Mobile home – Extensions – Licence agreement – Claimants occupying mobile home pitched pursuant to licence agreement – Bolt-on extension added – Further extension proposed – Section 29(1) of Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 – Section 13 of Caravan Sites Act 1968 – Whether existing extension taking mobile home outside statutory definition of caravan so as to breach licence agreement – Whether proposed extension doing so – Declarations sought – Claim allowed in part
The claimant married couple lived with their 17-year-old daughter in a mobile home that was pitched in a mobile home park owned by the defendant freeholder. The claimants occupied their pitch under a licence agreement granted in 1990, under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, by the then owner of the park. That agreement required them to keep the mobile home in a mobile and habitable condition and not to erect any structure or mobile home extension on the pitch without the prior written consent of the park owner. The requirement for consent, which was not to be unreasonably withheld, was reiterated in a set of rules governing the use of the park that were binding on both the claimants and the defendant. The licence agreement defined the term “mobile home” in identical terms to the relevant statutory definition of a caravan.
The claimants’ mobile home had originally been manufactured in the 1970s as a single unit on a wheeled chassis. In 2002, they obtained planning permission to add a single-storey extension to be used as a bedroom, for which the then park owner had given its approval. The extension was bolted onto the original structure; it was not attached to the ground and was capable of disassembly and removal if necessary.
After the defendant acquired the park, the claimants sought its consent to add a further extension, for which planning permission was obtained in 2006. The defendant refused permission and, further, required the removal of the 2002 extension on the ground that it failed to meet the statutory definition of a mobile home and breached the licence agreement.
The claimants brought proceedings, seeking declarations that: (i) their mobile home satisfied the statutory definition in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and was a mobile home within the meaning of the 1983 Act; and (ii) the proposed further extension would not breach the licence agreement such that the defendant could not reasonably withhold its consent. The defendant counter-claimed for declarations and orders in its favour.
Held: The claim was allowed in part; the counter-claim was dismissed.
(1) The claimants’ mobile home in its existing state was a structure designed or adapted for human habitation and was capable of being moved from one place to another, so that it qualified as a “caravan” within the meaning of section 29(1) of the 1960 Act. To meet the latter requirement, the entire structure had to be capable of being moved as a single unit, by towing or on a motor vehicle or trailer, without being disassembled into its component parts: Carter v Secretary of State for the Environment [1994] 2 EGLR 194; [1994] 29 EG 124 applied. Further, it had to be capable of being moved lawfully on the public highway save where the exception for twin-unit caravans in section 13(1) of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 applied: Byrne v Secretary of State for the Environment (1997) 74 P&CR 420, Howard v Charlton [2002] EWCA Civ 1086; [2002] 3 EGLR 65; [2002] 39 EG 150 and Brightlingsea Haven Ltd v Morris [2008] EWHC 1928 (QB); [2008] PLSCS 293 considered. In the case of a twin-unit caravan, comprising two separate sections designed to be assembled on-site, each of the sections had to be capable of being lawfully moved on a public highway when disassembled. Lawful movement meant movement that complied with the requirements of road traffic legislation, which imposed regulations as to the dimensions of vehicles and trailers that were permitted to use the public highway: see the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 and the exceptions for special vehicles of exceptional width in the Road Vehicles (Authorisation of Special Types)(General) Order 2003.
The claimants’ mobile home, as extended, was too wide to be moved lawfully as a single structure on the public highway. However, it could be viewed as a twin-unit caravan with two separate sections, the original mobile home and the existing extension, that, when disassembled, could each be carried or towed lawfully on a public highway. The fact that the two sections had not been designed and constructed jointly, to fit as one unit, did not prevent them from falling within section 13 of the 1968 Act. It sufficed that the extension had been designed to be assembled to the original mobile home, and there was no requirement that the mobile home should also have been designed to be assembled to the extension. There had been no breach of the licence agreement.
(3) The claimants’ proposed extension would take the mobile home outside the statutory definition of a caravan since, in order to be lawfully moved on the public highway, it would have to be disassembled into three separate sections and would therefore fall outside section 13; the proposed extension would be a breach of the licence agreement and the defendant could reasonably withhold its consent to that extension.
Nicholas Yell (instructed by LGP Solicitors, of Marlow) appeared for the claimants; Leslie Blohm QC (instructed by Turbervilles, of Uxbridge) appeared for the defendant.
Sally Dobson, barrister
