Planning permission — Reuse of existing buildings — Planning policy guidance — Planning permission for change of use refused by local authority — Planning inspector refusing appeal on basis that increased traffic generation outweighing advantages of reuse — Whether inspector erred in failing to deal with possibility of imposing a negative condition — Claim dismissed
The claimant applied for planning permission for a change of use of three building units on a farm in Somerset. The second defendant local authority refused the application. PPG 7 provided advice on the location of rural business, and PPG 13 included advice on reducing the need to travel in the context of rural employment. On appeal by the claimant, the planning inspector identified two main issues, namely whether the proposed development: (i) was consistent with planning policies to minimise the need to travel; and (ii) would lead to a dispersal of employment activity. The inspector dismissed the appeal on the first issue, although he found in favour of the claimant on the second issue. The inspector found that although the units would not generate a great demand for travel, the estimated movements would not be modest when compared with other units. A proposed pedestrian and cycle track were unlikely to be attractive or well used. A bus stop might have provided a realistic and acceptable level of non-car transport, but such a condition would be unreasonable because it would need to be approved by other bodies. The proposal was generally at odds with the national guidance and policy objectives of sustainability, and, overall, the harmful degree of car dependency arising from the development would outweigh the contribution to the local economy.
The claimant applied to the High Court, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, to quash the inspector’s decision. He argued that the inspector had: (i) misinterpreted and misunderstood the interaction between PPG 7 and PPG 13 and failed to weigh in the balance the relative advantages of giving effect to rural employment and the disadvantages of traffic generation; (ii) given inappropriate weight to the transport issue as opposed to the employment issue; and (iii) considered the possibility of imposing a condition requiring the claimant to provide a bus stop as an unlawful positive condition, whereas he should have considered changing it to a negative condition prohibiting development until the bus stop condition had been satisfied.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
1. The inspector had considered both PPG 7 and PPG 13 as a whole, had given clear and adequate reasons for his decision, and had not erred in law. Policy guidance should not be interpreted as if it contained the words of a statute. So long as the inspector applied a meaning to a policy that it was capable of bearing as a matter of law then he would not have erred in law. PPG 7 clearly envisaged that a legitimate planning objection could be constituted by traffic implications, and that traffic objections could outweigh the advantages of reuse. There could be no justification for assuming that the inspector had treated the mere fact that there would be more than modest traffic generation as the main reason for dismissing the appeal. The inspector had identified a range of traffic considerations that justified an objection, and he had not regarded any particular objection as automatically determinative of the matter.
2. Moreover, it was not for the inspector to impose conditions that the parties themselves had not considered, except in very limited circumstances. An inspector was only obliged to consider a form of condition that had not been proposed by the parties where the problem with the condition and the solution to it were both obvious, and the solution could be put in place without the necessity for any further representations or additional material. That was not the case here. It was not for the inspector to engage in a speculative rewrite of a condition to see whether he could come up with something to satisfy the parties. There were no obvious remedies to an obvious problem, only possible remedies. The inspector had not erred in failing to consider the possibility of a negative condition.
Natalie Lieven (instructed by Burges Salmon, of Bristol) appeared for the claimant; Michael Bedford (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; the second defendants did not appear and were not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
