Colley v Council for Licensed Conveyancers

Council for Licensed Conveyancers receiving complaints about professional services supplied by applicant – Council making orders – Applicant seeking to challenge orders by way of judicial review – Permission to apply refused – Whether applicant having unused statutory ground of appeal – Whether prospective appellant requiring permission to appeal – Appeal allowed The applicant, a licensed conveyancer, acted for B in connection with B’s purchase of a leasehold flat in Bournemouth. The lease to B did not contain any express right of access from the front door of the building over the hallway to the front door of her flat. When B came to sell her lease in 1998 the purchaser was not prepared to rely upon such implied rights as might exist. As a result, B spent £500 in obtaining an express grant. B complained to the respondent council. The matter was referred to an investigating committee, which directed the applicant to pay £500 to B and to repay certain fees. The applicant failed to comply with the direction and the respondent referred a complaint to the Disciplinary and Appeals Committee. The committee ordered that the direction compelling the applicant to pay £500 and to repay certain fees should be treated, for the purposes of enforcement, as if it were contained in an order of the High Court (the first decision). Further complaints were subsequently made to the respondent in connection with the sale of a house in Poole, alleging that the applicant had continued to act for different clients when a conflict of interest had arisen. In August 2000 the respondent suspended the applicant’s practising licence for six months and directed him to pay a contribution towards the complainants’ costs (the second decision). The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent’s first and second decisions. In September 2000 permission to apply was refused on the ground that section 26(7) of the Administration of Justice Act 1985 conferred on the applicant a statutory right to appeal to the High Court, which had not been used. As a result, the applicant sought an extension of time within which to appeal under section 26(7) of the Act. The judge granted limited permission to appeal from the first decision but refused permission to appeal from the second decision. The applicant appealed, claiming that the judge’s order should be set aside, as he did not need permission to appeal. Held: The appeal was allowed. 1. After consideration of the provision of Part II of the 1985 Act and section 53 of, and Schedule 8 to, the Court and Legal Services Act 1990, it was plain that the statutory right of appeal provided in section 26(7) of the 1985 Act applied to both the first and second decisions. In particular, the right to appeal was exercisable in respect of the direction made in the first decision, even though it had been made under para 17(1) of the 1990 Act. It would be absurd if the method of challenging the two decisions differed, one by way of judicial review and the other by way of appeal. Accordingly, the judge had been correct to refuse to permit the applicant to proceed by way of judicial review. 2. Part 52 of the Civil Procedure Rules and its associated practice direction did not require a prospective appellant to obtain any permission to appeal. Accordingly, it could be concluded that permission to appeal was not required for appeals to the High Court pursuant to section 26(7) of the 1985 Act. Therefore, the parts of the judge’s order refusing permission to appeal were to be set aside. That outcome not only affected the applicant’s rights but also the rights of all those seeking to exercise statutory rights of appeal. R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 WLR 1622 considered. Murray Hunt (instructed by Strachan Visick Ltd) appeared for the applicant; J David Cook (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) appeared for the respondent. Thomas Elliott, barrister