Comprehensive development — Redetermination — Appeal refused — Residential development and bypass — Relevant development plans — Secretary of State’s finding on balance that development seriously undermining purpose of operative development plans — Need for measure of public certainty — Secretary of State dismissing appeal — Decision quashed in appeal to High Court
The appeal concerned Salisbury District Council’s refusal to grant outline planning permission for comprehensive development, including a bypass, on land to the west of Downton, Wiltshire. It had first been considered at a local inquiry and the inspector’s decision upholding that refusal was itself upheld by the Secretary of State. An appeal by the applicants to the High Court was allowed and the matter was sent for redetermination. The second inspector on inquiry also refused planning permission. The Secretary of State upheld that refusal stating, inter alia, that the coming in to force of section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, required him to determine the appeal in accordance with the relevant development plans unless there were material considerations which indicated otherwise. He found that the proposal did not prejudice structure and local policies under the plans and helped achieve their aims with regard to the bypass. However, the appeal proposal was clearly in conflict with other policies on housing in the development plans. Those policies had followed the statutory process of public consultation and debate. To allow the appeal would significantly remove the measure of certainty that local interests were entitled to expect as to what types of development would be permitted in their locality. The applicants appealed.
Held The Secretary of State’s decision was quashed.
1. Section 54A did set up a presumption in favour of the development plan, but for its rebuttal it was sufficient if there were material considerations which indicated otherwise: St Albans District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1992] EGCS 147.
2. Further, para 17 of PPG1 stated that although the provisions of plans were not prescriptive they were intended to provide a firm basis for consistent decision.
3. It was clear therefore that the decision-taker had to follow a consistent course in arriving at the decision having regard to statute, plans, policies, and other material considerations. However, he also had a wide discretion to reach the proper decision on the facts of the case.
4. There was, as a result, a legitimate public expectation that any planning decision would be arrived at by the process of paying regard to plans, statute, policies, etc. However, there could not be a legitimate expectation that any particular planning application would be determined solely by reference to the relevant plan.
5. The submission was accepted that that expectation was not a separate and independent consideration which directly related to what was the proper use of the land. It was a matter relating to the process by which the decision on that question had to be reached. The word “certainty” did not appear in the guidance and was inconsistent with statutory provisions and with the clear statement that the plan was not prescriptive.
6. Seen in the context that the clear findings that the development as a whole would not cause physical harm, there should not be an independent consideration of the housing proposal.
Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC (instructed by Boodle Hatfield, of Southampton) appeared for the applicants; Richard Drabble (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State for the Environment; Philip Petchey (instructed by the solicitor to Salisbury District Council) appeared for the local planning authority.
