Service occupancy – Employee claiming that he would not have moved to company-owned house but for assurance of lifelong residential security – Whether the giving of such assurance to be inferred from employee’s decision to forego opportunity of buying council house
In 1963 the defendant (C), then a council house tenant in North West London, took employment with the plaintiff building contractors (the employers) where his father was working as yard foreman with the benefit of living accommodation on their Edgware site. In 1969 C, then aged 31, filled in certain forms with a view to buying his council house under a scheme then in operation. At about the same time a director of the employers, mindful that C’s father would shortly retire, had a discussion with C during which he offered C his father’s job and gave certain assurances as to the future residential security of C and his family . As a result of this discussion C decided not to proceed with the purchase of his council house and moved into a house belonging to the employers. In 1973 the employers, having received an attractive offer for the Edgware site, invited C to find a house close to their Kingsbury yard, which the employers would buy for C to occupy as before. C acted on this invitation and in due course moved into 39 Limesdale Gardens, Edgware (Limesdale), which he subsequently kept in repair at his own expense.
In 1991 C lost his job when the employers went into administrative receivership following which the employers, in the person of the receiver, served a notice to quit and claimed possession of Limesdale. In proceedings brought in Central London County Court in 1996 the judge rejected the employers’ claim and declared that C was entitled under the doctrine of equitable estoppel to occupy Limesdale for life, or for so long as he wished. In so holding, the judge found that, in the absence of any reliable evidence as to the nature of the discussions in 1969 and 1973, the most likely inference to be drawn from C’s decision not buy his council house was that he had been assured by his employers that he would obtain lifelong security. The employers appealed.
Held The appeal was allowed
1. Since the 1973 arrangements were intended to reflect what had already been agreed, it was only necessary to consider the effects of the parties’ discussions in 1969.
2. To found his case on equitable estoppel, C had to show that it was unconscionable for the employers to set up their legal rights, which would only be so if C had been induced to change homes and forego the purchase opportunity by an assurance of lifelong security. In the absence of evidence of what was said, this could only be a matter of inference. The inference drawn by the judge was purely speculative, it being quite possible that the attraction for C at the age of 31 was the prospect of a better job, which included suitable accommodation for his family. Furthermore, the employers could not have offered the company house on the terms alleged without departing from their standard practice. On the available evidence, the only reasonable inference was that the accommodation was intended to be made available for the period of employment and no longer.
Matthew Collings (instructed by Wilde Sapte) appeared for the plaintiff appellant; Sinclair Cramsie (instructed by Camerons) appeared for the defendant respondent.
