Agricultural arbitration–Special case stated by the arbitrator–Whether landlord had delivered a sufficient statement of case to comply with paragraph 6 of Schedule 6 to the 1948 Act–Brief general statement expressed in conditional terms–No particulars given–No sufficient statement ‘with all necessary particulars’ delivered within statutory time-limit of 28 days–Particularised statement delivered later but out of time and not capable of acceptance–No power to extend time
This was a
special case stated by Philip John Paul TD FRICS, the arbitrator appointed by
the agreement of the parties, to determine certain matters arising out of the
surrender by the tenant to the landlords of the agricultural holding known as
South Hill Farm, Bleadon, in the counties of Avon and Somerset. Five questions
of law were submitted for the opinion of the court, but it became clear in the
course of the argument that if one of these questions was decided in accordance
with the tenant’s submissions there would be no need for the judge to consider
the others. This question related to the sufficiency of the landlords’
statement of case for the purpose of paragraph 6 of Schedule 6 to the 1948 Act.
The landlords
were the Church Commissioners for England and the tenant was David Ambrose
Heber Granville Mathews.
John M Male
(instructed by Radcliffes & Co) appeared on behalf of the landlords; H A C
Densham, solicitor, of Burges, Salmon & Co, of Bristol, represented the
tenant.
Giving his
opinion on the matters raised in the case, JUDGE HUTTON said: This is a special
case delivered by the arbitrator, Mr Paul, which arises from an arbitration
under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (‘the 1948 Act’). Five questions of
law were submitted for the opinion of this court. It became apparent, however,
during the course of argument that the whole of the questions can initially be
reduced to a decision on question 2. This is because if the decision of this
court is in favour of the outgoing tenant’s submissions then all of the landlords’
claims are statute barred and there is no need for me to consider the other
questions. I am now deciding the answer to question 2 alone.
The question
asked by the arbitrator is as follows:
Have the
landlords delivered a sufficient statement of case to comply with the
requirements of paragraph 6 of the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act?
That question,
as framed, only falls to be answered if I am satisfied that a valid notice
under section 70 of the 1948 Act was initially given. I do not, however,
decide, for the reasons I have given above, that first question which remains
open for decision should the need arise. I answer only the second question
because the answer to the other questions will become
tenant.
The statement
of case delivered on behalf of the landlords contains as particulars of the
landlords’ claim only the matters specified in paragraph 7 of that statement.
Paragraph 7 reads as follows:
If the
arbitrator finds that the above notice was valid, he will be asked to give an
award on the validity and/or quantum of 30 items of dilapidations to house,
buildings, cottage and land still outstanding between valuers.
No further–I
nearly said no further and better particulars–but I amend that to say no
particulars have been given of the landlords’ claim whatsoever.
It is
submitted by Mr Densham on behalf of the outgoing tenant that these are not and
cannot be ‘particulars’ within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the Sixth Schedule
and he relies in particular upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re
O’Connor and Brewin’s Arbitration [1933] 1 KB 20, a case in which
‘particulars’ and the nature of the particulars needed to be given are
discussed at length. It was decided in that case that insufficient particulars
had been given where a tenant claimed ‘Disturbance: two years’ rent:
£514.’ The need for particulars is
described in that case as being required from a party to limit the other party
in his inquiries to the matters set out in the particulars and to show the
issues between the parties. They must be informative as to the extent and the
nature of the claim, as opposed to the class of claim, and must be more than
mere generalities and more than merely a statement that there is to be a claim.
Mr Densham also relied upon Spreckley v Leicestershire County Council
[1934] 1 KB 366, another Court of Appeal case with similar facts, in which a
similar decision was reached. It is, therefore, submitted quite
incontrovertibly by Mr Densham, that paragraph 7 does not amount to particulars
at all but at the most amounts to mere generalities.
Mr Male, on
behalf of the landlords, on the other hand, says that they do amount to
particulars because
(a) the arbitrator could look for the
particulars of the 30 items of claim from the outgoing tenant’s statement of
case and the particulars delivered by the outgoing tenant and
(b) could hear evidence from the landlords as to
the nature of the discussions between the landlords and the outgoing tenant
and arrive at
the particularisation of the 30 items in that way.
I have no
doubt that particulars delivered by one party cannot be relied upon in support
of the other party’s case. I find that to be absolutely certain. I reject the
submission of Mr Male that evidence of discussions could amount to particulars
because paragraph 6(b) of the Sixth Schedule to the 1948 Act expressly limits
the evidence that can be given to the matters alleged in the statement and
particulars delivered by either party. I therefore reject the landlords’ case
and I find that no sufficient statement of case was delivered within the period
of 28 days provided for by paragraph 6 of the Sixth Schedule to the 1948 Act
and that that period had expired three times over before an amended statement of
case, which was, in fact, a particularised statement of case, was delivered. I
am told that there is a line of decisions by other county courts which
determine that the 28-day period for the delivery of necessary particulars of
the party’s case is inflexible and cannot be extended even by agreement.
I therefore
rule that the landlords’ case is statute barred and that, therefore, is an end
of the matter. Although it would have been interesting to have heard argument
on the rest of the issues raised by the statement of case, I find that it is
unnecessary to answer the other questions raised in view of the decision that I
have reached on question 2.
It is ordered
that a copy of this order be sent by the Registrar to the said P J Paul for him
to proceed in accordance with the opinion so declared as aforesaid.
The landlords
shall pay the outgoing tenant’s costs to be assessed on Scale IV, with
discretion to the Registrar in respect of the usual items.
