Rateable value of dock wharf–How to be determined–General Rate Act 1967, section 35–Docks and Harbour (Valuation) Order 1971–Special basis of valuation prescribed–Applicable only to named undertakers–Present case governed by general law–Profits basis–Appeal dismissed
This was an
appeal by Harwich Dock Co Ltd from the refusal of the Divisional Court to grant
an order of mandamus requiring the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to calculate
the rateable value of a hereditament known as Navyard Wharf, occupied by the
company in Harwich harbour, in accordance with the Docks and Harbour
(Valuation) Order 1971, and for the valuation officer for Tendring, Essex, to
make any consequent alterations in the valuation list.
George Dobry
QC and F A Amies (instructed by Middleton, Lewis & Co, of Horley, Surrey)
appeared for the dock company; Brian Davenport (instructed by the Solicitor of
Inland Revenue) represented the commissioners and the valuation officer.
Giving
judgment, BRIDGE LJ said that the wharf in question comprised a complex of
jetties with berths for five ships. At all material times the hereditament as a
whole had been an approved wharf for the purposes of section 14, and had
included two transit sheds approved within section 17, of the Customs and
Excise Act 1952. The sole question was how the rateable value was to be
determined. Under section 35 of the General Rate Act 1967 the Secretary of
State for the Environment was empowered to make provision by order for
determining the rateable value of ‘any hereditament occupied by the persons
carrying on, under authority conferred by or under any enactment, a dock or
harbour undertaking.’ The company
claimed that the hereditament should be valued under the Docks and Harbour
(Valuation) Order 1971, and sought to establish the claim by mandamus. The
commissioners and the valuation officer contended that the rateable value
should be assessed after 1971 as it had been before 1971–under the general law
of rating on the so-called profits basis. The company contended that the dock
undertaking was carried on under authority conferred by the Customs and Excise
Act 1952 by virtue of the approvals given under sections 14 and 17. The
commissioners contended that the statutory authority envisaged by section 35 of
the General Rate Act 1967 was authority conferred on a particular named
undertaking to carry on the totality of the undertaking.
The rival
contentions were finely balanced. He (his Lordship) found nothing in the
context in which the words ‘under authority conferred by or under any
enactment’ appeared in section 35 to afford any clue to the underlying
legislative purpose. Nor was there any decisive pointer in the arguments for
either side. It was said that the commissioners’ construction gave no effect to
the words ‘under any enactment,’ since no example could be given of a statutory
dock or harbour undertaking whose powers were not derived directly from
statute. On the other hand, it was said that the company’s construction would
render purposeless the whole phrase, since in practice every dock undertaking
must operate at a place where goods could be handled in connection with their
export, import, or coastwise transportation.
In the end his
Lordship’s impression was that it was marginally more probable that Parliament
intended the result which followed from the narrow rather than the wide
construction, and he would dismiss the appeal.
ROSKILL LJ and
CAIRNS LJ delivered concurring judgments and the appeal was dismissed.
