The story is told (well it is now) of a poodle that was served its daily delicacies in a cut-glass bowl. Now you could say, borrowing the wording of Article 3 of the 1987 Use Classes Order, that the use of that receptacle was “ordinarily incidental” to the feeding of the dog. You would presumably not use that expression if you read “ordinarily” as meaning “as one would commonly expect”.
The importance of Harrods v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 31 EG 101 (CS) lies in the firm adoption of the more restrictive meaning of “ordinarily”. It was not disputed that the use of the roof of that store as a helicopter pad (to facilitate the labours of its colourful owner and chief executive) would be incidental to the permitted retail use of the site. Nevertheless, that alone was held to be insufficient to entitle Harrods to the issue of a certificate of lawful proposed use under section 192 of the 1990 Act.
For planning purposes, a move to an unconventional use that would have an impact upon the public was to be equated with a material change of use.
For further comment, see John Martin’s and Martin Edwards’s review of the case in
The Court of Appeal has since dismissed Harrods’ appeal: see [2002] 11 EG 154 (CS).
The story is told (well it is now) of a poodle that was served its daily delicacies in a cut-glass bowl. Now you could say, borrowing the wording of Article 3 of the 1987 Use Classes Order, that the use of that receptacle was “ordinarily incidental” to the feeding of the dog. You would presumably not use that expression if you read “ordinarily” as meaning “as one would commonly expect”.
The importance of Harrods v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 31 EG 101 (CS) lies in the firm adoption of the more restrictive meaning of “ordinarily”. It was not disputed that the use of the roof of that store as a helicopter pad (to facilitate the labours of its colourful owner and chief executive) would be incidental to the permitted retail use of the site. Nevertheless, that alone was held to be insufficient to entitle Harrods to the issue of a certificate of lawful proposed use under section 192 of the 1990 Act.
For planning purposes, a move to an unconventional use that would have an impact upon the public was to be equated with a material change of use.
For further comment, see John Martin’s and Martin Edwards’s review of the case in Out of the ordinary.
The Court of Appeal has since dismissed Harrods’ appeal: see [2002] 11 EG 154 (CS).
