In Caradon District Council v Paton [2000] 35 EG 132, the claimant council, which had sold a house under the right-to-buy scheme, successfully restrained the buyer from letting his house for short-term holiday use. Putting the house to that use was held to be a breach of an express covenant against using the property for any purpose other than that of a private dwelling-house.
One of the reasons given (the home reason) was that the expression “private dwelling-house” connoted use as a “home” and that holidaymaking use could not be so described. But that was not the only reason. The other (the housing policy reason) was that the covenant had to be construed against the background of the council’s policy of ensuring that such properties remained part of the housing stock available for people who wished to live in the locality.
The presence of the housing policy reason may well give rise to serious difficulties in future litigation.
Suppose, first, that the same dispute has arisen following a purely private sale. Could the buyer contend that the home reason was technically obiter, or that it could be read only in conjunction with the housing policy reason?
In a right-to-buy situation a difficulty of a different kind is presented by the successful judicial review proceedings taken by the buyer in R v Braintree District Council, ex parte Halls [2000] 36 EG 164. On the authority of that case (not cited in Caradon, and taking a quite different tack), the buyer might well contend that the council vendors simply had no power to impose the restriction in the first place. However, as noted in our commentary on Braintree (
Legal niceties aside, it is only too clear that the perceptions in the two cases of parliamentary policy (as driven by the Margaret Thatcher administration) could not be further apart. Our former PM would undoubtedly recognise the policy, judicially noticed in Braintree, as hers. It would take courage of the highest order to bring Caradon to her attention.
In Caradon District Council v Paton [2000] 35 EG 132, the claimant council, which had sold a house under the right-to-buy scheme, successfully restrained the buyer from letting his house for short-term holiday use. Putting the house to that use was held to be a breach of an express covenant against using the property for any purpose other than that of a private dwelling-house.
One of the reasons given (the home reason) was that the expression “private dwelling-house” connoted use as a “home” and that holidaymaking use could not be so described. But that was not the only reason. The other (the housing policy reason) was that the covenant had to be construed against the background of the council’s policy of ensuring that such properties remained part of the housing stock available for people who wished to live in the locality.
The presence of the housing policy reason may well give rise to serious difficulties in future litigation.
Suppose, first, that the same dispute has arisen following a purely private sale. Could the buyer contend that the home reason was technically obiter, or that it could be read only in conjunction with the housing policy reason?
In a right-to-buy situation a difficulty of a different kind is presented by the successful judicial review proceedings taken by the buyer in R v Braintree District Council, ex parte Halls [2000] 36 EG 164. On the authority of that case (not cited in Caradon, and taking a quite different tack), the buyer might well contend that the council vendors simply had no power to impose the restriction in the first place. However, as noted in our commentary on Braintree (PP 2000/10), that decision may have turned on its particular facts.
Legal niceties aside, it is only too clear that the perceptions in the two cases of parliamentary policy (as driven by the Margaret Thatcher administration) could not be further apart. Our former PM would undoubtedly recognise the policy, judicially noticed in Braintree, as hers. It would take courage of the highest order to bring Caradon to her attention.
