Limitation Act 1980 – Acknowledgment of claim – Appellant housing co-operative retaining services of respondent firm of solicitors without agreeing fees – Respondent bringing claim on bill of costs – Whether claim time-barred – Whether respondent acknowledging claim so as to start time running afresh under section 29(5) of 1980 Act – Whether solicitor’s claim for professional fees a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim within meaning of section 29(5) – Appeal dismissed The appellant housing association instructed the respondent firm of solicitors in the task of obtaining possession of a flat from one of the appellant’s tenants. The respondent’s work was completed by the end of 2003. Since its fees had not been agreed, it was entitled to claim a reasonable amount for the work done and the appellant was entitled to have its bill assessed by the court. The respondent wrote to the appellant in September 2004, stating the amount that it claimed was payable. By a letter in reply sent later that month, the appellant protested about the amount claimed. Nothing further happened for some time. Eventually, in September 2010, the respondent brought proceedings against the appellant in which it claimed payment of £52,000 in professional fees and interest. The appellant contended that the claim was time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 since the respondent had not brought that claim within the relevant period of six years from the work being done. The respondent contended that the appellant’s letter of September 2004 amounted to an acknowledgment of its claim, within section 29(5) of the 1980 Act, with the effect that time started running again from the date of that letter. A district judge dismissed the respondent’s claim for summary judgment but that decision was reversed by a judge on appeal. The judge held that the respondent’s claim fell within the scope of section 29(5) and that the September 2004 letter was an acknowledgment for that purpose. The appellant appealed. Held: The appeal was dismissed. (1) A solicitors’ claim for costs, billed but not yet fixed by assessment or agreement, was a “debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim” within the meaning of section 29(5) of the Limitation Act 1980. A distinction fell to be drawn between a claim in debt and a claim in damages. A solicitor’s claim for fees, in circumstances such as the present case, was a claim in debt in the nature of a quantum meruit, although it was not quantified unless and until it was either assessed by the court or agreed by the client, or was the subject of a judgment, whether or not preceded by an assessment: Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702 and Thomas Watts & Co (a firm) v Smith [1998] 2 Costs LR 59 considered. A quantum meruit liability was a debt even if it had not yet been quantified in a binding manner between the parties. The word “liquidated”, in ordinary legal usage, required that the liability should be for an ascertained amount. Most liquidated claims would be for a debt; unliquidated claims were normally in damages. The respondent’s claim was “liquidated”, for the purposes of section 29(5), notwithstanding that the claim was not yet quantified. As a quantum meruit claim for a “reasonable sum”, it was sufficiently certain for its amount to be ascertainable: Amantilla Ltd v Telefusion plc (1987) 9 Con LR 139 and Byatt v Nash unreported 28 June 2002 applied; Dwr Cymru v Carmarthenshire County Council [2004] EWHC 2991 (TCC) considered; Turner & Co v O Palomo SA [2000] 1 WLR 37 and Truex v Toll [2009] 1 WLR 2121 distinguished. The position was different in that regard from cases concerning insolvency, where the statutory context, namely a rule as to the liabilities on which a bankruptcy petition could be founded, could be expected to impose stricter and more specific requirements than a provision about extending the running of time in the case of an acknowledged liability. Moreover, under section 23(4) of the Limitation Act 1939, which had been replaced by section 29(5) of the 1980 Act, a “liquidated demand” had not been treated as requiring that the amount of the liability should already have been ascertained: Lagos v Grunwaldt [1910] 1 KB 41 considered. A solicitor’s claim for professional fees, even though not yet fixed by agreement or assessment, had previously fallen within section 23(4) of the 1939 Act and still fell within section 29(5) of the 1980 Act. Such claims were therefore open to be acknowledged under that provision. (2) The appellant had acknowledged the respondent’s claim. Its letter expressed concern about the amount of the claim but not about the fact of there being a claim at all. It amounted to saying that the appellant owed something to the respondent, in as much as it referred to the claim and took issue with the amount claimed, but not with the principle that something was payable: Dungate v Dungate [1965] 1 WLR 1477 considered. Accordingly, the respondent’s proceedings were not time-barred. Grant Crawford (instructed by Humphreys & Co, of Bristol) appeared for the appellant; Jeremy Burns (instructed by Phillips & Co, of Salisbury) appeared for the respondent. Sally Dobson, barrister
