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Hammersmatch Properties Ltd v First Secretary of State

Change of use — Leisure facilities — Local planning policy — Availability of alternative sites — Refusal of planning permission — Whether inspector’s decision justified on evidence — Judge finding inspector plainly wrong — Appeal allowed

The respondent appealed to the secretary of state against a failure by the local planning authority to determine its planning application, which was for a change of use of part of a building from B1 employment use to leisure use as a health and fitness centre. The building was located close to the primary retail core of the town centre and to bus and rail stations. It formed part of a larger complex of industrial and associated office buildings, some of which had been redeveloped while others stood empty. The respondent’s building had been empty for five years, and attempts to let it within its existing permitted use had proved unsuccessful. The building was functionally obsolete.

The inspector dismissed the appeal on the grounds that: (i) the proposed development would be an inappropriate use of employment land, having regard to local planning policies; and (ii) the proposed development was not needed in that location, having regard to the sequential approach to leisure development set out in national and local policies. He identified several other sites in the town centre that he regarded as being preferable for such development.

That decision was overturned on a challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The judge commented on the growing demand for health and fitness facilities, and held that the inspector had been plainly wrong to find that the appeal site was not a preferred location for leisure development. He further held that the inspector could not, in the light of the material before him, reasonably have found that the proposed development was an inappropriate use of employment land. The appellant appealed.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

The inspector’s conclusions and decision had not been irrational. He had not been required to regard the demand for health and leisure facilities as an overriding consideration, but had been obliged to have regard to material planning considerations. Since the appeal site was in a designated employment area, its retention for future employment use was a material consideration by virtue of the local plan. The inspector had been entitled to attach such weight as he saw fit to the requirement for employment land and the demand for health and leisure facilities, and to have regard to the suitability of the appeal site for that purpose, in the light of planning policies, and to the possibility of preferable sites becoming available. He had legitimately concluded that the site should be retained to meet future employment requirements together with business and community needs. He had applied a legitimate planning judgment to the facts that he had found in the context of the relevant planning policies; that planning judgment had been for him, and not the courts, to make and could not be impugned. Although it was possible to sympathise with the judge’s reasoning, he had allowed his personal view of the merits of the application to affect his analysis of the legal position.

Philip Coppel (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the appellant; Robert Griffiths QC and Stephen Whale (instructed by Thomas Eggar, of Crawley) appeared for the respondent.

Sally Dobson, barrister

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