Landlord and tenant — Assured shorthold tenancy — Housing Act 1988 section 20 notice — Disparity between dates in notice and commencement of tenancy — Whether effective creation of assured shorthold tenancy — Appeal — Possession proceedings — Proceedings dismissed by trial judge — Whether appellant entitled to appeal on matter decided against him
On 20 December 1995 the respondent landlord served
the appellant tenant with a notice of an assured shorthold tenancy that was
based on the prescribed form satisfying section 20 of the Housing Act 1988. The
form specified a six-month tenancy from 21 December. A tenancy agreement for an
assured shorthold tenancy was prepared, which also specified 21 December as the
commencement date of the term. In fact, the tenant did not enter into
possession of the property until 8 January 1996. Someone on behalf of the
landlord scratched out the reference to 21 December on the tenancy agreement
and inserted 8 January 1996 as the commencement date. In November 1997 the
landlord served a notice under section 21 of the 1988 Act and, in 1998,
commenced proceedings for possession. In the county court the judge decided
that the section 20 notice was valid, but, because there was a defect in the
section 21 notice, he dismissed the possession proceedings. The tenant was
granted leave to appeal the decision of the judge relating to the section 20
notice on the ground that he would otherwise be fixed with the decision in any
further possession proceedings; the tenant contended that the section 20 notice
was invalid.
allowed. The tenant was entitled to appeal that part of the judgment relating
to the section 20 notice notwithstanding that the judge had dismissed the
landlord’s claim for possession. The landlord had served a further section 21
notice, and there was no reason why the tenant should be exposed to the risk
that the decision on the section 20 notice might amount to res
or an issue estoppel. The notice of an assured shorthold tenancy dated 20
December 1995 was not a valid or effective notice in respect of the tenancy
agreement. The error in the section 20 notice was not obvious or evident, so
that the notice, which was
in fact erroneous, did not even satisfy the first stage of Peter
Gibson LJ’s approach in York v Casey [1998] 2 EGLR 25. It did not
satisfy the second stage, for when the notice was read in the context of the
tenancy agreement, it could not be said that a reasonable recipient would be
left in no reasonable doubt as to the term of the notice. The plain fact was
that the reader was left with two documents that were in conflict, and the
reasonable recipient could be left in real doubt as to whether, in truth, the
tenancy was to end on 23 June or 7 July 1996.
The following cases are
referred to in this report.
Andrews v Brewer
(1997) 30 HLR 203; sub nom Brewer v Andrews [1997] EGCS 19,
CA
Curtis v London
Rent Assessment Committee [1999] QB 92; [1998] 3 WLR 1427; [1997] 4 All ER
842; [1998] 1 EGLR 79; [1998] 15 EG 120, CA
Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749; [1997] 2
WLR 945; [1997] 3 All ER 352; [1997] 1 EGLR 57; [1997] 24 EG 122; 25 EG 138, HL
Panayi v Roberts
[1993] 2 EGLR 51; [1993] 28 EG 125; (1993) 25 HLR 421, CA
York v Casey [1998]
2 EGLR 25; [1998] 30 EG 110, CA
This was an appeal by the
defendant, Jonathan McCann, from part of a decision of Judge Oppenheimer in
Brentford County Court, who had dismissed a claim by the plaintiff, Clickex
Ltd, for possession of premises occupied by the defendant.
Alastair Panton (instructed by McKenna & Co)
represented the appellant; the respondent did not appear and was not
represented.
Giving the first judgment at the invitation of
Butler‑Sloss LJ, HOLMAN J
said: This appeal comes before us in somewhat unusual circumstances. In
December 1995 Clickex Ltd (the landlord) proposed to rent a room at 20 Lampton
Road, Hounslow, to Jonathan McCann (the tenant). The landlord wished and
intended that the tenancy would be an assured shorthold tenancy under the
provisions of Chapter II of the Housing Act 1988. So far as is material to this
case, section 20 of that Act provides:
(1) … an assured tenancy… is an assured shorthold
tenancy if —
…
(c) a notice in respect of it is served as
mentioned in subsection (2) below.
(2) The notice referred to in subsection (1)(c)
above is one which —
(a) is in such form as may be prescribed;
(b) is served before the assured tenancy is
entered into;
(c) is served by the person who is to be the
landlord under the assured tenancy on the person who is to be the tenant under
that tenancy; and
(d) states that the assured tenancy to which it
relates is to be a shorthold tenancy.
