Dwelling-house — Modernisation — Defendant architect employed by plaintiff — Contractor employed to do building work — Work not completed — Supervening insolvency — Architect’s design failing to comply with building regulations — Plaintiff claiming damages against defendant — High Court holding defendant liable for breach of duty — Plaintiff entitled, inter alia, to damages for loss suffered as result of contractor — Judgment for plaintiff
In May 1989 the plaintiff agreed to purchase 43 Cheyne Place, London SW3, intending to make it her home. She obtained a survey which showed it essentially sound, but she wished to make certain alterations and basic modernisation. For that purpose she needed an architect and the defendant accepted the engagement as such in June 1989. In August 1990 the plaintiff entered into a contract for the building work with W & Co. The defendant had experienced difficulties with W during works at her own home, but did not inform the plaintiff. W did not complete the contract works and the plaintiff’s contract with them was determined by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff on July 18 1991.
Alternative contractors were found to finish the work. They became insolvent and left the site on February 12 1992 on the plaintiff’s instructions. The defendant’s design did not comply with building regulations and further delay was incurred while remedial works were done. The plaintiff claimed damages for breach of the defendant’s duties as an architect in contract and tort. The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the defendant was in breach of duty in failing to warn her about the difficulties already experienced with W. The defendant denied liability and counterclaimed for the allegedly unpaid balance of fees. Judgment was given on the issues on April 26 1995; after further representation, judgment on the outstanding issues was given on October 10 1995.
Held Judgment for the plaintiff.
1. On the evidence, the defendant was in breach of duty in relation to the selection of W in failing to disclose her own experience of their shortcomings and failing to inquire into W’s financial situation. On the balance of probabilities had those breaches not occurred, W would not have been selected.
2. The measure of damages was “that sum of money which will the put the party who has been injured in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting compensation”: see Livingstone v Rawyards Coal (1880) 5 App Cases 25 at p39; Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 at p855.
3. That involved a comparison between the position which in the event obtained, following a breach by the person liable with the position which would have obtained had that breach not occurred.
4. Where a valuer’s negligence caused the lender to enter into a transaction, which he would not otherwise have done and because he could not escape the transaction at will, the court would regard that negligence as the effective cause of loss which the lender suffered as a result: see Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 EGLR 129.
5. As a matter of common sense the selection of W was an effective cause of the engagement of alternative contractors on cost plus terms to make good W’s defective and incomplete work. It was a foreseeable and probable consequence. The Banque Bruxelles principle was directly applicable with the necessary accommodation to the roles of the present parties and the facts of the instant case.
The plaintiff appeared in person; Hugh Evans (instructed by Forsyte Saunders Kerman) appeared for the defendant.
