Development — Outline planning permission – Statutory development plan – Appellant challenging grant of planning permission to develop angling centre – Whether the inspector properly construing and applying local statutory development plan — Appeal allowed
The third respondent applied to the second respondent council, acting as the local planning authority, for outline planning permission to develop land at Wylands International Angling Centre in Catfield, East Sussex. The scheme included the construction of 15 cabins in a field adjacent to a lake to replace nine touring caravans, four chalets and three static caravans. The application was refused. However, following an inquiry by an inspector appointed by the first respondent, the third respondent’s appeal against that refusal was allowed.
The appellant, an adjoining landowner, appealed, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, for an order to quash that decision. The court dismissed his appeal but granted him permission to appeal on the ground of whether the inspector had properly construed and applied policy EM10 of the local statutory development plan.
Paragraph 11 of EM10 sought to control and restrict new chalet or static caravan development. Under the policy, additional static caravan and chalet accommodation for holiday purposes would not be permitted unless: (i) it would significantly improve the appearance of an existing site; or (ii) was essential for a rural enterprise. Although more than 50% of tourist accommodation in the area was provided by static caravans, which added to the economic vitality of the district, the second respondents considered that new holiday centres and static caravan sites were inappropriate in the countryside in terms of their visual effects and the demand on local services and facilities.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
The court did not accept that the inspector had been unaware of the issue of whether the site was an “existing site” within the meaning of the policy. It would have been obvious to him that the appellant and the second respondents were focusing on the more rigorous requirement of the second limb of the policy because they submitted that this was not an existing site within the meaning of the policy so as to bring the first limb into play. The only sensible inference was that the inspector appreciated that the issue was whether it was an existing static caravan and/or chalet site. Reading the decision letter fairly and as a whole, it would be wrong to infer that the inspector had misunderstood the arguments and given a false construction to the concept of “existing site” within the policy: Seddon Properties Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 248 EG 95 considered.
The inspector’s reasons did not demonstrate that he misunderstood policy EM10, nor was there any consensus that the site was not an existing site within the meaning of that policy. Even if that had been the thrust of the submissions made to the inspector, he was not obliged to accept the evidence of expert witnesses in the absence of contrary evidence: Kentucky Fried Chicken (GB) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1977) 245 EG 839 applied.
The inspector was entitled to conclude that the existing four units of accommodation were chalets within the meaning of the policy. They had that appearance and there was no reason why they should fall outwith that concept merely because had been converted from a cowshed. It might be correct to say that to create chalets in that way would not engage EM10 because it involved no additional building works, but that was immaterial. Once in place, the building would plainly be relevant in determining whether the site could properly be described as a chalet site. If a significant number of chalets had been erected in that way, it would be absurd not to describe the site as such merely because the chalets were conversions.
However, when assessing the nature of the site, the three static caravans ought not to have been taken into consideration; it was a breach of planning law to use them for accommodation. It would be surprising if a developer could bring itself within the first rather than the second limb of EM10 by relying on such accommodation when it might be required to terminate that use at any time. Further, four chalets would, in principle, have been capable of constituting a sufficient evidential basis on their own to justify the inspector’s conclusion that this was an existing site within the meaning of the policy. EM10 did not prescribe the number of chalets or static caravans necessary to bring an existing site within its terms; that was a matter of judgment for the inspector, and it would not have been a perverse conclusion.
However, it was unclear from the inspector’s reasons how he had reached his decision. Consequently, the appellant had been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide adequate reasons. Without explaining why he had considered that the existing site fell within the first limb, it was not clear whether the inspector had properly directed himself on that issue. More specifically, he had failed to state whether he had had regard to the touring caravans, the static caravans, the chalets or a combination of them. Accordingly, this was one of the exceptional cases in which a reasons challenge had to succeed. It was uncertain whether the inspector had properly directed himself to the appropriate factors when assessing the nature of the site. Although the court was not satisfied that he had misunderstood the requirements of EM10, it had real doubt over how he had applied the policy to the facts. Without reasons, the appellant was not able to say whether the inspector had reached a conclusion in accordance with the law.
Thomas Hill QC (instructed by Wragge & Co LLP) appeared for the appellant; Rupert Warren (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first respondent; the second respondent did not appear and was not represented; Graham Stoker (instructed by DMH Stallard LLP, of Crawley) appeared for the third respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
