Leasehold Reform Act 1967 — Right to enfranchisement Appeal by landlord from decision of county court judge in favour of tenant — Tenant had a term of 51 years from May 13 1964 at £52 per annum of 6.11 acres of land with, originally, two derelict cottages thereon — Over a period of years the cottages were rebuilt, in accordance with a covenant in the lease, and a number of garages built — A small part of the land was acquired by compulsory acquisition and the rent marginally reduced — In 1981 the tenant served notice on the landlord of his desire to acquire the freehold under the 1967 Act — The claim was resisted by the landlord on various grounds — It was submitted that the two cottages did not constitute a ‘house’, that the tenancy was not a long tenancy at a low rent, and that the tenant was not entitled to claim the freehold of the whole acreage leased to him — The county court judge reduced the area to which the tenant was entitled but otherwise rejected the landlord’s submissions — On appeal to the Court of Appeal the issue resolved itself into the question of whether the tenancy was a long tenancy at a low rent; if it was not, the other points raised became academic — The county court judge had assumed that the garages built on the land should be included in determining the rateable value on the appropriate day, thus arriving at a rateable value of £100, of which the reserved rent of £52 was less than two-thirds — In this the judge erred, failing to distinguish between the ‘house and premises’ for the purpose of section 2(3) and the ‘dwelling-house consisting of the house in question’ for the purpose of section 4(1)(a) — For the latter purpose the garages should not be included — As a result, the rateable value was either £42 or £76, according to what was considered to be ‘the appropriate day’, but in either case the reserved rent of £52 was more than two-thirds — Held accordingly that the tenancy was not a long tenancy at a low rent and the tenant did not qualify for enfranchisement — Landlord’s appeal allowed
No cases are
referred to in this report.
This was an
appeal by the landlord, Lancelot Guy Allgood, from the decision of Judge Hall,
at Hexham County Court, in favour of the claim by the tenant, James Dixon, that
he was entitled under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 to enfranchise the house
and premises known as Riverside Cottages, Acomb, Hexham, Northumberland,
subject to a restriction as to the area of the property. There was a
cross-appeal by the tenant, the present respondent, contending that he was entitled
to acquire the whole of the premises comprised in the lease.
J H Fryer
Spedding (instructed by Wilkinson Marshall Clayton & Gibson, of Newcastle
upon Tyne) appeared on behalf of the appellant; the respondent appeared in
person.
Giving
judgment, SLADE LJ said: This is an appeal by Mr Lancelot Guy Allgood from a
judgment of His Honour Judge H G Hall given in the Hexham County Court on
October 24 1985. By his order it was in effect decided that Mr James Dixon was
entitled to enfranchise a house and premises known as Riverside Cottages,
Acomb, Hexham, Northumberland, subject to a limitation that the house and
premises should be restricted to the house and gardens ‘as defined in the
decision of the Lands Tribunal dated January 28 1981’.
There is also
a cross-appeal by the respondent to the appeal, Mr Dixon. Mr Allgood (whom I
will henceforth call ‘the landlord’) has appeared before us by counsel, Mr
Fryer Spedding. Mr Dixon has appeared in person and has, if I may say so,
assisted us ably by clear oral and written submissions.
The history of
the matter begins with the execution of a lease dated December 31 1964 by which
there was granted to Mr Dixon a term of 51 years at a yearly rent of £52 from
May 13 1964 of property defined in the lease as
ALL THAT land
situate in the Parish of St John Lee and forming part of the Lessors Hermitage
Estate coloured blue on the plan annexed hereto and containing in area Six
acres and eleven one-hundredth parts of an acre or thereabouts TOGETHER with
two derelict cottages situate thereon.
Clause 4(c)
contained a tenant’s covenant in the following terms:
within five
years from the [13th] day of May [1964] in accordance with plans previously
submitted to and approved of by the Lessors or their Agents to rebuild the said
two derelict cottages to the reasonable satisfaction of the Lessors or their
Agents. . .’
By clause 4(d)
the tenant covenanted
from the
[13th] day of May [1969] to maintain the said two rebuilt cottages in a good
and tenantable condition and properly painted and decorated inside and outside
and in such condition to hand over the demised premises to the Lessor at the
end or sooner determination of the said term.
