Licence – Eviction – Notice – Appellant occupying property as licensee of the owner – Licence an “excluded” licence for purposes of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 such that appellant not entitled to statutory notice period – Appellant forcibly evicted by police attending in response to allegations of violence made by owner – Respondent son of owner present at eviction – Whether respondent liable for damages for unlawful eviction – Whether eviction without notice unlawful – Appeal dismissed
For several years, the appellant occupied a property as a licensee of the owner, who also lived there. The two had an arrangement under which the appellant claimed housing benefit with which he made a payment to the owner for his use of part of the premises. A relationship formed between the two although they continued to sleep in separate bedrooms.
Towards the end of 2012, the owner’s health deteriorated and she went into hospital suffering from vascular dementia. She began to make allegations against the appellant, including allegations of violence, and claimed that she did not want to return to the property while he was there. The respondent, who was the owner’s son, contacted the police and moved himself into the property. When the police attended, there was an altercation which resulted in the appellant being forcibly ejected from the property and removed in a police car.
The appellant brought a claim against the owner and the respondent for unlawful eviction. It was not disputed that the appellant had occupied under an “excluded licence” for the purposes of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, such that he was not entitled to the statutory period of notice under the 1977 Act. However, the appellant argued that he could not be evicted without any notice at all.
By the date of the hearing, the appellant had married the owner and his claim against her had been compromised. The claim proceeded against the respondent only.
Dismissing the claim, the judge found that, where the owner was communicating that she wanted the appellant out of the property, his right to stay there was extremely limited and those who acted on the owner’s wishes had done so entirely properly. The judge found that the respondent was simply a conduit for his mother’s wishes, that the eviction had been effected not by the respondent but by the police, and that the respondent had not played a sufficient part in the eviction as to give rise to liability for damages. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) It was apparent from the judge’s judgment that, while the respondent was present when the appellant was evicted, he had taken no active role in what happened, with the physical removal being effected by the police. There was nothing to indicate that the respondent had done anything at the property, while the appellant was being evicted, that was capable of making him a joint tortfeasor. Nor did his acting as a conduit for his mother’s wishes make him a joint tortfeasor. The appeal therefore failed on that ground and it was not strictly necessary to determine whether notice always had to be given to evict a licensee.
(2) Per curiam: Nonetheless, regardless of whether notice of any kind was required to terminate a licence, it was clear law that, where the relevant period had not been specified by the licence itself, a licensee was entitled, following revocation of the licence, to whatever in all the circumstances was a reasonable time to remove himself and his possessions: Minister of Health v Bellotti [1944] KB 298 applied. It was not possible to define the principle with more precision. At one end of the spectrum, an unwanted visitor who presented himself at the front door, was asked in, but was then told to go, had to leave immediately, taking the quickest route back to the highway and not delaying; his period of grace might be measured in minutes: Robson v Hallett [1967] 2 QB 939 applied. In other circumstances, a period measured in years might sometimes be appropriate: Parker v Parker [2003] EWHC 1846 (Ch) considered. In a case such as the present, it was doubtful that a period measured in minutes, hours or even days would suffice. On the other hand, it might typically be a period measured in weeks, rather than months or years.
Daniel Brayley (instructed by the Bar Pro Bono Unit) appeared for the appellant; James Fieldsend (instructed by the Bar Pro Bono Unit) appeared for the respondent.
Sally Dobson, barrister
