Planning authorities undertake their principal planning functions by way of committee but have the power to delegate minor or routine matters to the planning officer to determine. The functions delegated to a planning officer can differ widely between planning authorities.
In R (on the application of Springhall) v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 19; [2006] PLSCS 17 the court was asked to consider whether a planning officer’s grant of planning permission made under delegated powers was ultra vires. Under the scheme, certain planning applications were to be determined by the planning committee; for example, where the application was a significant departure from the provisions of the adopted development plan or interim policy or where officers were recommending a decision contrary to the submitted written views of interested third parties. However, the planning officer had the power to make decisions where the application was in accordance with any supplementary planning guidance and where any interested third party did not indicate a wish to address the planning committee.
In Springhall, the proposal was to demolish a property that had been designated as a building of townscape merit and was located in a conservation area. The local development plan and supplementary planning guidance contained a presumption against demolition of such buildings. The appellant had submitted an objection to the application although he did not wish to address the planning committee.
The appellant applied for judicial review on the ground that the application should have been referred to the planning committee. He relied upon R (on the application of Carlton-Conway) v Harrow London Borough Council [2002] EWCA Civ 927; [2002] 3 PLR 77, which held that if there was an issue regarding the meaning of an application or a planning policy it was unlawful to make a decision by way of a delegated power.
The application was dismissed. The court found clear distinctions between the two cases and held that unless the decision maker attached a meaning to the words of a planning policy that were patently incorrect, it was not for a court to substitute its own interpretation of that policy. A decision could be challenged only if it were wholly unreasonable; determination of policy and the basis of their schemes of determination were matters for the planning authorities, not the court.
This case demonstrates that to use judicial review as a challenge to the use of delegated powers will succeed only in exceptional circumstances, which do not include challenges based upon interpretation of wording. Accordingly, local planning authorities should ensure that the scope of delegated powers is clearly set out and easily understandable.
Gill Castorina is an associate at Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker (Europe) LLP
Planning authorities undertake their principal planning functions by way of committee but have the power to delegate minor or routine matters to the planning officer to determine. The functions delegated to a planning officer can differ widely between planning authorities.
In R (on the application of Springhall) v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 19; [2006] PLSCS 17 the court was asked to consider whether a planning officer’s grant of planning permission made under delegated powers was ultra vires. Under the scheme, certain planning applications were to be determined by the planning committee; for example, where the application was a significant departure from the provisions of the adopted development plan or interim policy or where officers were recommending a decision contrary to the submitted written views of interested third parties. However, the planning officer had the power to make decisions where the application was in accordance with any supplementary planning guidance and where any interested third party did not indicate a wish to address the planning committee.
In Springhall, the proposal was to demolish a property that had been designated as a building of townscape merit and was located in a conservation area. The local development plan and supplementary planning guidance contained a presumption against demolition of such buildings. The appellant had submitted an objection to the application although he did not wish to address the planning committee.
The appellant applied for judicial review on the ground that the application should have been referred to the planning committee. He relied upon R (on the application of Carlton-Conway) v Harrow London Borough Council [2002] EWCA Civ 927; [2002] 3 PLR 77, which held that if there was an issue regarding the meaning of an application or a planning policy it was unlawful to make a decision by way of a delegated power.
The application was dismissed. The court found clear distinctions between the two cases and held that unless the decision maker attached a meaning to the words of a planning policy that were patently incorrect, it was not for a court to substitute its own interpretation of that policy. A decision could be challenged only if it were wholly unreasonable; determination of policy and the basis of their schemes of determination were matters for the planning authorities, not the court.
This case demonstrates that to use judicial review as a challenge to the use of delegated powers will succeed only in exceptional circumstances, which do not include challenges based upon interpretation of wording. Accordingly, local planning authorities should ensure that the scope of delegated powers is clearly set out and easily understandable.
Gill Castorina is an associate at Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker (Europe) LLP