Limitation Act 1980 – Acknowledgment of claim – Appellant housing co-operative retaining services of respondent firm of solicitors without agreeing fees – Respondent bringing claim on bill of costs – Whether claim time-barred – Whether respondent acknowledging claim so as to start time running afresh under section 29(5) of 1980 Act – Whether solicitor’s claim for professional fees a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim within meaning of section 29(5) – Appeal dismissed The appellant housing association instructed the respondent firm of solicitors in the task of obtaining possession of a flat from one of the appellant’s tenants. The respondent’s work was completed by the end of 2003. Since its fees had not been agreed, it was entitled to claim a reasonable amount for the work done and the appellant was entitled to have its bill assessed by the court. The respondent wrote to the appellant in September 2004, stating the amount that it claimed was payable. By a letter in reply sent later that month, the appellant protested about the amount claimed. Nothing further happened for some time. Eventually, in September 2010, the respondent brought proceedings against the appellant in which it claimed payment of £52,000 in professional fees and interest. The appellant contended that the claim was time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 since the respondent had not brought that claim within the relevant period of six years from the work being done. The respondent contended that the appellant’s letter of September 2004 amounted to an acknowledgment of its claim, within section 29(5) of the 1980 Act, with the effect that time started running again from the date of that letter. A district judge dismissed the respondent’s claim for summary judgment but that decision was reversed by a judge on appeal. The judge held that the respondent’s claim fell within the scope of section 29(5) and that the September 2004 letter was an acknowledgment for that purpose. The appellant appealed. Held: The appeal was dismissed. (1) A solicitors’ claim for costs, billed but not yet fixed by assessment or agreement, was a “debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim” within the meaning of section 29(5) of the Limitation Act 1980. A distinction fell to be drawn between a claim in debt and a claim in damages. A solicitor’s claim for fees, in circumstances such as the present case, was a claim in debt in the nature of a quantum meruit, although it was not quantified unless and until it was either assessed by the court or agreed by the client, or was the subject of a judgment, whether or not preceded by an assessment: Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702 and Thomas Watts & Co (a firm) v Smith [1998] 2 Costs LR 59 considered. A quantum meruit liability was a debt even if it had not yet been quantified in a binding manner between the parties. The word “liquidated”, in ordinary legal usage, required that the liability should be for an ascertained amount. Most liquidated claims would be for a debt; unliquidated claims were normally in damages. The respondent’s claim was “liquidated”, for the purposes of section 29(5), notwithstanding that the claim was not yet quantified. As a quantum meruit claim for a “reasonable sum”, it was sufficiently certain for its amount to be ascertainable: Amantilla Ltd v Telefusion plc (1987) 9 Con LR 139 and Byatt v Nash unreported 28 June 2002 applied; Dwr Cymru v Carmarthenshire County Council [2004] EWHC 2991 (TCC) considered; Turner & Co v O Palomo SA [2000] 1 WLR 37 and Truex v Toll [2009] 1 WLR 2121 distinguished. The position was different in that regard from cases concerning insolvency, where the statutory context, namely a rule as to the liabilities on which a bankruptcy petition could be founded, could be expected to impose stricter and more specific requirements than a provision about extending the running of time in the case of an acknowledged liability. Moreover, under section 23(4) of the Limitation Act 1939, which had been replaced by section 29(5) of the 1980 Act, a “liquidated demand” had not been treated as requiring that the amount of the liability should already have been ascertained: Lagos v Grunwaldt [1910] 1 KB 41 considered. A solicitor’s claim for professional fees, even though not yet fixed by agreement or assessment, had previously fallen within section 23(4) of the 1939 Act and still fell within section 29(5) of the 1980 Act. Such claims were therefore open to be acknowledged under that provision. (2) The appellant had acknowledged the respondent’s claim. Its letter expressed concern about the amount of the claim but not about the fact of there being a claim at all. It amounted to saying that the appellant owed something to the respondent, in as much as it referred to the claim and took issue with the amount claimed, but not with the principle that something was payable: Dungate v Dungate [1965] 1 WLR 1477 considered. Accordingly, the respondent’s proceedings were not time-barred. Grant Crawford (instructed by Humphreys & Co, of Bristol) appeared for the appellant; Jeremy Burns (instructed by Phillips & Co, of Salisbury) appeared for the respondent. Sally Dobson, barrister