The form of notice prescribed in the relevant
regulations for the purpose of section 20(2)(a) is form 7 in the Schedule to
those regulations or ‘a form substantially to the same effect’.
On 20 December 1995, which was a date before the
proposed tenancy was entered into, the landlord did indeed serve upon the
tenant a printed ‘Notice of an Assured Shorthold Tenancy’ of which all the
printed parts reproduce and correspond to form 7. The printed words read, so
far as is material:
1. You are proposing to take a tenancy of the
dwelling known as: [blank] from [blank] 19 [blank] to [blank] 19 [blank].
The printed prescribed sidenote reads:
The tenancy must be for a term certain of at
least six months.
The blanks as to the term of the tenancy were
filled in so that the form read:
from 21 Dec [for December] 1995 to 23 June 1996.
A tenancy agreement was signed by both parties on
21
filled in. It specifies that the tenancy is for:
A term certain of 6 [months]… from the Commencement
Date.
In the space provided in which to insert the
commencement date, there was originally inserted (as is still plain to see,
although it was subsequently altered) ‘21.12.1995’.
A printed clause towards the end of the tenancy
agreement states:
This Agreement is intended to give rise to an
assured shorthold tenancy as defined in Section 20 of the Housing Act 1988 and
the Tenant acknowledges that the Landlord has given the Tenant a valid notice
for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) of Section 20.
On the date that the tenancy agreement was
apparently signed, viz 21 December 1995, there could not, I think, be
any basis for doubting or disputing that the notice in form 7 was indeed ‘a
valid notice’ for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) of section 20.
The case before the circuit judge proceeded
without oral evidence on the basis of certain agreed or admitted facts that the
judge recorded and recited in his judgment as follows:
The plaintiffs say that a previous tenant was
late in leaving these premises, hence the defendant did not go into the
property until 8
that day. It is agreed that the defendant got the notice on 20 December 1995.
It is not agreed that the defendant knew that the reason that he did not go in
on 21 December 1995, was that the former tenant was late in leaving. On the
contrary, the defendant says he thought that the premises were empty on 21
December 1995, and that there was no hurry for him to go in. So he went in on 8
January 1996.
Thus, all the paperwork, if I can so describe it,
was initially prepared, signed and served on the basis that there would be an
assured shorthold tenancy for six months, commencing on 21 December 1995 and
expiring on 20 or 23 June 1996. The dates in the notice in form 7 and in the
tenancy agreement were in harmony, no point having been taken as to the
apparent minor discrepancy between 20 June, which is six months from 21
December, and 23 June.
But, in the event, the tenant could not or did not
enter the property until 8 January 1996. Critically, someone on behalf of the
landlord at some stage scratched out (although leaving it visible underneath)
the date ‘21.12’ on the tenancy agreement and inserted above it the date ‘8.1’,
and wrote over the figure 5 in the year so as to make it read 6. In short, the
commencement date was altered from 21.12.95 to 8.1.96. Accordingly, the dates
in the notice in form 7, which remained as 21
23
(six months from 8.1.96, namely until 7.7.96) were, and are, in conflict.
In November 1997 the landlord served a notice
under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988. In March 1998 it commenced
proceedings in Brentford County Court for possession. By his defence, the
tenant took two points. The first point was that the tenancy which had, in
fact, been created was not an assured shorthold tenancy. He claimed that the
statutory requirements of section 20 were not fulfilled in that the notice in form
7 was invalid or ineffective due to the discrepancy as to dates. I will call
this ‘the section 20 point’.
The second point was that the notice requiring
possession, which the landlord had served in November 1997 under section 21,
was technically defective for reasons that it is not necessary to relate. I
will call this ‘the section 21 point’.
On 4 December 1998 in Brentford County Court,
Judge Oppenheimer held that: (i) the notice in form 7 under section 20 was
valid, so an assured shorthold tenancy had indeed been created; but (ii) the
section 21 notice was indeed defective. So he dismissed with costs the claim
for possession and, to put it colloquially, the tenant won. But if Judge
Oppenheimer is right on the section 20 point, it will be a Pyrrhic and
short-lived victory for the tenant. All the landlord has to do (and, indeed, I
understand from its solicitors’ letter to the Court of Appeal dated 18 March
1999 that it has now already done so) is serve a fresh and technically correct
section 21 notice and the ensuing claim to possession will be unanswerable. So
it is very important to the tenant to establish, if he can, that Judge
Oppenheimer was wrong on the section 20 point and that this is indeed an
assured, but not an assured shorthold, tenancy.