By clause 4(i)
the tenant covenanted
not to build
on the said land any building other than the said two new cottages and domestic
office used therewith and not to use the demised premises for the purposes of
any trade profession or business.
As to the
subsequent events in this matter, I turn to the learned judge’s judgment, of
which I would like to express my appreciation, because it is a most careful one
and it has set out the facts very clearly for our assistance. I quote from para
7:
(a) At the time of the grant [of the lease] the
two cottages were mostly unroofed and without doors or windows. The walls remaining
were as shown on the ‘plan as existing’ produced and marked ‘A1’.
(b) From this plan it appears that the two
cottages were separated by an unpierced party-wall albeit in ‘dog-leg’ form.
(c) A plan was drawn up showing the proposed
reconstruction which is stamped Dec 19 1963 which he [Mr Dixon] produced and is
marked ‘A2’.
(d) At the time he already planned to occupy the
whole structure for himself and his family but was advised by the landlord’s
agent to put in plans for separate cottages as these would attract two
improvement grants. As can be seen from these plans the party wall was to be
pierced in two places on the ground floor and parts of the first floor occupied
with one cottage were situated over parts of the other cottage on the ground
floor.
(e) The work of reconstruction was carried out by
the Applicant assisted by local labour over an extended period. The first part
to be completed was that now identified in the valuation as Riverside Cottage
with an entry dated May 9 1966. He took up occupation of this part but retained
his principal home in Newcastle.
(f) When the second cottage, identified as
Riverside Cottage East with the entry February 6 1967, was completed he let it,
furnished, to a subtenant.
(g) In 1970 he relinquished his home in Newcastle
and Riverside Cottage became his home.
(h) The range of garages was completed, as
appears from the valuation list
to being used for garaging cars is used as a domestic storeplace.
(i) In the course of construction he departed
from the original plans without informing the lessors. He was unable to provide
plans showing these departures. No plans have been produced showing the present
layout and I have therefore carried out an inspection of the property. From
this it is apparent to me that there have been piecemeal alterations and
additions as new ideas have occurred to the Applicant during the prolonged course
of construction.
(j) In 1977 the subtenancy was terminated and the
Applicant’s daughter and her husband moved in to the premises. The doorway at
the end of the ground floor passage which had been temporarily sealed was
unsealed and they lived together as a family unit from then on, eating at the
same table and each family having free access over the whole premises
notwithstanding that the daughter, her husband and now their adopted child have
their bedrooms in the part identified as Riverside Cottage East.
(k) The Applicant’s reason for this arrangement
is to make provision for the declining years of himself and his wife. The
property is in a very isolated situation. Living alone would become a heavy
burden on them as they advanced in years and the comfort of having younger
members of the family living with them was much to be desired. This is a
solution to the problems of old age which is becoming well recognised and is
often pursued to the mutual advantage of both generations.
(l) After completion of the cottages and garages
the Applicant built an extensive walled garden with greenhouses from which he
provides the household needs for fruit and vegetables.
In or about
1974 a Government department acquired a small part of the 6.11 acres demised by
the lease by means of a compulsory acquisition. Mr Dixon made an application to
the Lands Tribunal to apportion the rent between the land acquired by the
department and the residue of the leased land. A chartered surveyor, Mr J M
Clark, gave evidence to the Lands Tribunal on behalf of the landlord, in the
course of which he produced a plan and schedule purporting to give particulars
of the property let to Mr Dixon. It divided the property into four parts,
consisting in the whole of 6.11 acres. One of these four parts was referred to
by Mr Clark as ‘cottages and gardens’; it was said to comprise 0.761 acre and
was shown hatched brown on the attached plan.
The order of
the Lands Tribunal dated January 28 1981 was that the amount of rent to be
apportioned to the land acquired was the small sum of 56p. The result was to
reduce the annual rent payable under the lease to £51.44.
By a notice of
February 18 1981, later amended on June 22 1981, Mr Dixon gave the landlord
notice of his desire to acquire the freehold of the land demised in exercise of
his rights under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. The notice, as amended,
asserted inter alia that the rateable value of the cottages and premises
at the ‘appropriate day’ was £100. The significance of this assertion will
appear later in this judgment.
At this point
I think it will be convenient to refer to a few of the relevant provisions of
the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (to which, as subsequently amended, I will refer
as ‘the 1967 Act’).
