Caravan park for holiday purposes — Change of use to permanent accommodation — Enforcement notice — Inspector finding that no conditions on use imposed — Whether inspector applying correct test — Whether change of use matter of fact and degree — Inspector’s decision quashed — Judgment for applicant
The appeal concerned land at Clanna Caravan Park, Alvington, Lydney, Gloucestershire, which had been used as a caravan park for holiday purposes only under a 1985 planning permission. In March 1993, the local planning authority (the applicants) issued an enforcement notice alleging breach of planning control in that there had been a change of use to a caravan park for permanent residential use. The inspector who was appointed to hold a public inquiry stated that whether the occupation of caravans as permanent residences, rather than for holiday purposes, constituted a material change of use needed to be determined as a matter of fact and degree. On that criterion he did not consider it to be a material change of use if a holiday caravan were to be occupied as a permanent dwelling and that to restrict occupation in that way could only be achieved by the imposition of appropriate planning conditions. The applicant challenged the decision on the grounds, inter alia, that the inspector was wrong to hold that if it were necessary for planning purposes to restrict the occupation of caravans to holidaymakers, that could only be achieved by the imposition of conditions and, further, that as no such conditions had been imposed, the matters in the enforcement notice did not constitute a breach of planning control.
Held The application was granted; the inspector’s decision was quashed.
1. The inspector had wrongfully excluded from his consideration whether there had been a material change of use. Among other issues, there were acknowledged traffic effects of the different uses. That was an important material factor from a planning point of view: see Devonshire County Council v Allens Caravans (Estates) Ltd (1962) 14 P&CR 440.
2. The inspector had also erred in law in considering whether certain changes of use were incapable of amounting to a material change of use as a matter of law, but were to be considered only as a matter of fact and degree. He had failed to give clear and adequate reasons as to whether or why the incapacity arose as a matter of law or as a matter of factual impossibility.
3. The court adopted the arguments in the cases cited to it: see R v Tunbridge Wells Borough Council, ex parte Blue Boys Developments Ltd [1990] 1 PLR 55 and Lilo Blum v Secretary of State for the Environment (unreported, June 6 1986).
4. The inspector had erred in law as contended by the applicants and there had been a change of use which constituted a breach of planning control.
Robert Fookes (instructed by the solicitor to Forest of Dean District Council) appeared for the applicants; David Holgate (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State for the Environment; the second respondent did not appear and was not represented.
