Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, Part II — Machinery for termination of lease by tenant — Necessity for three months’ notice — Separate claim for rent in respect of articles used in cinema — Whether within ambit of Part II
This was a claim by Nu Flats and Properties Ltd, of Park Street, London, W, against Mr Sol Sheckman, of Westgate Road, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, lessee of the Rio Cinema, Sheerness, for three months’ arrears of rent, £487 12s 10d.
Mr Lionel Blundell, QC, (instructed by Messrs Kenneth Brown, Baker, Baker) represented the plaintiffs, and Mr Ronald Bernstein (instructed by Messrs Clifford-Turner & Co, agents for Messrs Keenlyside & Forster, of Newcastle) appeared for the defendant.
Mr Blundell said that the cinema was leased for 21 years in 1937 to Gaumont British Corporation Ltd, who underleased to the defendant in 1948 for a ten-year term, to expire on June 21, 1958. Under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, section 27(1), the defendant was required to serve three months’ notice on the landlord if he wished to quit at the expiration of the lease. The plaintiff claimed that he had failed to do so, that the tenancy accordingly continued, and that he was liable for the rent for the period in dispute.
The defendant’s case was that his managing agents wrote to Circuits Management Association Ltd, agents for Gaumont British, on April 12, 1958, notifying them that the cinema lease expired on June 18 and asking them to whom the keys should be handed over. This indicated that he did not want the tenancy continued. The keys were delivered on June 20, 1958, to Circuits Management, who thereby accepted possession of the premises on behalf of Gaumont British.
Giving judgment, Finnemore J, said that under the Act a tenant not wishing to continue a tenancy was required to give written notice to the immediate landlord not later than three months before the expiration of the lease. In this case a letter was written, but only two months before the expiry date, so that that point could not be carried further.
The defendant next contended that from June 14, when the last show was put on at the cinema, the tenancy was no longer one which covered premises occupied for the purpose of a business. There was no substance in this. To spend the last few days of a lease clearing up premises seemed to be as obvious and essential a part of carrying on business therein as was the work of preparing the premises for business. It would lead to strange results if it was said that the owner of a cinema ceased to occupy it as such the moment the last customer left after the final performance, and that everything he did afterwards tidying up, etc, was not done in the course of occupation of the premises for business.
The defendant then claimed that there was a surrender of the premises when the keys were handed over. He (his Lordship) was satisfied, however, that the only reason the keys were handed to the plaintiffs’ agents was to go into the matter of dilapidations. There was no evidence that they were managing agents in any other respect at all. The simple explanation of the case was obvious. Neither the defendant nor Gaumont British ever gave a thought to the Act of Parliament or the question of surrender. They just acted on the assumption that the tenancy was being ended. In any event he (Finnemore, J) doubted whether there could be a valid surrender which would destroy the rights of the plaintiffs the competent landlords, unless they were party to it. It was plain on any view of the law that plaintiffs were not a party to anything in the nature of a surrender of tenancy.
A 21-day stay of execution was granted pending a possible appeal.
Judgment with costs was given for the defendant on a claim against Mr Sheckman by Mirabeau Ltd, of Park Street, London, W, for £472 12s 3d, as three months’ rent of equipment provided at the Rio Cinema. The plaintiff and the defendant were represented by the same counsel, who were instructed by the same solicitors.
Finnemore, J, giving judgment, said that the articles were leased under a separate agreement. The plaintiffs claimed that the Landlord and Tenant Act applied in the same way as for the tenancy of the building, but the defendant argued that it was not applicable because the equipment could not properly be described as “premises”, and was not “occupied”. He (the Judge) felt that although some of the articles were attached to the building itself, that did not mean that the tenant occupied them, and the Act did not apply to such a tenancy.
