Plaintiffs’ application for injunction — Highway authority stopping up road for limited period — Traffic calming scheme — Plaintiffs’ business affected thereby — Injunction granted at first instance — Council appealing on ground that action an abuse of process — Public law claim to be asserted only by judicial review — Appeal allowed
The three respondents to the appeal were an hotel, theatre, and restaurant in Thames Street, Sonning, Berkshire. It was accepted that their businesses depended on forward booking and that restricted access to their premises could detrimentally affect their business and goodwill. The appellant highway authority, Berkshire County Council, had considered for three years a traffic calming scheme for Thames Street, through which travelled some 11,000 vehicles per day. Consultation had been carried out prior to January 1996, but the respondents were not aware until February 5 that Thames Street would be closed to all traffic for two and a half weeks. Thereafter, they were informed on February 8 that there would be but partial closure to allow vehicular access to each of their different premises. However, on February 12, the council concluded that on the ground of safety, the execution of the road construction scheme would involve total closure of the road, the works to be concluded in six days. The respondents learned of this decision on February 29 and the work was due to be commenced on March 11. While welcoming the traffic calming, the respondents objected to the roadworks which prevented two-way traffic through Thames Street and sought an injunction at first instance, arguing that their customers would have to take a long diversion, as the River Thames ran along the back of their premises, and that most of their business came from the south east from which access would be prevented.
At first instance the respondents were granted an injunction that the work should not proceed by way of total road closure in order to comply with road safety regulations and that the diversion would be quite unacceptable. The highway authority argued, inter alia, that they could legalise an obstruction to the public right of passage if they were authorised by statute to do so. It followed therefore that it could not be a common law nuisance to close a road to vehicular traffic pursuant to section 14 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 which allowed the traffic authority to restrict or prohibit traffic on a road where works were intended to be executed. Further, as a general rule it was contrary to public policy and as such an abuse of the process of the court to permit a person, seeking to establish that a decision of a public body infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection under public law, to proceed by way of an ordinary action. Such action had to be by way of judicial review proceedings. The respondents argued, inter alia, that there was nothing in section 14 which took away the private law right. Further the council had to show that the order had been reasonably made and reasonably implemented.
Held The council’s appeal was allowed.
1. In the court’s view, the main point of the proceedings at first instance was misconceived.
2. The order under section 14 was prima facie valid and did not have to be justified by refutation of argument.
3. If a compromise could not be found and the respondents wished to pursue the matter on the ground that the conduct of the authority had been unreasonable in that they had changed their mind at short notice from a partial to a total road closure, they could only do so by way of judicial review proceedings.
Timothy Straker (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard as London agents for Berkshire County Council) appeared for the appellant highway authority; Jonathan Ferris (instructed by Clintons) appeared for the respondents.