When granting leave to appeal, the single judge,
Laws LJ, said:
The judge’s decision to uphold the section 20
notice is arguably wrong for the reasons given in the notice of appeal and
skeleton argument.
Exceptionally, I consider that the applicant
should not be debarred from appealing because the action against him was
dismissed: he is or may be fixed with a finding that he is an assured shorthold
tenant which he cannot challenge in subsequent possession proceedings. But of
course it will be open to the respondents to argue that the appeal is
incompetent because no order for possession was made against the appellant.
The respondent landlord has not chosen to argue
that the appeal is ‘incompetent’. Instead, its solicitors wrote to the Court of
Appeal office on 18 March 1999 saying:
We have been notified that Leave to Appeal has
been granted and we have received a copy of the Notice of Appeal…
Our concern about this matter is that the
possession proceedings which we commenced on behalf of our client was dismissed
by His Honour Judge Oppenheimer on the 4th December 1998. Our client is liable
to pay the costs in respect of those proceedings and Leave to Appeal at that
hearing refused.
So far as our clients are concerned, they do not
propose to pursue the original proceedings any further and, indeed, we have
some weeks ago served a Section 8 and Section 21 Notice so that fresh
proceedings can be commenced in the coming weeks.
It seems to us, therefore, that the Appeal is
academic and we do not believe that the outcome of the Appeal will be of any
benefit to the Appellant against whom fresh proceedings for possession will be
commenced very shortly.
We consider that our clients’ interests in this
matter are best served by writing to you to let you know our clients’ concerns,
rather than attending Court at considerable expense to our clients.
We would emphasise that we do not intend to show
any disrespect to this Honourable Court by not attending nor should it be
interpreted that failure to attend is in any way an admission of liability.
In view of the above, we would ask that the Court
does not, in any event, make any Order for costs against our client, in view of
the circumstances mentioned above.
The notice of appeal, which the solicitors for the
landlord acknowledged receiving, very clearly sets out why, in the view of the
appellant tenant, his appeal is far from being academic, and that, in his view,
the outcome (if favourable to him) will be of crucial benefit to him. The
notice of appeal concludes by saying:
The learned judge conceded that the section 20
point was arguable and the only reason that leave to appeal was not given was
that the tenant had won. Whilst the tenant may have ‘won’ the possession
action, he will be soon evicted unless the section 20 point is overturned on
appeal. Therefore unless the section 20 point is appealed, the tenant will have
won the battle, but will lose the war. The most recent authority for the
proposition that [it] is possible to appeal a judgment in the appellant’s
favour is to be found in Curtis v London Rent Assessment Ctte…
Curtis v London
Rent Assessment Committee is now reported at [1999] QB 92* and the relevant
passage is at pp107D-109D. The situation in the present case is not strictly
analogous to the situation in that case. In that case, the Court of Appeal was
able itself, in substitution for the order of the judge, to remit the
references for determination of rent to the tribunal for fresh determination.
So Auld LJ was able to say at p109B:
If… McCullough J’s rulings on the substantive
issue are wrong or are such as possibly to mislead a new committee into
repeating the errors of the present committee, the judge’s order has not given
the landlord all that he wants and to which he is entitled and the Court of
Appeal can do something about it… It can exercise… the power of the court below
to remit the matter for rehearing and determination… in accordance with the
correct opinion of the court.
*Editor’s note: Also reported at [1998] 1 EGLR 79
In the present case, however, there will not be a
rehearing of the present proceedings, they having fatally failed on the section
21 point, and there is effectively nothing to remit for redetermination. I
accept, however, the submission of Mr Alastair Panton, on behalf of the tenant,
that although Judge Oppenheimer made one order, namely to dismiss the
proceedings, he made two decisions or determinations, namely decisions or
determinations on each of the section 20 and the section 21 points. Further,
although Judge Oppenheimer does not say so in so many words, his rejection of
the section 20 point and his going on to deal with the section 21 point clearly
implies a judicial finding that, on the correct application of the law to the
facts of this case, the tenant has only the security of an assured shorthold
tenancy. That finding may or may not amount to res judicata or an issue
estoppel in subsequent proceedings between the same parties. But I do not see
why the tenant should be exposed to the risk that it does; nor the utility, if
it does not amount to res judicata, in these parties having to re-argue
the identical point before the same or another circuit judge only, perhaps, to
arrive at the Court of Appeal on the same issue on a later date.
