Rating — Two fields forming part of a large farm — Use once a year for point-to-point races on Easter Monday — The racing circuit was in one of the fields (an arable field) and it contained seven permanent fences — The other field (permanent pasture) was used on the day of the races for control purposes, catering, betting and parking — There were five or six races run on the day, each lasting for five or six minutes; the meeting lasted about two and a half hours, the actual racing occupying a total of about 30 minutes — The valuation officer proposed to include the two fields in the valuation list with a rateable value of £850 as a ‘race course’ — Local valuation court held, on an objection, that the fields were exempt from rating as agricultural land within section 26(3) of the General Rate Act 1967, the race course use being minimal — The decision was overturned by the Lands Tribunal on an appeal by the local valuation officer — The present appeal to the Court of Appeal was brought by
This was an
appeal by Mr C L Loyd, the occupier of Lockinge Farm, Wantage, Oxfordshire,
from a decision of the Lands Tribunal (V G Wellings QC) holding that certain
fields were liable for rating as a ‘race course’. The respondent to this appeal
was the valuation officer, Mr J M Hayes. The Lands Tribunal’s decision was
reported at (1982) 264 EG 540, [1982] 2 EGLR 228 (but see amendment at end of this
report).
Edward Cazalet
QC and R J A Carnwath (instructed by Withers) appeared on behalf of the
appellant; Alan Fletcher (instructed by the Solicitor of Inland Revenue)
represented the respondent.
Giving the
judgment of the court, FOX LJ said: This is an appeal from a decision of the
Lands Tribunal. The case is concerned with the rating of two adjacent pieces of
land at Lockinge Farm, Wantage, Oxfordshire, which is a farm of some 2,300
acres.
The northern
piece of land is an arable field of about 13 acres. The perimeter of the field
is laid out as a circuit for point-to-point races. Those races take place on
one day a year, at Easter; that has been so since 1953. The circuit is about 12
furlongs in length and contains seven permanent steeplechase fences and two
temporary fences. There are also some permanent rails on some parts of the
circuit; they are on the inside of the track along its southern end and at the
corners — and there is a short length in the middle of the eastern section.
Between
meetings the circuit is used for the production of hay.
The southern
field consists of 52 acres. It is permanent pasture. It is not suitable for
arable land because of a ditch, a right of way and the steep slope of the
ground towards the southern end of the field. It is used in conjunction with
the circuit for control purposes and for catering, betting and parking.
In March 1978
the valuation officer made a proposal to bring the two pieces of land together
into the valuation list under the description ‘race course’ with a rateable
value of £850. That proposal was objected to and, on the hearing of that
objection, the local valuation court held that the two pieces of land were
exempt from rating on the ground that they were agricultural land within the
provisions of section 26(3) of the the General Rate Act 1967, the use as a race
course being in the opinion of the valuation court de minimis.
Section 26(1)
of the General Rate Act 1967 is as follows:
No
agricultural land or agricultural buildings shall be liable to be rated or be
included in any valuation list or in any rate.
Section 26(3)
of the Act is as follows:
In this
section the expression ‘agricultural land’ —
(a) means any land used as arable meadow or
pasture ground only, land used for a plantation or a wood or for the growth of
saleable underwood, land exceeding one quarter of an acre used for the purpose
of poultry farming, cottage gardens exceeding one quarter of an acre, market
gardens, nursery grounds, orchards or allotments, including allotment gardens
within the meaning of the Allotments Act 1922, but does not include land
occupied together with a house as a park, gardens (other than as aforesaid),
pleasure grounds, or land kept or preserved mainly or exclusively for purposes
of sport or recreation, or land used as a racecourse; and for the purposes of
this paragraph the expression ‘cottage garden’ means a garden attached to a
house occupied as a dwelling by a person of the labouring classes; and
(b) includes land occupied with, and used solely
in connection with the use of, such a building as is mentioned in subsection
(4)(b) of this section . . .
From the
decision of the valuation court the valuation officer appealed to the Lands
Tribunal. That appeal was heard by Mr V G Wellings, who allowed it. He held that
the user of the land as a race course was not trifling and accordingly that the
maxim de minimis non curat lex did not apply. Mr Loyd, the occupier of
Lockinge Farm, now appeals from that decision.
The following
facts, inter alia, were found by the Lands Tribunal in addition to those
which I have already set forth:
(i) The race meetings are conducted by the Old
Berkshire Hunt and are subject to the regulations for point-to-point
steeplechases of the Jockey Club.
