Practice and procedure – Proprietary estoppel – Summary judgment – Claimants claiming interest in property on basis of proprietary estoppel relying on parents’ assurances – Defendant applying for reverse summary judgment – Whether defendant satisfying burden of proof that claimant had no real prospect of success at trial – Application dismissed
The claimants brought a proprietary estoppel claim against the defendant in respect of two properties. The first was Belmont Farm, near Devoran, Truro in Cornwall which consisted of a farmhouse, garden, cottage, outbuildings and 22 acres of agricultural land. The second was 38 acres of land at Tregoose Farm, also near Truro, which included a 10 acres field, known as Dog Park, which had development potential.
The first claimant’s father (H) had farmed both properties before his death in March 2020. The defendant inherited Belmont Farm from H (her husband). The land at Tregoose Farm was jointly owned at his death by H and the defendant. The claim was brought against the defendant both personally and as executrix of H’s estate.
The claimants argued that H had wished the farm to continue to be farmed by his descendants and that, in autumn 2013, he asked the claimants to relocate to live near to Belmont Farm so that they could learn the ropes of the farming business and take on the farm, which he assured them would be theirs one day. After repeated requests and further assurances, in the presence of the defendant, the claimants said they moved with their young family from Guildford to Cornwall and the second claimant gave up his job and had worked on the farm since September 2015.
The defendant applied for reverse summary judgment against the claimants. She contended, amongst other things, that the assurances pleaded were too uncertain to be the foundation of a proprietary estoppel claim.
Held: The application was dismissed.
(1) Under CPR rule 24.3, the court might give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on an issue if it considered that the party had no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and there was no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at trial. The burden of proof rested on the applicant even though at the trial the burden would rest on the respondents as claimants.
The law on proprietary estoppel was concerned with how things would be in the future. It was about promises, and not merely statements of present intention. There had to be a promise or assurance by a property owner, whether by words or conduct, and on one occasion or more, or over a period of time, apparently intended to be relied upon, made to another person who relied on such promise or assurance to their detriment, such that it would be unconscionable for the property owner to renege on the promise or assurance: Thorner v Major [2009] 2 EGLR 111 considered.
(2) The burden at trial lay on the claimants to prove their case. But the present application was not the trial of the claim. It was an application by the defendant to bring the claim to an end summarily, without a trial, on the basis that the claimants had no real prospect, or only an unreal, illusory or theoretical prospect, of success at trial. The burden lay on the defendant, to prove that that was the case. That was a high threshold. A claimant was not lightly to be deprived of a trial: see Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Condek Holdings Ltd [2014] BLR 574; [2014] PLSCS 190.
There were clear factual disputes between the parties. Although, some such disputes might have no substance worth a trial, the factual disputes here were not of that limited character. In particular, whether any assurances (if given) were “clear enough” could only sensibly be determined once all the facts were found, and the context was clear. The resolution of the dispute whether assurances were neither intended nor apparently intended to be relied upon could be properly resolved only at trial by the court considering all the evidence, including in particular the cross-examination of the various witnesses upon their witness statements.
The defendant had made powerful arguments, supported by documents and recordings of conversations, and it would not be easy for the claimants to surmount them at trial where the burden would lie on them to prove their case. However, on all the material before the court, although the case was weak, it was not so weak that the court could say it had only a fanciful or theoretical prospect of success. Accordingly, summary judgment could not be granted.
(3) In accordance with CPR rule 24.6, when the court determined a summary judgment application it might make its order subject to conditions in accordance with rule 3.1(3) which might include a condition to pay a sum of money into court; and specify the consequence of failure to comply with the order or a condition.
Here the defendant asked that the order dismissing its application for reverse summary judgment, and thus permitting the matter to go to trial, be made conditional on the claimants’ paying a sum of money into court, with the sanction of dismissal of the claim if that was not done within a specified time. The claimants resisted that on the basis that the claim was not so weak as to justify such an order, and also that it would stifle the claim altogether.
The burden lay on the respondent to an application for a conditional order to establish on the balance of probabilities that it would be unable to comply with a condition requiring payment into court or the provision of equivalent security. In the present case the claimants were aware at least from the service of the defendant’s witness statement that, if the summary judgment application did not succeed, a conditional order would be sought. If the claimants succeeded in their claim, in accordance with the usual costs rules, then, subject to CPR Part 36, it was not likely that there would be any significant costs order made against them in favour of the defendant.
(4) The court would dismiss the application for reverse summary judgment, but conditionally on charges of various interests belonging to the claimants being made in favour of the defendant, or alternatively payment into court. This was a case which cried out for mediation by the parties and the court would order a stay of the claim to allow for mediation.
Alexander Learmonth KC (instructed by Coodes LLP, of Truro) appeared for the applicant; Alex Troup KC (instructed by Direct Access) appeared for the respondents.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