In this case, as much as in Curtis, the
judge’s rulings (if not his order) have not, if wrong, ‘given to the appellant
all that he wants and to which he is entitled’. He, and indeed the landlord,
are entitled to a correct ruling on a point of intense direct interest to each
of them. So, in my judgment, this appeal is not ‘academic’ and we should
entertain it. If, anticipating the result, we decide that Judge Oppenheimer was
wrong, we have power under RSC Ord 59 r 10(3) to give any judgment that ought
to have been given, and power under r 10(4) to make any order to ensure the
determination of the real question in controversy between the parties. The real
question in controversy between these parties is, indeed, the section 20 point.
I, for my part, much regret that the respondent
landlord has not chosen to participate, not least because I would have valued
the benefit of its argument. But if it is right that we should entertain this
appeal, we cannot be thwarted by its decision not to participate.
The effect of errors, omissions or discrepancies
in notices under section 20 has been considered by this court in at least three
reported cases, two of which were cited to the judge and considered at length
by him in his judgment. The first was Panayi v Roberts (1993) 25
HLR 421*. In that case, the section 20 notice described the term of the
proposed tenancy as being ‘from November 7, 1990 to May 6, 1991’, ie for six
months. But the tenancy itself was expressed to be for a term of 12 months from
7 November 1990.
*Editor’s note: Also reported at [1993] 2 EGLR 51
Counsel for the landlord submitted, as described
by Mann LJ at p424:
first that the appearance in the notice of ‘May’
rather than ‘November’ was an evident error and, secondly, that the legislative
purpose had been achieved because the appellant was warned by paragraph two of
the notice that she was about to enter into a shorthold with limited rights of
protection after either six months or an expiration in accord with the terms of
the tenancy…
Mann LJ continued:
The issue can be narrowed. There is a statutory
precondition that a notice should have been served in the prescribed form. The
prescribed form requires for completion a specification of the date on which
the tenancy in respect of which a notice is served both commences and ends. The
narrow issue is whether a notice which gives a wrong date (here a termination)
is ‘substantially to the same effect’ as one which gives the correct date.
Authority and an evident error apart, I would exclude a quality of obtuseness
as being extraordinary. The writing of ‘1793’ for ‘1993’ would be an evident
error. The writing in this case of ‘May’ rather than ‘November’ in my judgment
would be a perplexity rather than an evident error to an ordinary recipient
proposing and taking a tenancy of [the property in question].
After referring to certain previous authority Mann
LJ concluded at p425:
Those observations confirm the view which I
independently formed. Form No 7 requires for its completion the specification
of a date of termination and must therefore predicate the insertion of the
correct date for the tenancy ‘in respect of which a notice is served.’ A notice
with an incorrect date is not substantially to the same effect as a notice with
the correct date and in this case the mistake was not obvious. The short answer
to [counsel for the landlord’s] submission is that although the legislative
purpose of the primary legislation could perhaps be met without a specification
of date, the legislative requirement of the secondary legislation is that there
should be a date, and a correct one, in respect of the tenancy granted.
I wish to give no encouragement to arguments
which are based on what were described to us as ‘slips of the pen’ and which I
have exemplified as ‘1793’ for ‘1993’. However, an insistence on accuracy seems
to me likely to simplify the task of the county court and more importantly to
enable tenants to know with certainty of their status.
The second case cited to the judge was the later
case of Andrews v Brewer (1997) 30 HLR 203. In that case, the
section 20 notice provided that the tenancy would commence on 29 May 1993 and
end on 28 May 1993 (rather than 1994). The tenancy agreement itself was for a
term of one year commencing on 29 May 1993. As Auld LJ said at p207:
The date specified in the notice was clearly a
clerical error. It provided that the tenancy would commence on May 29, 1993 and
end on May 28, 1993, on the face of it a day before its commencement.
He said later at p209:
The prescribed form required, among other things,
a clear indication of the start and end of the proposed tenancy. It is quite
clear, as I have already said, that in misstating the year of the termination
this notice was wrong, but it was obviously wrong and clearly a clerical error.
Put in a way in which this court has done in the case of Panayi &
Another v Roberts… it was an evident error, one which would have
been understood to be so by the parties and one which would not vitiate the
notice.
