Development — Grant of planning permission for commercial development — Claimants applying to quash decision — Applications to strike out claims — Whether claimants persons aggrieved — Whether claims having real prospect of success — Applications granted
Following a public inquiry, the first defendant granted the third defendant planning permission for a commercial development. The first claimant was a commercial property development company. It had neither objected to the planning application, nor taken part in the public inquiry, and it had no proprietary interest in the land affected by the proposed development. However, it was negotiating to acquire nearby land and was hoping to purchase the application site.
The second claimant was a local resident who occupied a property close to the application site. She had lodged objections based on traffic, pollution and noise, but had taken no further part in the planning process. She entered into an agreement with the first claimant, whereby the latter agreed to pay her £1,000 to apply to quash the first defendant’s decision if its own standing to bring an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was challenged.
In the event, both claimants brought almost identical applications arguing that the first defendant had: failed: (i) to have regard to PPG 6; (ii) properly to apply the sequential test established by para 1.11; and (iii) to have regard to the policy set out in para 3.24, namely that retail proposals were not justified simply in order to develop vacant or derelict sites.
The third defendant applied to strike out the claims for summary judgment on the grounds that: (i) neither claimant was an aggrieved person within section 288, and/or their proceedings were an abuse of the court’s process; (ii) the claimants’ applications were not served within the requisite time period and that period should not be extended; and (iii) the grounds of challenge had no reasonable prospect of success.
Held: The applications were granted.
The claims had no real prospect of success. In any event, the first claimant lacked standing and both claims had been served out of time.
The first claimant was a stranger to the application site and to the area affected by the development proposals. Without any commitment to, or any proprietary or other enforceable interest in, any land affected by the grant of permission, it had seen an opportunity to further its own commercial interests by acquiring another site in the hope that, by means of a successful challenge under section 288, it could upset the grant of planning permission. Such commercial opportunism fell short of the real or genuine interest in obtaining relief that had to be shown in order to give the first claimant the necessary standing to complain. It followed that it did not qualify as a person aggrieved by the decision to grant planning permission: R v Canterbury City Council and others, ex parte Springimage Ltd (1994) 68 P&CR 171; [1993] 3 PLR 58 distinguished.
But for the first claimant’s approach and the indemnity provided by the collaboration agreement, the second claimant would not have mounted a challenge. However, it was not necessary to decide whether her claim was an abuse of the court’s process. The criticism of the first defendant’s decision was without substance and there had been no real possibility of him reaching a different conclusion.
Timothy Corner QC and Robert Walton (instructed by Hill Dickinson, of Liverpool) appeared for the claimants; John Steel QC and Andrew Tabachnik (instructed by SJ Berwin) appeared for the third defendant, Lear Management; the first defendant and the second defendants, Stoke-on-Trent City Council, did not appear and were not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