(ii) The race meetings take place on Easter Monday
in each year. There are five or six races each year. Each race is over 3 miles
and lasts for five or six minutes. Accordingly the racing lasts about 30
minutes in each year. Each meeting lasts about 2 1/2 hours.
(iii) The ‘areas of control’ required by the Jockey
Club regulations for the conduct of point-to-point meetings are all situated on
the southern field in the six acres of it nearest to the circuit. These areas
of control comprise a parade ring formed by temporary chestnut fencing, an
unsaddling enclosure, weighing and changing tents, secretaries’ tent and other
stand wagons, enclosures or tents used by the officials of the meeting. In
addition, within that six-acre area, at each meeting, tents are provided for
caterers, a bar selling alcoholic refreshment, and for the tote. An area is set
aside for the use of bookmakers. Horse boxes for horses competing in the races
are parked within that 6-acre area.
(iv) The meeting is, says the tribunal, a great
attraction for persons living in the locality and, indeed, further afield and
as many as 10,000 spectators, some on foot but many in cars, attend the
meetings. Entry is free but charges are made for car parking. All cars are
parked on the southern field to the south of the six-acre area.
(v) The Jockey Club’s inspector makes an
inspection of the course about six weeks before the meeting when the clerk of
the course must produce two or more fences.
(vi) The chestnut fencing for the paddock is
erected about two weekends immediately before the meeting. The tents are
erected on the Thursday before the meeting. And on the Sunday before Easter the
car parking areas are marked out by tapes and cords.
(vii) By the Wednesday or Thursday immediately
after Easter everything is cleared away apart from the permanent features.
(viii) The use of the land for racing does not
affect the value of Lockinge Farm.
(ix) Except for a few days before and after
meetings, the southern field is indistinguishable from the rest of the farm
fields. It suffers no damage from its use at the race meetings.
(x) If there were no race meetings, the
agricultural use of the southern field would not differ.
(xi) The bulk of the revenue from the race
meetings is from car parking. In 1978 the total profit after all expenditure
was £5,733, and in 1979 it was £9,601. Most of the profit went to the Old
Berkshire Hunt. Mr Loyd, the present appellant, receives no financial benefit
from the race meetings.
We should add
that there is no dispute in this case as to the existence of hereditaments
which are capable of being separately rated. It is also common ground that the
island of land bounded by the circuit is not within any relevant hereditament.
We come to the
interpretation of the statute. The structure of section 26 of the Act of 1967,
so far as material, is this. By subsection (1) it is provided that no
agricultural land shall be liable to be rated. The definition of ‘agricultural
land’ is contained in subsection (3). It means (inter alia) ‘land used
as arable meadow or pasture ground only’. The subsection, however, is so drawn
as to exclude from the statutory meaning ‘land used as a race course’. There
was some debate before us as to the ambit of the words ‘arable meadow or
pasture ground only’. If, however, land is ‘used as a race course’, within the
meaning of the subsection, the precise ambit of the earlier words is not
material. If land is so used, it cannot be entitled to the exemption since the
statute expressly provides that agricultural land does not include land used as
a racecourse.
In the
expression ‘land used as a race course’, the crucial word, for the purposes of
the present case, is ‘used’. Subsection (3) does not qualify the word by
reference to extent at all. In that respect there is a striking difference in
language between the reference to
mainly or exclusively for purposes of sport or recreation’. Thus the statute
does not require that land be used ‘mainly or exclusively’ as a race course but
only that it is ‘used’ for that purpose. If it is ‘used’ as a race course
within the meaning of the statute, the fact that it is also used for other
purposes is not material. We say ‘within the meaning of the statute’ because
the user must be of such extent that the law will take account of it. If it is
so slight that the maxim de minimis non curat lex applies to it, then
the user will not be a sufficient user for the purposes of the statute. But
unless the user can be said to be de minimis it will satisfy the statute. Thus
in Wimborne and Cranborne Rural District Council v East Dorset
Assessment Committee [1940] 2 KB 420 farmland had been used for motor-cycle
races on two afternoons in 1937 and four afternoons in 1939. The attendance was
about 2,000 persons on each occasion in 1938. Quarter Sessions decided the land
was used as a race course for the purposes of the then current rating statute —
the provisions of which were not materially different for present purposes to
those of the 1967 Act. MacKinnon LJ, with whom the other members of the court
concurred, said at p 428:
But if the
user is sufficiently substantial that the maxim de minimis cannot apply,
I do not see how this court can hold that there was no evidence on which
quarter sessions could come to the conclusion they did come to.
