Claim form — Address for service “Last known residence” — Application to extend time for service — Application without notice on paper — Construction of Civil Procedure Rules Court providing guidance on interpretation
Four appeals on different facts raised issues concerning the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), in particular CPR 6 (relating to service) and CPR 7.6 (relating to the extension of time for service of the claim form).
The issues before the Court of Appeal were, inter alia: (i) the proper interpretation of CPR 6.4(2) and 6.5; (ii); the meaning of “solicitor is acting for the party to be served” in CPR 6.5(5) and (6); (iii) the meaning of “last known residence” in CPR 6.5(6); (iv) the correct approach to extending time for service of the claim form under CPR 7.6(2); and (v) the jurisdiction of the court regarding paper applications without notice under CPR 7.6(4)(b), 23.8 and 3.3.
Held: The court ruled:
(1) Where a defendant provided a claimant with a solicitor’s address for service, the claim form might validly be served at that address. The solicitor would not be required to confirm in writing that it was authorised to accept service before service could be effected.
CPR 6.4 and 6.5 dealt with fundamentally different methods of service but should be given their natural and ordinary meaning. CPR 6.4 was concerned only with personal service, which did not require the provision of an address for service. CPR 6.5 dealt with service by means other than by personal service and provided rules for determining the address at which service was to be effected. The purpose of CPR 6.4(2) was to prevent personal service, where a solicitor was authorised to accept service and had notified the serving party in writing of that fact, unless personal service was required by some particular rule, direction or court order.
(2) CPR 6.5(6) applied where the party to be served was a litigant in person who had not provided an address for service. The meaning of the words “no solicitor acting” in that provision was “no solicitor acting so that the solicitor can be served”. Unless a claimant had been made aware by the defendant or its solicitor that the latter was authorised to accept service, the claimant would be ill-advised to serve on the solicitor.
(3) To establish that service had been made at the recipient’s “last known address” within CPR 6.5(6), a claimant had to show that the address in question was the last place actually known to him or her. The rules deliberately included the word “known” and there were no policy reasons for giving the words a strained or unusual meaning.
(4) When deciding whether to grant an extension of time under CPR 7.6(2), the court had to consider the acceptability of any reason given for failing to serve within the requisite four-month period. Under CPR 7.6(3), the court would be unable to extend time unless all reasonable steps had been taken,
(5) A court in receipt of a “without notice” application, requesting that the case should be disposed of on paper, had to consider whether it would be appropriate to dispose of the matter without a hearing. An application for extension of time would be of potential importance and full consideration should be given to whether relief should be granted. Where the time limits were running out, the application should normally be dealt with by way of an urgent hearing. Where that was not practicable, consideration should be given to dealing with the application by telephone.
Christian Sweeney (instructed by Coles Miller, of Bournemouth) appeared for the appellant in the first appeal; Glyn Edwards (instructed by Lyons Davidson, of Bristol) appeared for the respondent in the first appeal; Nik Yeo (instructed by Russell-Cooke) appeared for the appellant in the second appeal; Andrew Butler (instructed by Forsters) appeared for the respondent in the second appeal; Christopher Sharp QC and John Livesey (instructed by John Hodge, of Bristol) appeared for the appellant in the third appeal; Michael de Navarro QC (instructed by Bevan Brittan, of Bristol) appeared for the respondent in the third appeal; Ronald Walker QC (instructed by Berrymans Lace Mawer, of Southampton) appeared for the appellant in the fourth appeal; Kevin Naylor (instructed by Neil Millar & Co, of Manchester) appeared for the respondent in the fourth appeal.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
