Mayflower Cambridge Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and another

Enforcement notice–Certain floors of seven-storey block of bedsitters let on nightly terms with services–Notice claiming that use had been changed to hotel accommodation held correctly drafted–Essence of an hotel is that it caters for a transient population–Bedsitters involve an element of permanence in their occupation This was an appeal by Mayflower Cambridge Ltd from a decision of the first respondent, the Secretary of State for the Environment, upholding an enforcement notice served on the appellants by the second respondents, Cambridge City Council, alleging that part of Mayflower House, Cambridge, was being used as hotel accommodation without planning permission, and requiring the appellants to discontinue that use. Mr M Howard (instructed by Davenport, Lyons & Co) appeared for the appellants, and Mr H K Woolf (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) represented the first respondent. The second respondents took no part in the proceedings. Giving judgment, LORD WIDGERY said that the subject-matter of the proceedings was a block of residential premises known as Mayflower House situated three-quarters of a mile from the centre of Cambridge. The seven-storey block was completed in the late 1960’s or early 1970’s, and had been intended for use on contract letting to students, but something went wrong, and the company had been letting it commercially, as it suited their purpose. They let the rooms under two kinds of lettings, nightly and weekly. Nightly terms included central heating; electricity for lights; laundering; cooking facilities; bedlinen; room cleaning; and baths. Weekly terms also included central heating, but not the cost of electricity. Linen and towels were available at an additional charge. In broad terms, the top three floors were let on nightly terms and the lower floors on weekly terms. The important issue in the appeal was whether there was a clear and understood distinction between use of premises as hotel accommodation and use as bedsitters. It was submitted that the enforcement notice served on the company by the second respondents was defective because it was vague and unclear. It stated that there had been a breach of planning control ‘in that the said land has been developed by the making of a material change in the use [of the buildings] to part use for hotel purposes.’  Counsel for the company submitted that this was not clear enough, and he relied on Miller-Mead v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 2 QB 196. He (his Lordship) thought that the notice was clear and could be well understood. He had not the slightest doubt that anybody concerned in this type of business, with the enforcement notice in one hand, walking out to look at the building and asking himself what was being complained of, would realise just what was complained of: that three floors were being turned over to housing of an hotel character, whereas the other floors were of a bedsitter character. The difference between the two sorts of accommodation depended on the stability of the population. To prove hotel use it was not132 necessary to establish that meals were provided or that there were hall porters or kitchen maids. The essence of an hotel was that it catered for a transient population. It was there to service people who were travelling. By contrast, a bedsitter provided a permanent home for somebody who remained for a substantial period. There was no ground upon which the Secretary of State’s decision could be criticised, and the appeal should be dismissed. ASHWORTH and MAY JJ agreed, and an order was made accordingly.