Auld LJ then cited passages from the judgment of
Mann LJ, which I have already cited above, and concluded that:
It is my firm view that the obvious clerical
error here does not detract in any way from the effect of the notice. It
certainly does not mean that it is not substantially to the same effect as that
in the prescribed form.
It is clear that Auld LJ regarded himself as
adopting and applying the approach of Mann LJ in Panayi, which, on the
facts of the Andrews case, clearly left the notice as valid and
effective in the latter case.
The third and most recent authority was not, in
fact, cited to Judge Oppenheimer, and, indeed, it seems to me at least possible
that if it had been he might have reached a different conclusion. The authority
is York v Casey [1998] 2 EGLR 25. In that case, the section 20
notice was dated 6 September 1996. It correctly stated that the commencement
date was 28 September 1996, but incorrectly stated that the termination date
was 6
the commencement date. In that case, the notice had been accompanied by a
letter from the landlords, which clearly and correctly stated that the proposed
tenancy was for a term of six months from 28
earlier cases of Panayi v Roberts and Andrews v Brewer,
the House of Lords had considered the effect of errors in notices between
landlords and tenants in the case of Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle
Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749*. Peter Gibson LJ reviewed the
cases of Panayi v Roberts and Andrews v Brewer in
the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Mannai and concluded
at p27J:
I agree with [leading counsel for the appellant
landlord] however, that the test posed and applied in those cases accords with
the test found to be appropriate in the Panayi [sic, as reported,
but the reference should clearly be to the Mannai] case. Accordingly,
what the court must do is to see whether the error in the notice was obvious or
evident and, second, whether notwithstanding that error the notice read in its
context is sufficiently clear to leave a reasonable recipient in no reasonable
doubt as to the terms of the notice.
*Editor’s note: Also reported at [1997] 1 EGLR 57
On the facts of that case he held that: (i) the
error was evident, as the termination date preceded the commencement date and
was plainly a
accompanied the notice made the true termination date sufficiently clear.
In my judgment, the present case does not raise
any new issue of law and properly falls to be determined by reference to the
approach culled from those three cases and the two-stage approach formulated by
Peter Gibson LJ. In my judgment, the present case is clearly on the Panayi
rather than the Andrews and York v Casey sides of the
line. In Andrews and York v Casey there were ‘evident’ or
patent errors in the notices, since they each purported to describe a tenancy
that ended before it began. There was no real ambiguity or conflict between the
terms of the notices and the terms of the tenancy agreements. To the tenant or
to any other reader of the two documents side by side (augmented in the case of
York v Casey by the letter that accompanied the notice) the
tenancy agreement manifestly described the terms.
In the present case, however, as in Panayi,
there is no ‘evident’ or patent error in the dates on the notice. Indeed, there
was no ‘clerical error’ at all, for on the date that the section 20 notice was
prepared and served it did indeed correctly describe both the commencement and
termination dates of the proposed tenancy. The dates on the two documents are
in complete conflict with each other and it is impossible to determine by
reference to the documents alone which is correct. In the words of Mann LJ they
are ‘a perplexity rather than an evident error’.
So, in the present case, I would unhesitatingly
hold that the error in the notice was not obvious or evident, so that the
notice, which is in fact erroneous, does not even satisfy the first stage of
Peter Gibson LJ’s approach. Nor does it satisfy the second stage, for when the
notice is read in the context of the tenancy agreement, ie side by side, it
cannot be said that a reasonable recipient is left in no reasonable doubt as to
the term of the notice. The plain fact is that the reader is left with two
documents that are in conflict, and the reasonable recipient could be left in
real doubt as to whether, in truth, this tenancy ends on 7 July or
23
Judge Oppenheimer, however, said:
Now, first of all, in this case the tenant knew
the date of the commencement of the tenancy had changed. On the agreed facts,
he knew that he had received the section 20 notice on 20 December 1995, his
tenancy being proposed to start the following day. He asserts that he thought
the premises were empty on that day, 21 December 1995, and that there was no
hurry for him to go in. He received his tenancy agreement dated 21 December
1995, with a commencement date starting that day for a period of six months.
But the date was scratched out on the tenancy agreement, and the date of 8
January 1996 was substituted, because he went in on that day, 8 January 1996.