Mr Cazalet,
for the appellant, referred us to three other cases (which were decisions of
the Lands Tribunal), but I do not think they take the matter any further. They
were Honiton and District Agricultural Association v Wonnacott
(1955) 48 R & IT 589, United Counties Agricultural Society v Knight
[1973] RA 13 and Young v West Dorset District Council [1977] RA
237. They are simply decisions, on their own facts, as to whether land was used
as arable meadow or pasture ground only.
In the present
case there were, in our opinion, ample grounds upon which the Lands Tribunal
could conclude that the two fields were ‘used as a race course’ within the
meaning of the statute. They plainly were ‘used’ as a race course. The actual
racing only took place on the circuit, but the southern field must nevertheless
be regarded as part of the race course. In the ordinary use of English the
expression ‘race course’ is not limited to the race track; it includes the
whole complex of the race track and the areas used for control, catering,
betting, parking, the viewing of races and the convenience of spectators
generally.
The question
then is whether the use of the two fields as a race course was de minimis.
In that connection it is the use of the land itself (ie the two fields) with
which one is concerned. The fact that the land is part of a larger unit (ie
Lockinge Farm) is not, we think, material. One measures the extent of the user
by reference to the land which is used and not by reference to Lockinge Farm as
a whole. It is not being sought to rate Lockinge Farm but only the two fields.
Nor do we think it is of consequence that Mr Loyd himself receives no part of
the benefit from the user as a race course. The test is user and not whether
the occupier receives the financial benefit of the user.
Now while it
is true that the race meeting takes place on only one day a year and does not
interfere with the profitability of the farm, we think that the following circumstances
without more would justify the Lands Tribunal in concluding that the user could
not be dismissed as de minimis:
(i) that some 10,000 people,
many with cars, go upon the land to attend the race meeting; tents have to be
erected for catering, a bar, the tote and other purposes;
(ii) that there are installed
upon the land some permanent fences and rails for the racing, and
(iii) that work has to be done on the fields some
days before the meeting to prepare them for the meeting.
The
jurisdiction of this court on the present appeal to interfere with the decision
below is, it is accepted, a limited one. The appellant must establish that the
decision of the Lands Tribunal was erroneous in point of law. The question
whether land is used as a race course is one of fact and degree. Unless,
therefore, it can be shown that the tribunal misdirected itself or that its
decision is plainly wrong, this court cannot interfere (Edwards v Bairstow
[1956] AC 14). Since, for the reasons which we have indicated, there seems to
us to be evidence which justifies the tribunal’s decision, it cannot be said
that the decision is plainly wrong. It is said, however, that the tribunal
misdirected itself. We do not accept that. The matters complained of are these:
(i) The tribunal referred to the importance
locally of the event. We are not satisfied that the tribunal there was doing
anything more than emphasise that the meeting was a substantial race meeting —
and that is, we think, material to the question of the extent of the user. We
note that the finding of fact (no (9)) was that ‘the race meeting is a great
attraction for persons living in the locality and indeed further afield and as
many as 10,000 spectators, some on foot but many in cars, attend the meetings’.
(ii) The tribunal referred to the large numbers of
persons who attend the meeting. That is, in our view, a material consideration
going to the extent of user.
(iii) The tribunal referred to the organisation and
preparation for the event. We can see that there could be much organisation and
preparation but very little user. But in the present case the organisation and
preparation involved work on the land to enable it to be used as a race course
and the tribunal was entitled to consider those matters in forming a general
view as to user.
(iv) The tribunal referred to the financial
return. We quite follow that there could be a very substantial user of land
with no financial return. And we suppose that there could be a quite trivial
user which produced a large financial return. But the Court of Appeal in the Wimborne
case, at p 428, evidently thought that the size of the receipts was material.
And it seems to us that, in the present case, while the size of the profit
probably does not tell one a great deal more than one learns from the number of
spectators, when one is asking whether this user is de minimis, the
combination of the facts that there were 10,000 spectators and a profit of
£9,000 are indicative of the extent of the user and go to the question whether,
for the purposes of this statute, that user can be said to be so trifling that
the law should disregard it. If we are wrong about that, we do not think it
makes any difference. Mr Cazalet accepts that, if there were a misdirection,
this court should determine the matter, since all the facts are known. And for
the reasons which we have given when expressing the view that there were ample
grounds upon which the tribunal could reach the decision which it did, we
conclude that this land is used as a race course and that the user is not
within the maxim de minimis non curat lex.
We should add
that, in the context of a rating statute, the result is not very surprising.
Agricultural land is exempted. But if farmland is used for a non-agricultural
purpose which produces a substantial annual profit, there is no reason why, as
a matter of policy, that should not be reflected in rateability.
We dismiss the
appeal.
The appeal
was dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.