The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed that the European Convention on Human Rights does not protect proprietors of registered land from being dispossessed by squatters: see JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom [2007] PLSCS 179.
The decision is the result of lengthy litigation that sharply divided the judges who dealt with the case. It concerned the legitimacy of our legislation, whereby squatters can apply to be registered with title if they can show that they have been in adverse possession of registered land for at least 12 years and that their rights matured on or before 12 October 2003.
The company took its case to the ECtHR because the squatter acquired title to the land before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in the
The Grand Chamber decided that Article 1 was engaged, but that it had not been violated. The company did not lose its title because of a legislative provision that permitted the state to deprive the company of its land, but as a result of the operation of the statutory limitation period that applied to actions to recover possession of land. The legislation was designed to regulate and control the use of land, and Article 1 does not inhibit laws that states deem necessary to control the use of property.
Under European law, any interference with the rights protected by Article 1 must strike a fair balance between individual rights and the public interest. The court weighed the arguments carefully and ruled, by a majority, that the existence of a 12 year limitation period was a legitimate measure, and that states are entitled to a wide “margin of appreciation” when implementing policies that they consider to be “in the public interest”.
The ECtHR accepted that, under Article 1, property owners that are deprived of property may be entitled to compensation. However, it held that this case fell into a different legal category because it concerned legislation controlling the use of property. The value of the claim was irrelevant. The company must have been aware of the limitation period, very little action would have been required to stop time running against it, and it would be contrary to require a party that had failed to observe a limitation period to be compensated for its failure to do so.
Property lawyers will welcome this pragmatic decision, which puts paid to the uncertainty that existed while these proceedings were being heard.
Allyson Colby is a property law consultant