In the particular circumstances of this
particular case, the tenant, in my judgment, could have had no doubt as to the
length of his tenancy. If either the landlord or the tenant had thought about
it, they would immediately, in my judgment, have realised that the dates on the
section 20 notice were no longer applicable or relevant to this tenancy. By an
error, the landlord did not take the notice back, scratch out the dates and put
the fresh dates thereon, and hand the notice back to the tenant, in other
words, re-serve the notice in its new form prior to handing him the tenancy
agreement.
That seems to me to have been an error that in no
way could have misled the tenant.
He went on to say:
I agree with the suggestion that I am in this
case taking account not only of the face of the documents, but the agreed
circumstances surrounding their execution.
There is nothing in any authority that suggests
that I should not do so. The question is difficult, but I resolve it in favour
of the landlord, for the reasons that I mention.
In my judgment, however, and with respect to Judge
Oppenheimer, existing authority does not justify looking into the circumstances
beyond the context of the contemporary documents themselves. Further, the judge
was not justified in his conclusion that: ‘That seems to me to have been an
error that in no way could have misled the tenant’. There is room for real
confusion in this case as to the termination date of his tenancy.
Judge Oppenheimer concluded this part of his
judgment by saying:
Finally on this point, it is perhaps pertinent to
point out… that a new section 19(A) has been added to the 1988 Act reversing
the position in relation to the service of section 20 notices, indeed making
them not used at all. In other words, that the law has changed since this
tenancy was granted, and that there is every reason, as far as legal policy is
concerned, to take a more benevolent view to what is a rather technical
question.
With respect to the judge, I cannot accept that
argument. The policy behind the enactment in 1996 (too late for this case) of
section 19(A) may well have been to make the law less technical and thus to
encourage the supply of more rental properties. But that does not seem to me to
justify taking a more benevolent view as to the prior law, thereby depriving tenants
of whatever security they are entitled to under that law. The fact that the law
has been made less technical tends to emphasise, rather than to detract from,
its prior technical state.
For these reasons, in my judgment, we should allow
this appeal and make an order that the Court of Appeal determines that the
notice of an assured shorthold tenancy to Jonathan McCann, dated 20 December
1995, is not a valid or effective notice in respect of the tenancy created by
the tenancy agreement dated 21.12.95 for the purposes of section 20(1)(c) and
(2) of the Housing Act 1988.
Agreeing, BUTLER-SLOSS
LJ said: I agree with the judgment of my lord. The appellant in this
case won the skirmish and lost the battle. The consequence of the judge’s
judgment was the dismissal of the action, but it also cleared the way for the
landlord to serve another section 21 notice on the tenant seeking possession to
which, in the light of the judge’s decision, there was likely to be no defence
by the tenant at the subsequent proceedings. That is because the judge held
that the section 20 notice complied with the requirements of the Housing Act
1988. The judge had made two decisions in his judgment: first, on the section 20
notice; and, second, on the section 21 notice.
I agree with Holman J that it would be appropriate
for the Court of Appeal to entertain an appeal from the judge’s finding on the
section 20 issue, which the appellant lost, although he had won on the overall
action.
The finding on the section 20 notice establishes
that the appellant held an assured shorthold tenancy. If the appellant is right
on his argument on the section 20 notice, as this court considers he is, he
holds an assured tenancy and not an assured shorthold tenancy. He therefore
would have a much increased security as a tenant. It is therefore very
important for the tenant that he should have the right to appeal the decision
that went against him. This issue is not academic but real.
I agree therefore that the court should entertain
an appeal by the tenant, even though the action against him was dismissed.
Although we have only heard submissions on behalf of the tenant, we are most
indebted to Mr Panton for providing us both with written and oral arguments and
a careful review of the relevant law. I agree with Holman
in the present case fall on the Panayi side of the line rather than the Andrews
v Brewer and York v Casey side.
Paraphrasing Mann LJ in Panayi, the
inconsistency between the section 20 notice and the tenancy agreement would be
a perplexity and not an evident error to an ordinary recipient proposing to
take a tenancy of room 2a, 20 Lampton Road, Hounslow.
I agree that the appeal should be allowed.
Consequently the appeal is allowed, and it is determined that the notice of an
assured shorthold tenancy to Jonathan McCann, dated 20 December 1995, is not a
valid or effective notice in respect of the tenancy created by the tenancy
agreement dated 21 December 1995 for the purposes of section 20(1)(c) and 20(2)
of the Housing Act 1988.
Appeal allowed.