Section 1(1)
provides:
This Part of
this Act shall have effect to confer on a tenant of a leasehold house,
occupying the house as his residence, a right to acquire on fair terms the
freehold or an extended lease of the house and premises where —
(a) his tenancy is a long tenancy at a low rent and
subject to subsections (5) and (6) below the rateable value of the house and
premises on the appropriate day is not (or was not) more than £200. . .; and
(b) at the relevant time (that is to say, at the
time when he gives notice in accordance with this Act of his desire to have the
freehold or to have an extended lease, as the case may be) he has been tenant
of the house under a long tenancy at a low rent, and occupying it as his
residence, for the last three years or for periods amounting to three years in
the last ten years; and to confer the like right in the other cases for which
provision is made in this Part of this Act.
It will thus
be seen that, in order to qualify for a right of acquisition under this
subsection, a tenant has to satisfy both the conditions set out in subparas (a)
and (b); and one of those conditions is that his tenancy must be ‘a long
tenancy at a low rent’ within the meaning of the Act.
Section 1(2),
so far as material, provides:
In this Part
of this Act references, in relation to any tenancy, to the tenant occupying a
house as his residence shall be construed as applying where, but only where,
the tenant is, in right of the tenancy, occupying it as his only or main
residence (whether or not he uses it also for other purposes); but
(a) references to a person occupying a house
shall apply where he occupies it in part only;. . .
Part occupation
therefore may suffice to provide a qualification.
Section 2(1),
so far as material, provides:
For purposes
of this Part of this Act, ‘house’ includes any building designed or adapted for
living in and reasonably so called, notwithstanding that the building is not
structurally detached. . .; and —
(a) where a building is divided horizontally, the
flats or other units into which it is so divided are not separate ‘houses’,
though the building as a whole may be; and
(b) where a building is divided vertically the
building as a whole is not a ‘house’ though any of the units into which it is
divided may be.
Section 2(3)
provides:
Subject to
the following provisions of this section, wherein relation to a house let to
and occupied by a tenant reference is made in this Part of this Act to the
house and premises, the reference to premises is to be taken as referring to
any garage, outhouse, garden, yard and appurtenances which at the relevant time
are let to him with the house and are occupied with and used for the purposes
of the house or any part of it by him or by another occupant.
The provisions
of section 2(1)(b) which I have quoted show that the division of a building
vertically will prevent its being treated as a ‘house’ for the purposes of the
1967 Act.
By a notice of
April 8 1981 the landlord refused to admit Mr Dixon’s right to enfranchise the
property on three grounds, which were substantially those eventually argued
before the learned judge. Accordingly, on July 1 1981 Mr Dixon issued an
originating application in which he asked for an order
declaring
that the applicant, the said James Dixon, is the tenant of a house and premises
known as Riverside Cottages, Acomb, Hexham, in the county of Northumberland,
within the meaning of section 1 of [the 1967 Act] and as such is entitled to
acquire the freehold of the said house and premises in accordance with the
provisions of the said Act.
This was
followed by a defence in which all the allegations of fact in the originating
application were admitted, save for, first, the description of the Riverside
Cottages as ‘house and premises’, secondly, the allegation contained in the
originating application that the rent of £52 per annum included £25 per annum
to fish at least two rods, and, thirdly, the allegation that the net annual
value for rating purposes of ‘the said house and premises’ was £100. I should
say at this point that Mr Dixon’s assertion that the rent of £52 per annum
includes £25 per annum to fish at least two rods is no longer pursued.
The learned
judge heard evidence from Mr Dixon and from Mr Clark on behalf of the landlord.
Mr Clark, as is recorded in the judge’s notes of evidence, gave evidence to the
effect that the curtilage of the property did not include the garages but was
where the cottages were situated together with an ‘obvious back yard’. The
judge reacted adversely to this suggestion, as will appear.
The first
ground of opposition to Mr Dixon’s application argued on behalf of the landlord
was in effect that the two cottages did not constitute together a ‘house’ for
the purpose of the 1967 Act. This argument essentially depended on the
construction and application of section 2(1)(b) of the 1967 Act, which I have
already quoted. As to this, the learned judge said this:
He [the
landlord] relies upon the evidence of Mr Clark, a chartered surveyor and the
respondent’s land agent since 1971 who said here were two cottages with two
rateable values, two telephones, two staircases, two kitchens and ‘they appear
to be vertically divided’. The question of vertical division appears to me to
be the crucial one having regard to the combined effects of section 1(2)(a) and
section 2(1)(b) of the Act of 1967. Mr Clark did not go on to describe where he
considered that vertical division to be. He produced no drawing to illustrate
it.
