Nuisance – Escape of fire – Rule in Rylands v Fletcher – Fire commencing on appellant’s premises fuelled by tyres stored there for purposes of business as motor vehicle tyre supplier and fitter – Fire destroying respondent’s adjoining property – Whether appellant strictly liable under Rylands v Fletcher rule – Appeal allowed The appellant carried on business as a motor vehicle tyre supplier and fitter from premises on a trading estate. A fire broke out on the premises owing to an electrical fault; fuelled by the tyres stored there, the fire destroyed both the appellant’s property and the respondent’s adjoining premises. The respondent claimed damages from the appellant. In the county court, the respondent’s primary claim against the appellant in negligence was rejected. However, the claimant’s secondary claim, in strict liability under the principle in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, was allowed. The recorder found that found that the appellant had squeezed tyre stock into his premises, storing it haphazardly and untidily. He further found that although tyres did not ignite readily, once they caught fire from another source they were difficult to put out. He held that the requirements for liability under Rylands v Fletcher were met since: (i) the defendant had brought a dangerous thing, namely the tyres, onto his premises; (ii) the danger had “escaped” from the appellant’s land onto the respondent’s land; and (iii) the appellant’s use of his land was “non-natural” and out of the ordinary because of the manner and numbers in which he stored tyres there. The appellant appealed. He contended that the recorder had erred in his application of the Rylands v Fletcher test for strict liability as it applied to fire cases. Held: The appeal was allowed. (1) In order for liability to arise under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, it was necessary to show that the defendant, as the owner or occupier of land, had brought or kept or collected an exceptionally dangerous or mischievous thing on his land, in circumstances where he must have recognised, or should reasonably have recognised, judged by the standards appropriate to the relevant place and time, that there was an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if the thing escaped, however unlikely an escape seemed. The defendant’s use of the land had to be extraordinary and unusual, having regard to all the circumstances of time and place. Liability would then arise if the thing escaped from the defendant’s property into or into the property of another, causing damage of a kind relevant to rights and enjoyment of the claimant’s land; damages for death and personal injury were not recoverable under the rule. It was not necessary to establish negligence on the part of the defendant, but an Act of God, or the act of a stranger, would provide a defence: Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1993] EGCS 211 and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61; [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 48 EG 127 (CS) applied. (2) There was no special rule for cases involving damage caused by the spread of fire. Damage caused by fire emanating from an adjoining property could, in an appropriate case, fall within the general Rylands v Fletcher rule: Jones v Festiniog Railway Co (1868) LR 3 QB 733 and Transco applied; Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43 considered. However, such cases would be very rare since: (i) what had to escape was the “thing” that had been brought onto the land, not the fire that was started or increased by the “thing”; (ii) while fire might be a dangerous thing, the occasions when fire, as such, was brought onto the land might be limited to cases where the fire had been deliberately or negligently started by the occupier or one for whom he was responsible; and (iii) in any event, starting a fire on one’s land might well be regarded an ordinary use of the land. (3) Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the appellant was not liable under the Rylands v Fletcher rule. The “thing” brought onto the appellant’s premises was a large stock of tyres. Tyres, as such, were not exceptionally dangerous or mischievous and there was no evidence that the appellant had recognised, or ought reasonably to have recognised, an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if the tyres escaped. The tyres had not in fact escaped; it was the fire that escaped, stoked by the tyres burning on the appellant’s premises. The escape of the fire did not bring the case within the rule. In any event, keeping a stock of tyres on the premises of a tyre-fitting business, even a very large stock, was not, for the time and place, an extraordinary or unusual use of the land. Per Lewison LJ: Liability for an escape of fire had been limited by section 86 of the Fires Prevention Metropolis Act 1774, which afforded a statutory defence in the case of a fire that had begun accidentally, in the sense that it involved no negligence. The principle in Rylands v Fletcher did not defeat a defence under section 86 against liability for the consequences of a fire that started and spread without anyone’s negligence: Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 applied. Although the general test of negligence might entail the taking of special precautions where the use in question involved the accumulation or storage of inflammable or readily combustible materials, that would be a question of fact to be decided on a case by case basis. Jonathan Waite QC and Michele de Gregorio (instructed by DAC Beachcroft LLP) appeared for the appellant; Philip Rainey QC and Nicholas Isaac (instructed by Beaumonts Solicitors LLP, of Hereford) appeared for the respondent. Sally Dobson, barrister
