Applications for planning permission refused – Objections made at subsequent public inquiry – Inspector granting conditional planning permission – Objector appealing – Whether inspector properly considered alternative uses and third party evidence – Whether proposed development prohibited by local Act of Parliament – Application dismissed
The planning authority refused applications for planning permission for the erection of a food retail development of approximately 5,000m2 and related elements, and the erection of non-retail development of approximately 7,400m2 and related elements. Both proposed developments were at the former gas works site at Lower Richmond Road, and Manor Road, Richmond. The applications were rejected for a number of reasons, the fourth of which was that the developments would “prevent the possibility of the site being developed for other appropriate purposes”. At a subsequent public inquiry the planning authority stated that they did not wish to promote any specific alternative use for the site and therefore they did not pursue the fourth reason for refusal. The applicant objected as the representative of the “Campaign to Resurrect Richmond Ice Rink”. However, the inspector granted conditional planning permission for the applications. The applicant appealed contending that the inspector had not properly considered, first, the issue of alternative uses for the site; second, third party evidence in support of an alternative on the basis that such evidence was “allowable” only because of the presence of the fourth reason for refusal; and, third, that the proposed development was prohibited by a local Act of Parliament, the Richmond Gas Act 1881.
Held The application was dismissed.
1. The inspector had not erred in his approach. He had looked at the alternative ice rink use issue and had taken account of, and understood, the third party representation which relied on the alternative ice rink use as a ground for objection. He had explained why he had attributed weight to the various facts which were matters for his judgment and which he had been entitled to take into account. The approach taken by the planning authority was a material matter which he had been obliged to take into account and to attach such weight as he though fit. Therefore the inspector had acted properly within his function of exercising planning judgment and it was not appropriate for the court to interfere.
2. He had been entitled to conclude that he was not in a position to judge whether a Local Act of Parliament prevented the gas works site from being used for any purpose other than a public service purpose and that, in any event, it was not material to the planning arguments because if there was such a prohibition then it would not be affected by his decision. The matters within the inspector’s remit concerned land use planning issues. If there had been some other statutory bar on the use of the site for the proposed development, then the inspector’s grant of planning permission would not prevent that other statutory bar from being effective. Likewise such statutory bar did not prevent the inspector from granting planning permission if he thought it right to do so on land use planning grounds.
The appellant appeared in person; Timothy Mould (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first respondent, the Secretary of State for the Environment; Martin Kingston (instructed by Ashurst Morris Crisp) appeared for third respondent, British Gas plc; the second respondents, Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council, did not appear and were not represented.
