Discontinuance notice — Advertisement with deemed consent on commercial premises — Decision letter undated and applicants contending that service of discontinuance notice defective in several respects — Inspector finding advertisement intrusive — Application to quash decision refused
The three applicants owned 365 Fulham Road, London SW10, and practised together as a firm of solicitors. When that practice merged with another firm from different offices, the three partners remained freehold owners in their personal capacities. The third respondent was the tenant of the retail unit on the ground floor. For at least 67 years there had been a display of advertisements on the flank wall of the premises. The fourth respondent was the current owner of the right to advertise and was displaying an Ultravision unit in succession to the 48-sheet poster panel previously displayed. The display of advertisements had the benefit of deemed consent under class 13 of Schedule 3 to the regulations viz Part V of, Schedule 4 to the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992.
The second respondents, Kensington and Chelsea Royal Borough Council, as the local planning authority took action to bring about the discontinuance of the display by purporting to serve a discontinuance notice under regulation 8 of the 1992 Regulations. Nine identical notices were issued. The fourth respondent, and the applicants, appealed to the first respondent against the notice on June 15 1994 and June 29 1994 respectively. An inspector was appointed to determine the appeals. The decision letter was not dated. The applicants applied for an order to quash the decision, arguing before the High Court, on the grounds inter alia, that the service of the discontinuance notice was invalid because: it was served on the wrong addresses; the service was ineffective because it was done on different dates; and the applicants suffered substantial prejudice because the letter was undated. The final sentence of the decision letter stated that the discontinuance notice should come into effect “at the end of one month from the date of this letter”. The inspector, in his decision letter, had dismissed the contention that the requirements of section 8 had not been met in so far as the discontinuance notice, as served, did not give a full statement of reasons why the use of the site for the display of advertisements with deemed consent gave rise to substantial injury to the amenity of the area.
Held The application to quash the decision letter was dismissed.
1. The court had to consider whether there was a discretion under section 288(5) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the notice. For that to be so, there had to be substantial prejudice by the failure to comply with the requirements of the 1990 Act and the regulations: see Wokingham District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and Bryant Homes (Southern) Ltd [1989] JPL 424.
2. Absence of a date could lead to substantial prejudice as the applicants could have been left in a state of uncertainty. However in the instant circumstances, the absence of the date did not lead to uncertainty. No prejudice been done by “the curiosities of service”. The notice had clearly reached the applicants in ample time. In absence of factual disadvantage the applicants could not be said to have been disadvantaged.
Charles Mynors (instructed by Nahlis Christou) appeared for the applicants; Nathalie Lieven (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Secretary of State for the Environment; the second, third and fourth respondents did not appear and were not represented.
