Compulsory purchase – Compensation – Limitation – Claimant seeking compensation for compulsory acquisition of land – Claim included in statement of case covering multiple references filed within time limit – Notice of reference filed after expiry of limitation limit – Whether claim referred to tribunal in time – Issue determined accordingly
In March 2015, the respondent local authority compulsorily acquired 66 separate parcels of land at Five Oaks Lane in Redbridge. The last date by which claims for compensation could be made was 31 March 2021.
On 30 March 2021, 17 individual notices of reference were filed with the Upper Tribunal claiming compensation under the Land Compensation Act 1961. The same solicitors acted on behalf of all the claimants. Each notice of reference was in the tribunal’s standard form and provided the information required by rule 21(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010. Each notice named a different claimant or group with an interest in an identified parcel of land.
The individual notices related in aggregate to 22 separate parcels of land but each was accompanied by a single statement of case covering all the claims. The statement explained that it was being submitted on behalf of each person listed, referred to as “the claimants”. It then identified 23 individuals and companies, the last of whom was the present claimant (FOLL).
An issue arose whether FOLL had referred a claim for compensation to the tribunal within the period of six years allowed by section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. The question arose because, although FOLL was one of the claimants listed in the statement of case, none of the notices of reference was lodged on its behalf or referred to it as a claimant.
Held: The issue was determined accordingly.
(1) By section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980, a claim to recover compensation had to be “brought” within six years from the date on which the claimant’s cause of action accrued. The starting point in determining whether a claim to recover compensation had been brought within the limitation period was section 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 which provided that: “Where by or under any statute (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) land is authorised to be acquired compulsorily, any question of disputed compensation … shall be referred to the Upper Tribunal and shall be determined by the Tribunal in accordance with the following provisions of this Act”. It followed that a claim would be “brought” for limitation purposes if it was referred to the Upper Tribunal within the requisite period: Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd [1999] Ch 139 followed.
Section 1 of the 1961 Act required that where land had been compulsorily acquired, a disputed claim for compensation had to be “referred to the Upper Tribunal”.
(2) In the present case, the statement of case submitted on behalf of each of the claimants was enough to refer a claim by FOLL to the tribunal. The substantive requirement of the 1961 Act was complied with, although it was not done in the form required by the Rules and Practice Directions.
The tribunal did not accept that the question whether a claim for compensation had been referred to the tribunal was to be determined by considering whether rule 28 of the 2010 Rules had been complied with. The 1961 Act did not require a notice of reference nor did it prescribe the form in which a disputed claim for compensation was to be referred to the tribunal. The tribunal’s rules and practice directions could not impose substantive limitations on the making of a claim which were not found in the 1961 Act. A document submitted to the tribunal asking it to resolve a dispute over the amount of compensation payable to a named claimant was all that was required by the statute.
(3) The statement of case did not contain all of the information required of a notice of reference and was not compliant with rule 28 or the Practice Directions. But rule 7(1) explained that an irregularity resulting from a failure to comply with any requirement in the rules, a practice direction or a direction of the tribunal, did not of itself render the proceedings void. By rule 7(2), the tribunal might require the failure to be remedied.
The delay in making a formal application to put the reference in proper order was not egregious. When the notices of reference were submitted to the tribunal, the parties jointly applied for and were granted a stay which continued until 18 October. It would have been better if the claimants’ application to regularise the proceedings had been made earlier but in view of the fact that the parties had agreed a stay of proceedings and the tribunal had fixed a date for a case management hearing, in circumstances where the person with the overall direction of the proceedings had died unexpectedly, the delay was neither inexplicable nor unforgivable.
(4) It would be unfair and unjust for the claimant not to be allowed to pursue what might be a valuable claim for compensation. The other 17 references would continue and, as the parties agreed, were to be heard together so there would be no significant saving of time or tribunal resources or costs for the parties if the claimant’s reference was to be excluded. The only beneficiary would be the respondent which would have acquired the land without having to pay compensation reflecting the value of the claimant’s interest. The respondent would nevertheless gain an advantage from the claimant’s rights as it would be able to assert that the interests of those owners who granted options to the claimant were less valuable to them because of the existence of the options. That would provide an undeserved windfall to the respondent and would be unfair to the claimant.
In any event, a refusal to allow the claimant to remedy its failure to comply with rule 28 and the practice directions would not dispose of the reference. The claimant’s claim was referred to the tribunal on 30 March, within the limitation period, when its solicitors filed the statements of case naming it as a claimant and explaining the basis of its claim in some detail. The tribunal was required either to determine that reference or to strike it out. Therefore, the claimant’s claim was referred to the tribunal within time.
James Pereira QC and George Mackenzie (instructed by Dentons UK and Middle East LLP) appeared for the claimant; Alexander Booth QC and Rebecca Clutten (instructed by Squire Patton Boggs (UK) LLP) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Click here to read a transcript of Five Oaks Land Ltd v Redbridge London Borough Council
