Appellants serving enforcement notice upon respondent – Respondent conveying land to B before expiry of period for complying with enforcement notice – B’s title not registered until later – Appellants bringing proceedings against respondent for breach of enforcement notice – Justices finding respondent not the owner of the land and acquitting him – Whether justices erred in finding respondent not the owner – Sections 179 and 336 of Town and Country Planning Act 1990 – Appeal allowed
In September 1998 the appellant local planning authority issued an enforcement notice upon the respondent (T), alleging a change of use of registered land owned by him from agricultural use to mixed use for agriculture and storage of non-agricultural materials. The notice required the storage use to cease. T’s appeal was dismissed, but the period for complying with the notice was extended to June 1999. In April 1999 T conveyed the land to B, although the transfer was not registered until August 2000. The land continued to be used for storage of a variety of materials.
In August 1999 the appellants laid an information against T, pursuant to section 179(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, alleging that he, as “owner of the land”, was in breach of the enforcement notice. Section 336 of the Act defines “owner” as “a person… who, whether in his own right or as trustee for any other person, is entitled to receive the rack-rent of the land, or, where the land is not let at a rack-rent, would be so entitled if it were so let”. T contended that he had ceased to be the owner of the land for the purposes of section 179 after the transfer to B in April 1999, because, after that date, B had had control of the land and would have been entitled to receive any rack-rent had the land been let. The justices acquitted T on that basis.
The appellants appealed, contending that: (i) T remained the legal owner of the land until such time as the transfer of title was registered with the Land Registry, as required by section 19 of the Land Registration Act 1925; (ii) T therefore fell within the definition of owner in section 336; and (iii) accordingly, the notice had been served on the correct party.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
1. Under section 19 of the 1925 Act, T remained the legal proprietor of the freehold estate until registration of B’s title. During the interim period, after transfer and before registration, B held the equitable interest in the land, and could not normally exercise any powers of the registered proprietor. Although that position was modified by section 37, the registered proprietor still had the legal estate vested in him and could still convey the freehold. If a transferor could still convey the freehold, he could also still obtain a rack-rent under a lease. Section 336(1) included within the concept of “owner”, for the purposes of enforcement action under section 179 of the 1990 Act, a person who was entitled to receive such rents, even if he had no beneficial interests in them. T therefore came within the definition of “owner”, even if he no longer had a beneficial interest in the land, until legal ownership transferred to B upon registration of B’s title.
2. Such an interpretation caused no injustice, since a transferor who was no longer in occupation and who no longer had control over the land could normally rely upon the defence contained in section 179(3) of the 1990 Act. Furthermore, the system of land registration was straightforward. The land register was open to public inspection and could be relied upon by third parties. If a local planning authority were unable to rely upon the register as an accurate record, it would lead to considerable difficulties in enforcing breaches of planning control.
James Findlay (instructed by the solicitor to East Lindsey District Council) appeared for the appellants; Robert Hill (instructed by Ringrose Law Group, of Boston) appeared for the respondent.
Sarah Addenbrooke, barrister
