaries, where development should be restricted to that which was essential for a countryside location, and from where there was a need to protect the intrinsic value of the open countryside from unwarranted incursion. The inspector allowed the appeal and granted planning permission on the basis that any harm caused would be outweighed by the development’s benefits, particularly in terms of the provision of affordable housing.
The claimant applied under section 288 of the 1990 Act to quash that decision contending that the inspector had failed to take into account, properly or at all, material considerations, namely, the conflict of the proposed development with the development plan; and failed to give adequate reasons for allowing the appeal, given the acknowledged conflict with the development plan.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) The court had to respect the expertise of specialist planning inspectors and start at least from the presumption that they would have understood the policy framework correctly. In the present case, the inspector had understood and considered the policies in the development plan upon which the claimant had relied. He had referred and given careful consideration to the neighbourhood plan and local plans and had expressly taken into account the conflict with development plan policies. It was clear that he had had regard to the relevant development plan policies and had applied them to the proposal when considering the character and appearance of the countryside. The inspector’s reasoning was both detailed and clear and met the relevant standards set out in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33: Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v Hopkins Homes Ltd [2017] UKSC 37; [2017] EGLR 27 followed.
(2) It was clear from his decision letter that the inspector had considered the policies in the context of housing need and accepted that the claimant had a five-year housing land supply but had been entitled to conclude that the additional housing, especially affordable housing, was a planning benefit which accorded with the policy objectives of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and the development plan. The inspector had clearly had regard to the housing provision, in particular the neighbourhood plans, and the fact that the proposed housing development fell outside it. He had given clear and detailed reasons for treating the proposed housing development as a planning benefit, despite the fact that it fell outside the development plan. It was inconceivable, in a short decision, that the inspector had overlooked his findings in relation to the development plan in coming to his conclusion. His decision had to be read as a whole, and his earlier findings could be assumed to form the basis for his conclusions. On a fair reading of the decision, the inspector had, in his conclusion, weighed up the planning harm to the appearance and character of the countryside, which he had found was contrary to the development plan, against the planning benefits which he had identified, which were material considerations indicating that the determination should be made otherwise than in accordance with the development plan, pursuant to section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. The fact that the inspector had not set out para 198 of the NPPF in his decision did not necessarily mean that he had ignored it. Paragraph 198 did not give enhanced status to neighbourhood plans or modify the application of the 2004 Act. In principle, the inspector had been entitled to decide that planning permission should be granted for a proposal which departed from the neighbourhood plan if material considerations so indicated and his conclusions were not inconsistent with para 198. Ultimately, the inspector had disagreed with the claimants’ assessment of the weight to be accorded to the planning harm and benefits. However, he was entitled to exercise his own planning judgment on those issues and the court would not interfere with it: R (on the application of DLA Delivery Ltd) v Lewes District Council [2017] EWCA Civ 58; [2017] PLSCS 35 followed. Sea & Land Power & Energy Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 1419 (QB); [2012] PLSCS 121 and Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) considered.
Katherine Olley (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard LLP) appeared for the claimant; Jack Parker (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared for the defendant; Guy Williams (instructed by DFW LLP) appeared for the interested party.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