Then the
learned judge referred to various authorities which had been cited to him and
distinguished them thus:
(iii) The case before me seems quite different. The
lease of 1964 envisaged not just the repair of the two derelict cottages but
their modernisation including the provision of ‘internal sanitation’ which
would be difficult to provide within the confines of the old layout. The
solution to this problem was the destruction of the old vertical division
between the cottages and the fitting in at different levels of the
accommodation of each to accommodate the new facilities. For instance the
bedroom of the westerly cottage was to extend over the bathroom of the easterly
cottage and the bedroom of the easterly cottage was wholly over the kitchen of
the westerly cottage.
(iv) although, as I have said, these plans had
been changed and extended in the course of the building, I was unable, during
my inspection, to find any evidence of a vertical division within section
2(1)(b) of the Act and was not assisted by Mr Clark’s generalisation.
The learned
judge on these grounds rejected the submission that the premises comprised two
houses vertically divided, so that this ground of opposition failed.
The second
ground of opposition was in effect that Mr Dixon’s
judge said in this context in due course.
The third
ground was in effect that, in any event, Mr Dixon was not entitled to claim the
freehold of the whole 6.11 acres leased to him. The learned judge
accepted this submission. On the other hand, he did not think that Mr Dixon was
to be restricted to the area described by Mr Clark in his evidence as ‘where
the cottages are situated and the obvious back yard’. He accordingly decided
that Mr Dixon was entitled to the declaration which he sought, subject to a
limitation of the term ‘house and premises’ so that it was to be co-extensive
with the cottages and gardens which had been defined by Mr Clark in his
evidence to the Lands Tribunal and had been hatched brown on the plan he
produced, comprising, I understand, 0.761 acre.
In an
amendment notice of appeal now before us, two main grounds of appeal are relied
upon by the landlord in support of the submission that the judge reached the
wrong decision:
(1) The learned judge erred in law or
alternatively drew an incorrect conclusion of fact or of mixed fact and law
from the primary facts found by him in holding that the above mentioned
property constituted ‘a house’ reasonably so called for the purpose of section
2 of the above Act.
(2)(i) That there was no evidence to support the
learned judge’s finding that the rateable value of the said property was £100
on the appropriate day which day was May 9 1966 or alternatively February 6
1967.
(ii) That the learned judge erred in law in
including the rateable value of the five garages now situate upon the said
property in the rateable value of the property for the purposes of section 4 of
the Act.
In a
respondent’s notice Mr Dixon, for his part, submits in effect that the learned
judge erred in holding that he was entitled to acquire only the 0.761 acre, but
should have held that he was entitled to acquire the whole of the premises
still comprised in his lease. However, this submission only becomes relevant if
it is established that he possesses all the necessary qualifications to entitle
him to acquire the freehold under section 1(1) of the 1967 Act. For present
purposes, as I have already indicated, the most important of the necessary
qualifications is that his tenancy must be a ‘long tenancy at a low rent’ (see
subsection 1(a)). If his tenancy is not a ‘long tenancy at a low rent’ within
the relevant definition, his claim must inevitably fail at the outset.
With the
sensible agreement of Mr Dixon and counsel for the landlord, we have, in all
the circumstances, begun by hearing argument from both sides on the second of
the two main grounds raised by the notice of appeal, which relates to the
existence or not of a ‘long tenancy at a low rent’. It has also been agreed
that, if we were to decide the point in favour of the landlord, we should give
judgment on the appeal to this effect and not proceed to hear argument on the
other points raised in the notice of appeal or the respondent’s notice, which
on this footing would have become academic.
In dealing
with the point raised by the second main ground in the notice of appeal, I will
assume in favour of Mr Dixon, though without deciding the point, that the
learned judge was right in deciding that the building comprising the two
cottages is one house, notwithstanding section 2(1)(b) of the 1967 Act and
notwithstanding the submissions which the landlord has made, and would make, to
the contrary.
