Application for planning permission — Application determined on issue of total floorspace — No legislative definition of floorspace — Inspector correct to use own discretion — Claim dismissed
The claimant owned property in the New Forest. In 2002, he submitted an application for planning permission to enlarge the ground floor and the roof space. The application was refused, and the claimant appealed under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The appeal was dismissed, but the decision was subsequently quashed by consent. In calculating the total floorspace in the property, it was agreed that the inspector had been wrong to exclude the boarded floor in the roof on the ground that the area was used solely for storage purposes. The appeal was redetermined, and was subsequently dismissed by a second inspector. He concluded that although the roof space had natural light, electricity and a boarded floor, its relative inaccessibility and minimal headroom meant that it should not be included in determining total floorspace. The claimant contended that the inspector’s decision was wrong, and that he had erred in law. He subsequently applied, under section 288(a)(ii) of the 1990 Act, to quash the decision, and for the matter to be determined by the court.
Held: The claim was dismissed.
The first inspector was wrong to refuse planning permission on the ground that the roof space was used as storage. It was, however, open to the second inspector to refuse planning permission on other grounds. He was right to exercise his discretion in considering whether to include the floorspace in the loft as part of the total floorspace. His decision to consider the cumulative effects, that is, the way in which the roof space was used, including access, the way in which the floor had been covered, the proportion of available headroom and the existence of natural light, when considering whether to count the floor in the roof as floorspace for the purpose of planning was correct. It was agreed that there is no statutory or legislative definition of “floorspace”. The “mere” existence of a floor, for example, in a narrow crawl space in a cellar or roof, cannot be considered as internal floorspace for planning purposes. The inspector was correct in applying his own professional judgment on the facts of the case.
Marc Willers (instructed by Batten, of Yeovil) appeared for the claimant; Timothy Corner QC (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the respondents.
Vivienne Lane, barrister
