Using threatening language to intimidate in the course of a dispute which is the subject of legal proceedings justifies interim injunctions in order to prevent oppressive conduct in litigation and to protect the court’s own processes.
In Linemile Properties Ltd and another v Plater and another [2023] EWHC 810 (Ch), the Chancery Division has dismissed an appeal from the grant of interim injunctions in a dispute over a right of way.
The appellants/defendants owned a property known as Eden and a road – Piggy Lane – over which the respondents/claimants had a right of way in two directions to two entrances to their property, Moorefield. The dispute concerned the exercise and condition of the right of way including contributions to the upkeep of the road over which the right was exercisable. Injunctions had already been granted against the appellants in December 2020 and June 2021 concerning access to Piggy Lane, the removal of a hardstanding and the provision of a walkway.
In September 2021, the respondents’ solicitor sought to visit their home. There was a verbal exchange with the second appellant, captured on CCTV, which left the solicitor intimidated and scared and he departed without being able to see his client. In October 2021, the appellants were restrained until trial or further order from abusing, harassing, assaulting, approaching or being within 10 yards of the respondents’ solicitor and any partner in the firm or any expert engaged by the respondents to assist them in the proceedings.
The appellants argued that the judge had erred in law in granting the injunctions as a freestanding remedy in respect of individuals and a firm who were not a party to the proceedings. The matter should be left to the police, to whom the incident had been reported.
The Chancery Division dismissed the appeal. The judge had not fallen into error. He had not made an order which amounted to a free-standing remedy divorced from the litigation and the respondents’ claim. The interim relief granted was expressly for the benefit of the respondents and to protect their entitlement to unimpeded legal and expert advice.
The second appellant’s words and actions were threatening and could not be shrugged off as a normal reaction or a turn of phrase in common use. The judge was exercising the court’s power to guard its own processes and do justice by regulating the conduct of a party before it, over whom it had jurisdiction.
Louise Clark is a property law consultant and mediator