Section 4 of
the 1967 Act, to which I have not yet referred, contains a definition of a
tenancy at a ‘low rent’ for the purposes of the 1967 Act. Section 3 defines a
‘long tenancy’. There is no doubt that Mr Dixon’s tenancy is a long tenancy
within this definition. It is section 4 which presents the difficulties so far
as he is concerned.
Section 4(1)
begins as follows:
For the
purposes of this Part of this Act a tenancy of any property is a tenancy at a
low rent at any time when rent is not payable under the tenancy in respect of
the property at a yearly rate equal to or more than two-thirds of the rateable
value of the property on the appropriate day . . .
The subsection
therefore obliges one to see what was the rateable value of the property ‘on
the appropriate day’. The ascertainment of ‘the appropriate day’ is
therefore of crucial importance.
I interpose a
reference to section 4(2), which, so far as material, provides:
Where on a
claim by the tenant of a house to exercise any right conferred by this Part of
this Act a question arises under section 1(1) above whether his tenancy of the
house is or was at any time a tenancy at a low rent, the question shall be
determined by reference to the rent and rateable value of the house and
premises as a whole, and in relation to a time before the relevant time shall
be so determined whether or not the property then occupied with the house or
any part of it was the same in all respects as that comprised in the house and
premises for purposes of the claim . . .
I now revert
to section 4(1)(a), which provides that, for the purpose of this subsection:
‘appropriate
day’ means the 23rd March 1965 or such later day as by virtue of section 25(3)
of the Rent Act 1977 would be the appropriate day for purposes of that Act in
relation to a dwelling-house consisting of the house in question.
I stress that
there can be only one ‘appropriate day’ in relation to any one claim under
section 1 of the Act, such as that now made by Mr Dixon. We have, therefore, to
ascertain what was the one ‘appropriate day’ for the purpose of his claim.
There was no
entry in the rating valuation list on March 23 1965 in respect of any of the
buildings on the land in question. There is a letter addressed to Mr Dixon from
the local council dated September 26 1985, which confirms that the relevant
buildings were assessed for rating purposes and were first included in the
valuation list on directions issued by the valuation officer on the following
dates: ‘Riverside Cottage, Howford, Acomb’ on May 9 1966 with a rateable value
of £42; ‘Riverside Cottage East, Howford, Acomb’ on February 6 1967 with a
rateable value of £34; ‘5 Garages adj Riverside Cottage, Howford, Acomb’ on December
22 1971 with a rateable value of £24. The total of those three rateable values
represents the figure of £100 referred to by Mr Dixon in his pleadings.
Since none of
the buildings appeared in the valuation list on March 23 1965, section 4(1)(a)
of the 1967 Act makes it necessary to ascertain what would, by virtue of
section 25(3) of the Rent Act 1977, be the appropriate day for the purposes of
that Act in relation to ‘a dwelling-house consisting of the house in question’.
These references in subpara (a) to ‘a dwelling-house’ and to ‘the house in
question’ are in striking contrast with the earlier references in the earlier
sections to ‘the house and premises’. Though Mr Dixon forcefully submitted to
the contrary, they seem to me to oblige us, in applying section 4(1)(a) to the
facts of the present case, to confine our attention to the building comprising
the two cottages and not to take into account the separate building comprising
the five garages, for the purpose of ascertaining ‘the appropriate day’.
I now turn to
section 25(3) of the Rent Act 1977, which provides:
In this Act
‘the appropriate day’ —
(a) in relation to any dwelling-house which, on
23rd March 1965, was or formed part of a hereditament for which a rateable
value was shown in the valuation list then in force, or consisted or formed
part of more than one such hereditament, means that date, and
(b) in relation to any other dwelling-house,
means the date on which such a value is or was first shown in the valuation
list.
Subpara (a) can
have no application on the facts of the present case. It inevitably follows
from subpara (b) that, in relation to the dwelling-house said to comprise
Riverside Cottage and Riverside Cottage East, ‘the appropriate day’ must be
either May 9 1966 or February 6 1967, being the dates on which the two cottages
first appeared, respectively, in the valuation list.
