Powers of local housing authority — Compulsory purchase — Claimant’s house unfit for human habitation — Council making compulsory purchase order with a view to selling house on open market — Whether power to acquire compulsorily exercisable where other powers available — Whether compulsory purchase limited to purpose of providing social housing — Sections 17 and 204 of Housing Act 1985 — Claim dismissed
The claimant owned a mid-terrace house in a conservation area in St Albans. The house was in a very poor condition. In April 2000, the second defendant council made a compulsory purchase order in relation to the property, pursuant to their power under section 17(1)(b) of the Housing Act 1985. A public inquiry was held before an inspector, who found, inter alia, that: (i) the claimant’s property was unfit for human habitation; (ii) its defects directly affected the adjoining properties; (iii) the claimant did not have the financial resources to restore it; and (iv) although the property required considerable repairs that could not be funded by the council or a social landlord, it could be sold on the open market, and, thereafter, renovated satisfactorily. He concluded that there was a compelling case in the public interest to justify compulsory acquisition, and the first defendant Secretary of State subsequently confirmed the order.
The claimant brought proceedings to challenge that decision under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, contending, inter alia, that it had been unlawful for the council to proceed with the compulsory purchase order under section 17(1)(b). She submitted that: (i) since the property was a single house and unfit for human habitation within the meaning of section 604, the council had been confined to the means of intervention listed in section 604A (which amplified earlier provisions in sections 189, 263, 265 and 289, concerning, respectively, repair notices, closing orders, demolition orders and clearance areas); and (ii) section 17 permitted the acquisition of a house only in order to add it to the public sector “social housing” stock.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
1. Section 17, properly construed in its context, was clear and unambiguous. There was no provision within the section, or elsewhere, to exclude its operation where a notice under section 189, 264 or 265 had, or had not, been served, and those sections contained no indication that they constituted the only powers available to a local housing authority when a house came within their terms. It was inherently improbable that parliament would have intended to exclude unfit housing from the ambit of section 17.
2. The claimant was not correct in arguing that section 17 applied only to the acquisition of a house for social housing purposes. The section 17 power had to be exercised “for the purposes of” the part of the Act in which it appeared, and the main purpose was the provision of housing accommodation. There was nothing to restrict that to public or social housing. Accordingly, the council had been entitled to proceed under section 17(1)(b).
3. Historically, in relation to the almost identical provision in section 96 of the Housing Act 1957, the courts had consistently rejected similarly narrow constructions to those advanced by the claimant. If parliament had intended to change that approach, it would have done so expressly. Moreover, the same approach had continued in cases decided under the 1985 Act: Andreiser v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 195 EG 121 and Bell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1989] 1 EGLR 27 considered.
The claimant appeared in person; David Forsdick (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first defendant; Joshua Swirsky (instructed by the solicitor to St Albans City and District Council) appeared for the second defendants.
Sally Dobson, barrister
