Possession order — Validity of order — Council originally acquiring land as clearance area — Houses on land managed by plaintiffs for temporary housing — Tenants refusing to give up possession — Whether development pending — Whether “land” including all land or only land on which house was standing — Whether secure tenants — Judgment in tenants’ favour
In 1969, land in and around Lillieshall Road, Clapham, London SW4, including no 22, the subject-matter of the present proceedings, was declared a clearance area by Lambeth London Borough Council under the Housing Act 1957. Two years later they made a compulsory purchase order with regard to the land so that 22 Lillieshall Road was transferred to them pursuant to the CPO. A rehabilitation order for part of the land in the clearance area, including no 22, was made for the houses to be improved to the “full standard”. The Lillieshall Road Co-operative was formed and the council permitted it to use and manage houses in the road. The tenancy of no 22 was granted to the defendants as founder members of the co-operative. In 1990 a notice to quit was served on the defendants and possession proceedings commenced in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment in the county court. The defendants appealed on the grounds that: (i) the word “land” in para 3(1) of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1985 did not refer to all the land acquired at the same time as the dwelling-house which formed the subject of the proceedings, referring only to the land with which no 22 was let; and (ii) no development of that land was pending.
Schedule 1, para 3 to the Housing Act 1985 provides: “(1) A tenancy is not a secure tenancy if the dwelling-house is on land which has been acquired for development and the dwelling-house is used by the landlord pending development … as temporary housing accommodation.”
Held The appeal was allowed.
1. The evidence had not gone far enough to support the judge’s conclusion that the local authority were keeping the land pending development. There had not been sufficient evidence to determine the council’s plans for the area of whole. Therefore, para 3(1) was not satisfied and the appellants were secure tenants.
2. In view of the above, it was not necessary for the court to determine the question of whether “land” bore the narrow meaning, as contended for by the tenants, or the wider meaning as the council maintained.
Jeremy Morgan (instructed by Jacqueline Everett & Co) appeared for the appellants; and Andrew Judge (instructed by Cook & Partners) appeared for the respondent council.
