Lands Tribunal — Claim for compensation — Statutory time-bar on references to the tribunal — Reference out-of-time — Whether tribunal in error in refusing to determine reference
The respondent
district council acquired land from the appellant under a general vesting declaration
of February 1977. Negotiations with the district valuer proceeded for several
years. In October 1986 the appellant referred the disputed claim for
compensation to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, and the tribunal refused to
accept the application on the ground that the claim was time-barred. The
appellant appealed by way of a special case.
The six-year
period, within which a question of disputed compensation arising out of an
acquisition of an interest in land can be referred to the tribunal, runs from
the date at which the claimant first knew, or could reasonably be expected to
have known, of the vesting of his interest: para 36, Schedule 24 to the Town
and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972. It followed that as the latest date
the claimant could have known of the vesting was February 1977, the date of
confirmation of the vesting declaration, his reference should have been made
before February 1983. The tribunal was entitled to refuse jurisdiction in
respect of a reference made in October 1986.
to in the opinion
Apostolic
Church Trustees v Glasgow District Council
1977 SLT (LT) 24
Appeal by way
of special case from the Lands Tribunal for Scotland
This was an
appeal by way of a special case from the Lands Tribunal, who had decided that
the appellant’s application to refer a question of disputed compensation was
time-barred.
appeared in person.
Peoples (instructed by Stathern & Blair WS) appeared for the respondents.
following opinion of the court was delivered.
LORD JUSTICE
CLERK (LORD ROSS): This is a special case stated by
the Lands Tribunal for Scotland under section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries
Act 1971 for the opinion of the Court of Session at the request of the
appellant, who is Laurence Garvey, against the respondents, who are Clydebank
District Council.
Although the
appellant, who appeared in person, sought to raise a large number of matters in
his address to the court, the sole issue raised in the special case is whether
the Lands Tribunal for Scotland were correct in law in holding that the
appellant’s application to the tribunal was time-barred and that his
application should be dismissed.
The background
to this appeal is fully set forth in the statement of facts contained in the
special case. The first matter which the appellant raised was that a
plea-in-law raising the issue of time-bar had been added by way of amendment,
and he contended that the respondents ought never to have been allowed to amend
their pleadings by adding this plea-in-law. It is plain from
allow the amendment. Whether or not to allow the pleadings to be amended in
this way was a matter for the discretion of the tribunal, and nothing which the
appellant has said would persuade us that we would be justified in interfering
with the tribunal’s decision in this respect. It should be added that there is
no question in the case raising the issue of whether the amendment should have been
allowed.
It was obvious
that the appellant feels a strong sense of grievance. He maintained that
negotiations had proceeded between himself and the district valuer over some 11
years and that a neighbouring owner whose subjects were less extensive than the
appellant’s subjects had received over £ 25,000 in compensation whereas the
largest sum which the district valuer had offered the appellant was £ 4,000. He
thus contended that he had been dealt with unjustly. Again it must be pointed
out that this is not an issue which is raised before us and that the sole issue
before this court is the matter of time-bar.
The provisions
relating to time-bar are to be found in para 36 of Schedule 24 to the Town and
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972. That paragraph is in the following terms:
(1) The time within which a question of disputed
compensation, arising out of an acquisition of an interest in land in respect
of which a notice to treat is deemed to have been served by virtue of
paragraphs 6 to 8 above, may be referred to the Lands Tribunal shall be six
years from the date at which the person claiming compensation, or a person from
whom he derives title, first knew, or could reasonably be expected to have
known, of the vesting of the interest by virtue of those paragraphs.
(2) In reckoning the period of six years referred
to in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, no account should be taken of any
period during which the person claiming compensation or the person from whom he
derives title was in minority or less age or was under legal disability.
In the light
of the findings in this case the tribunal held that the appellant was aware of
the vesting of his interest from 1974 or in any event from the date of the
decision of the Second Division of the Court of Session on February 8 1977 (or
February 19 1977) refusing his appeal against the granting of decree against
him in an action of summary ejection. The tribunal then stated:
Accepting
that the latest date when he could be considered to have known about the
confirmation of the vesting was 18 February 1977, his time limit in terms of
paragraph 36 of Schedule 24 was 18 February 1983. As his application to the
Tribunal was not formally made until 17 October 1986, although there had been
correspondence with the clerk to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland since 2
October 1985, the application was well outside the time limit for doing so.
We are quite
satisfied that on the facts the tribunal were fully justified in arriving at
this conclusion. The appellant maintained that the six-year period did not
apply in the way that the tribunal had applied the period, and he contended
that the six-year period should run from the date when negotiations were broken
off. His submission was that the date when he became aware of the general
vesting declaration did not enter into the matter at all. He claimed to find
support for his submission from Apostolic Church Trustees v Glasgow
District Council 1977 SLT (LT) 24. In particular, he sought to rely on a
passage from the opinion of the tribunal at p 26:
With regard
to the various anomalies raised by claimant’s counsel to support a starting
point for the time bar as at the date of dispossession, we generally agree with
the acquiring authority’s contention that it would be technically competent to
make a reference to the Tribunal prior to dispossession — and
starting point for the time bar as at the date of dispossession, we generally
agree with the acquiring authority’s contention that it would be technically
competent to make a reference to the Tribunal prior to dispossession — and
therefore prior to expiry of the six-year time limit. Nevertheless one would
not expect this to be done, even by a professional adviser, if negotiations
were proceeding normally.
As we
understood it, the appellant sought to take from that passage that there could
be no question of time-bar running so long as negotiations were continuing. In
our opinion, however, he has misunderstood this passage. In a later passage in
the opinion in that case it is stated:
Whatever may
be the alleged compensation anomalies resulting from recent United Kingdom
planning legislation which introduced the new expedited procedure, the Tribunal
have to apply the actual wording of para 6(1) of the Sixth Schedule as they
find it. The Schedule plainly states that the six-year period is to run not
from when the local authority entered upon and took possession of the land but
from the date at which the claimant first knew, or could reasonably be expected
to have known, of the vesting of his interest under para 3 of the Schedule.
That case
concerned the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1945, Schedule 6, para
6(1), but these provisions are substantially the same as the provisions of para
36 of Schedule 24 to the Act of 1972. We entirely agree with what the tribunal
said in that case regarding their obligation to apply the actual wording of the
Schedule as they found it. So, applying the words of the Schedule in this case,
we are entirely satisfied that the tribunal were correct when they concluded
that the six-year time period had elapsed before the appellant made his
application to the tribunal on October 17 1986. It follows that the question in
the case falls to be answered in the negative and the appeal refused.
Appeal
refused.
