General Rate Act 1967–Whether Electricity Board’s unoccupied showroom liable to be rated–Effect of rating of unoccupied property–Exception for showrooms not occupied or used unaffected by empty property rate–Distress warrant quashed
This was an
appeal by the London Electricity Board from a decision of a stipendiary
magistrate sitting at Thames Magistrates’ Court on October 13 1975, granting
the London Borough of Tower Hamlets a distress warrant for the recovery of £386
rates due on premises owned by the board in Roman Road, Bow.
D Widdicombe
QC and A Alesbury (instructed by Waltons & Morse) appeared for the
appellants; C Joseph and C Magill (instructed by the Solicitor to the London
Borough of Tower Hamlets) represented the respondents.
Giving
judgment, MICHAEL DAVIES J said that the appellants’ complaint was that the
magistrate erred in law because the period for which the rates were claimed was
a time when the premises were both unoccupied and unused.
Section 34(1)
of the General Rate Act 1967 provided that, subject to the provisions of
section 34(2), no premises which were, or formed part of, premises occupied by
an electricity board were liable to rates or to be included in any valuation
list. Section 34(2)(b) provided that section 34(1) should not apply to a
showroom or any other place occupied and used
There was no
dispute that the premises in the present case were used by the appellants until
November 1974 as showrooms and accordingly section 34(1) did not apply and they
were rated in the ordinary way. It was now said on behalf of the appellants
that when the premises were empty and not occupied or used by the appellants
they were not taken out of section 34(1) and there was therefore no question of
their being liable for rates. That submission had been accepted by the learned
stipendiary and he (his lordship) agreed with his finding in that respect. On
the face of it that would seem to end the case, but matters had gone further,
because what had happened was that the respondents, by virtue of powers in
section 17 of the 1967 Act, decided that the provisions of Schedule 1 to the
Act should apply and unoccupied premises should be liable for rates. For the
respondents it was contended before the magistrate, who accepted it, that para
1 of Schedule 1 should be construed as meaning that unoccupied premises should
be deemed to be occupied and liable for rates. He (his lordship) found that argument
unacceptable. It seemed to him that if it had been intended to provide for the
situation now urged by the respondents the schedule could easily have ‘deemed’
that this situation existed for the purposes of section 34. There was, however,
nothing in the schedule which caused him to think that the conclusion which one
reached from section 34(1) and (2)(b) was affected in any way. The situation
was not changed in any way by Schedule 1. It did not provide that the premises
should be deemed to be occupied and used for the purpose of a showroom.
The
stipendiary magistrate reached a conclusion on the facts which was correct,
namely, that the occupation and use by the board had to be established in order
to bring the premises into section 34(2) but was in error in his conclusion
that Schedule 1 enabled the respondents to rate and assess the premises during
the period of non-occupation. For those reasons the appeal succeeded and the
distress warrant should be quashed.
LORD WIDGERY
CJ and GOFF J agreed. The appeal was allowed and the distress warrant quashed.
