Option to buy granted by lessor — Term expires and lessee holds over — Whether option nevertheless exercisable on lessor’s death
This was a claim by Mr Maurice Edward Giles, of Sandon Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham, against Mr Richard John Hughes, of Nanhoran House, Nevin, Caernarvonshire, and Mr Joseph Williams, of Glyn Afin, Nevin, as executors of Augusta Sophia Henrietta Bott, deceased, for specific performance of an agreement under which the late Mrs Bott granted the plaintiff an option to purchase certain land at Nevin.
Mr AC Sparrow (instructed by Messrs Sharpe, Pritchard & Co, agents for Messrs Atkins & Selkirk, of Birmingham) appeared for the plaintiff, and Mr K Backhouse (instructed by Messrs Kirk Jackson & Co, of Swinton, near Manchester) represented the defendants.
Mr Sparrow said that on October 19, 1946, Mrs Bott granted the plaintiff a seven-years lease of land at Nevin at a rent of £40 per annum. On July 19, 1947, she executed a deed, supplemental to the lease, which provided that “upon the death of the lessor the lessee shall be entitled to purchase the fee simple of the property demised at the price of £1,200 free from encumbrances upon giving notice in writing within six months of the death of the lessor to her executors.” When the term expired the lessee held over, and a provision in the supplemental deed relating to the grant of a further lease for 21 years was never acted upon. Mrs Bott died on July 21, 1958, and plaintiff’s case was that he exercised the option by a letter of January 16, 1959. The executors repudiated the claim, and by their defence said that the option to purchase was expressed to be in respect of land demised by the deed. The plaintiff had failed to exercise the right to take the land for a further term of 21 years, and the option thereby became null and void. A further defence was that the letter of January 16, 1959, was not a notice in writing given to the executors in accordance with the terms of the option.
Giving judgment, LLOYD-JACOB, J, said that the question for decision was whether on its true construction, the supplemental deed gave the right of purchase of the freehold to the plaintiff only so long as he held the property under the original lease, or whether the deed applied as between these two people in their personal capacities, distinct from their relationship of landlord and tenant.
The lease was referred to in the deed as “hereinafter referred to.” But the deed itself was expressed to have been made between the parties in their personal capacities. The phrase “thereinafter referred to” was employed merely to assist in linking the documents, and did not seriously affect the view that it was an acknowledgment of the arrangement between the parties in their personal capacities. It would be putting too strict an interpretation on the documents to say that the agreement was only applicable so long as the lease of the property was in existence. Accordingly the plaintiff was entitled to judgment with costs, having validly given notice requiring the executors to sell him the property, as agreed between himself and the testator.
