RIBA agreement — Construction of services and fees schedule — Architect engaged to carry out design works — Early termination of architect’s appointment — Calculation of fees — Construction by official referee in favour of plaintiff architect — Court of Appeal allowing appeal against that decision
By a written contract dated December 1 1992 the defendant engaged the plaintiff as architect, on the conditions set out in the Architects Appointment (1982 ed, July 1990 revision) issued by the RIBA, to perform the services listed in the contract schedule in respect of a health club at 41 Mackennal Street, London NW8. The defendant later decided to change its approach to the development project and terminated the plaintiff’s engagement on or about December 22 1993. The plaintiff claimed a fee, calculated as a percentage of £880,000, in respect of alterations and refinements made to the building.
Clause 4.28 of the agreement provided that, on suspension or termination of the architect’s appointment he would be entitled to fees for all work completed at that time on a “partial service basis”. Clause 4.26 provided that all percentage fees for partial services should be based on the architect’s current estimate of the total construction costs of the works or on the most recent cost limit agreed with the client, whichever was the lower. The defendant objected that the plaintiff’s figure was excessive and a question arose as to the construction of the architect’s agreement. The official referee found in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.
Held The appeal was allowed.
1. On a proper construction of the RIBA Architects Appointment and schedule of services and fees, the architect was entitled on the ending of his appointment to a fee for basic services completed, calculated on a percentage basis.
2. He was entitled to that part of the total percentage fee for basic services (ie 9% of the total construction costs) which was commensurate with that part of basic services completed by him.
3. The total construction costs were based on the plaintiff’s estimate of the costs of the works current at the date of termination or the most recent cost limit agreed with the defendant, whichever was the lower.
4. The judge had wrongly construed the schedule to the agreement as indicating that the percentage basis only applied to the provision of basic services if all the basic services were provided by the plaintiff and therefore did not apply to payment for basic services on termination. The word “full” in the contract indicated only that the parties were initially contracting for the plaintiff to provide all the basic services.
Adrian Cooper (instructed by Amhurst Brown Colombotti) appeared for the plaintiff; Robert Willer (instructed by Peter Mercadante & Co, of Northolt) appeared for the defendant.