Nuisance – Escape of fire – Rule in Rylands v Fletcher – Fire commencing on appellant’s premises fuelled by tyres stored there for purposes of business as motor vehicle tyre supplier and fitter – Fire destroying respondent’s adjoining property – Whether appellant strictly liable under Rylands v Fletcher rule – Appeal allowed The appellant carried on business as a motor vehicle tyre supplier and fitter from premises on a trading estate. A fire broke out on the premises owing to an electrical fault; fuelled by the tyres stored there, the fire destroyed both the appellant’s property and the respondent’s adjoining premises. The respondent claimed damages from the appellant. In the county court, the respondent’s primary claim against the appellant in negligence was rejected. However, the claimant’s secondary claim, in strict liability under the principle in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, was allowed. The recorder found that found that the appellant had squeezed tyre stock into his premises, storing it haphazardly and untidily. He further found that although tyres did not ignite readily, once they caught fire from another source they were difficult to put out. He held that the requirements for liability under Rylands v Fletcher were met since: (i) the defendant had brought a dangerous thing, namely the tyres, onto his premises; (ii) the danger had “escaped” from the appellant’s land onto the respondent’s land; and (iii) the appellant’s use of his land was “non-natural” and out of the ordinary because of the manner and numbers in which he stored tyres there. The appellant appealed. He contended that the recorder had erred in his application of the Rylands v Fletcher test for strict liability as it applied to fire cases. Held: The appeal was allowed. (1) In order for liability to arise under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, it was necessary to show that the defendant, as the owner or occupier of land, had brought or kept or collected an exceptionally dangerous or mischievous thing on his land, in circumstances where he must have recognised, or should reasonably have recognised, judged by the standards appropriate to the relevant place and time, that there was an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if the thing escaped, however unlikely an escape seemed. The defendant’s use of the land had to be extraordinary and unusual, having regard to all the circumstances of time and place. Liability would then arise if the thing escaped from the defendant’s property into or into the property of another, causing damage of a kind relevant to rights and enjoyment of the claimant’s land; damages for death and personal injury were not recoverable under the rule. It was not necessary to establish negligence on the part of the defendant, but an Act of God, or the act of a stranger, would provide a defence: Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1993] EGCS 211 and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61; [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 48 EG 127 (CS) applied. (2) There was no special rule for cases involving damage caused by the spread of fire. Damage caused by fire emanating from an adjoining property could, in an appropriate case, fall within the general Rylands v Fletcher rule: Jones v Festiniog Railway Co (1868) LR 3 QB 733 and Transco applied; Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43 considered. However, such cases would be very rare since: (i) what had to escape was the “thing” that had been brought onto the land, not the fire that was started or increased by the “thing”; (ii) while fire might be a dangerous thing, the occasions when fire, as such, was brought onto the land might be limited to cases where the fire had been deliberately or negligently started by the occupier or one for whom he was responsible; and (iii) in any event, starting a fire on one’s land might well be regarded an ordinary use of the land. (3) Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the appellant was not liable under the Rylands v Fletcher rule. The “thing” brought onto the appellant’s premises was a large stock of tyres. Tyres, as such, were not exceptionally dangerous or mischievous and there was no evidence that the appellant had recognised, or ought reasonably to have recognised, an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if the tyres escaped. The tyres had not in fact escaped; it was the fire that escaped, stoked by the tyres burning on the appellant’s premises. The escape of the fire did not bring the case within the rule. In any event, keeping a stock of tyres on the premises of a tyre-fitting business, even a very large stock, was not, for the time and place, an extraordinary or unusual use of the land. Per Lewison LJ: Liability for an escape of fire had been limited by section 86 of the Fires Prevention Metropolis Act 1774, which afforded a statutory defence in the case of a fire that had begun accidentally, in the sense that it involved no negligence. The principle in Rylands v Fletcher did not defeat a defence under section 86 against liability for the consequences of a fire that started and spread without anyone’s negligence: Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 applied. Although the general test of negligence might entail the taking of special precautions where the use in question involved the accumulation or storage of inflammable or readily combustible materials, that would be a question of fact to be decided on a case by case basis. Jonathan Waite QC and Michele de Gregorio (instructed by DAC Beachcroft LLP) appeared for the appellant; Philip Rainey QC and Nicholas Isaac (instructed by Beaumonts Solicitors LLP, of Hereford) appeared for the respondent. Sally Dobson, barrister