Plaintiff buying property — Son and family living in property — Plaintiff seeking possession against son’s widow — Whether widow having equitable interest — High Court finding for widow — Plaintiff’s appeal allowed in part by majority
The plaintiff owned 223 Coventry Road, Ilford, which he bought with a mortgage in his sole name in 1968. His son, R, married the first defendant, M, in 1971. They had five children, the three oldest being the other defendants to the action and all of them living with their mother. R and M at first lived with the plaintiff at another address and then R lived in 223 Coventry Road with his mistress. When M started legal proceedings against R, it was arranged that in return for dropping the proceedings, she and R should live with their children at 223 Coventry Road. They carried out extensive improvements to the house at R’s expense. The marriage finally broke down in 1988 and M obtained a court order excluding R from the house. R died in 1991. M had supposed from 1981 to 1990 that the house belonged to R, who had paid the mortgage instalments while he was living there. The plaintiff let the house in which he and his wife were living, which he also owned. Thereafter, because of a change in his own circumstances, he sought possession of the house in Coventry Road in which M and her children were living. M had put in a new kitchen in 1990 with borrowed money. At first instance the judge found that M had an equitable interest in the house on the basis of proprietary estoppel. The plaintiff appealed.
Held The appeal was allowed in part.
1. In Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96, the conditions for the claim of an equity were laid down, viz that the person made a mistake as to his legal rights; that that person expended money on the faith of that mistaken belief; the possessor of the legal right knew that his right was inconsistent with any equity; that he must have known of the other person’s mistaken belief and encouraged the other person in expending money either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal rights.
2. Per Hirst and Roch LJJ: M was able to satisfy all those requirements and the judge was correct in deciding that it was a case where she had an equity which defeated the plaintiff’s claim for possession.
3. Having found the existence of an equity the judge was correct that he had to determine its extent. However, the court disagreed with his finding that M had a beneficial interest owing to proprietary estoppel.
4. In the court’s view, what had been created on the facts was a licence for M to remain in the house for her life or such shorter period as she might decide.
5. On the question of relief necessary to give effect to the equity, the plaintiff’s claim for possession would be refused on terms — such as M’s responsibility for outgoings, mortgage repayments etc, which should be the subject of discussion.
6. Per Dillon LJ dissenting: The highest effect would have been to prevent the plaintiff obtaining possession against the wishes of R during his lifetime. However, the equity did not extend to R’s wife after R’s death. Although the plaintiff should not be seeking to evict his widowed daughter-in-law and grandchildren and render them homeless, the court could not regard that as per se enough to render his conduct so unconscionable in the eyes of equity so as to entitle to the court to refuse him possession of the house.
John Bryant (instructed by Jennings Son & Ash) for the plaintiff; Nicholas Chapman (instructed by Gill & Co) for the defendants.