Mr Fryer
Spedding submits as his first argument that the 1966 date rather than the 1967
date is ‘the appropriate day’. I do not find it necessary to decide this point,
because it seems to me as clear as crystal that ‘the appropriate day’ in
respect of the house (assuming for this purpose that the two cottages are to be
regarded as one house) must be one or the other of the two dates which I have
last mentioned. The rateable value of the house on ‘the appropriate day’ was
either £42, if ‘the appropriate day’ is taken as being May 9 1966, or £76, if
‘the appropriate day’ is taken as being February 6 1967. £52 is more than
two-thirds of the figure of £42 or £76, whichever figure is taken. In these
circumstances I see no answer to Mr Fryer Spedding’s submission that Mr Dixon’s
tenancy is not a tenancy ‘at a low rent’ within the relevant definition
contained in section 4(1) of the 1967 Act.
The learned
judge dealt with the point now under discussion in his judgment as follows:
Although the
rent reserved of £52 is less than 2/3rds of the rateable value of £100 on the
appropriate day it is submitted that the rateable value of the garages should
be excluded thus reducing the total rateable value to £76 of which the rent of
£52 is marginally more than 2/3rds. I reject this submission. It is made on the
basis of Mr Clark’s evidence that the garages are not within the curtilage of
the property. It is distressing to find that this evidence is in direct
contradiction of his statement of evidence before the Lands Tribunal. In this
he clearly shows an area of 0.761 acres described as cottages and gardens,
hatched in brown on his plan, which covers the garages.
Section 2(3)
of the Act provides that ‘house and premises’ is to be taken as referring to
any garage, outhouse, garden, yard and appurtenances and section 4(2) states
that the question of (a low rent) shall be determined by
Section 4(6) also provides for a just apportionment of an entire rent should
the need arise.
I pause to say
that section 4(6) of the 1967 Act appears to me to have no relevance to the
facts of the present case, because there has been no severance of the property
in so far as it consists of the two cottages and the five garages.
As Mr Dixon
pointed out to us, the learned judge appears, from what he said, to have
actually decided that the rateable value of the property on ‘the appropriate
day’ was £100, though he gave no reasons for that decision. If that decision
had been correct, he would of course have been correct in deciding that this
was a tenancy at a low rent. With all respect to him, however, it seems to me
that he must have misunderstood the argument that was being put to him on this
point, the argument being (a correct one in my view) that the appropriate day
was either May 9 1966 or February 6 1967. Mr Fryer Spedding has explained to us
that this particular submission was not based on Mr Clark’s evidence at all; it
was based on the figures shown in the letter from the rating authority. Mr
Dixon submitted to us that the learned judge was justified in regarding
December 22 1971 as being ‘the appropriate day’, since it was the first date
upon which both the two cottages and the five garages appeared in the
rating list. I would have had some sympathy with this argument before making
detailed reference to the statutory provisions, but, when such detailed
reference is made, in my opinion they do not permit it. In particular, section
4(1)(a) of the 1967 Act appears to me to preclude it.
It may well be
that, as Mr Dixon has submitted to us, the five garages fall to be included in
the definition of the ‘house and premises’ contained in section 2(3) of the
1967 Act, but, for reasons which I hope I have sufficiently explained, this
definition does not in my opinion assist in ascertaining ‘the appropriate day’.
Its relevance lies in ascertaining the extent of the land and buildings which a
tenant, who has all the qualifications required by section 1(1), is entitled to
acquire by virtue of that subsection. Unfortunately so far as he is concerned,
Mr Dixon does not in my judgment possess all those qualifications.
I conclude
that his tenancy is not a tenancy ‘at a low rent’ and that accordingly he does
not possess the necessary qualifications to entitle him to invoke section 1(1)
of the 1967 Act. It follows that I would allow this appeal. I would set aside
the learned judge’s order and I would make an order refusing the order for
enfranchisement sought by the originating application.
Agreeing,
WAITE J said: Although we are differing from the views of the learned judge, I
do not think it necessary to add any detailed grounds of my own for taking the
same view as Slade LJ, because it seems clear to me that, as my lord has said,
the learned judge had not fully appreciated the significance of the differences
in wording between ‘a dwelling-house consisting of the house in question’, as
that expression is used in section 4(1)(a) of the 1967 Act, and the phrase ‘the
house and premises’ referred to in section 2, and elsewhere in section 4, of
the same Act. I would therefore agree in allowing the appeal and would concur
in the order proposed.
The appeal was
allowed with costs in the Court of Appeal and below. The order below was set
aside and the application for an order for enfranchisement refused. Leave to
appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
